G.R. No. 167304 August 25, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND VICTORIA AMANTE,
RESPONDENTS.
[PERALTA]
Facts:
Victoria
Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to
get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 in order to defray
seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which
she headed. No liquidation was made after almost two years and so on December
22, 1995, a demand letter was issued by the City Auditor asking respondent to
settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours from receipt of the
demand. Upon the recommendation of the Commission on Audit (COA), the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas) resolved to file an Information
for Malversation of Public Funds. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
found probable cause to indict respondent Amante and thus on May 21, 2004, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP) filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445
(The Auditing Code of the Philippines).
Respondent
Amante in her MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION dated November
18, 2004 stated that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said
criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying
a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases
where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher,
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The
Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case
against Amante for lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without
prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
Issue/s:
Whether
or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Ruling:
The
present case falls under P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249. Under
Section 4(a) of said law, the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to
acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among
others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not
devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively
enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same
law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By
simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The provision of the law shows that those
public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may
not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those
that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office.
In
the offenses involved in Section 4(a), public office is essential as an element
of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved
in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were
committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. Moreover, Section
4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It
simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary
Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.
The Petition was
GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. Consequently, case was REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings.
G.R. NO. 152574, NOVEMBER 17,
2004
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., PETITIONER,
VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
[PANGANIBAN.]
Facts:
Petitioner
Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as
Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility
for the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for
Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant
to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility
for said position.
On
May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21,
series of 1994 with Section 4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive
Service (CES). These positions require Career Service Executive Eligibility
(CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. But, this provides that
incumbents to CES shall retain their permanent appointment but upon promotion
or transfer to other CES positions, they shall be under temporary status until
they qualify.
Two
years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA
a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center
Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to
question the disapproval and was not the real party in interest.
Issue/s:
- Whether
the petitioner has the personality and the real party in interest to
question the disapproval of his appointment.
- Whether
the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994,
which deprived petitioner his property right without due process of law,
is constitutional.
- Whether
the CSC correctly denied his appointment.
Ruling:
A.
Personality and real party in
interest.
The
CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the
appointing authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the right
to contest the disapproval. While there is justification to allow the
appointing authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to
preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action. Aggrieved
parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration
or to appeal. On this point, the concepts of “legal standing” and “real party
in interest” become relevant.
The
question in legal standing is whether such parties have ‘alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ If
legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s
part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order
disapproving his appointment. Clearly, the petitioner was prejudiced by the
disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although petitioner had no
vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned.
Corollary to this point, he should be granted the opportunity to prove his
eligibility. He had a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which
justifies his challenge to the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.
A
real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. “Interest” within the
meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule refers to a
real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy;
or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general
rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
Although
the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely
affected by the CSC’s Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is
rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC
disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent capacity.
Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as
an approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a
permanent appointee.
B.
Due Process
Civil
Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and
regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC
deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the
Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet
this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
The
challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner’s ELM eligibility. He was
appointed to a CES position; however, his eligibility was inadequate.
Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of the position, which
in petitioner’s case was a Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE). The
challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in
the positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to
retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of
CSEE. Clearly, the Circular recognizes the rule of prospectivity of regulations;
hence, it is not an post facto law or a bill of attainder.
In
the present case, the government service of petitioner ended when he retired in
1996; thus, his right to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of
eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years later as department
manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the
eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
On
petitioner’s averment that he was not afforded due process for CSC’s alleged
failure to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged
Circular, is not convincing. The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a
quasi-legislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every
affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no
determination of past events or facts that have to be established or
ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
C. Whether CSC correctly denied
his appointment
Since
petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent
appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the
nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative
disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment,
merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In
sum, while petitioner was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC
Resolutions to the courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the position
he was appointed to.
The Petition was GRANTED
insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED insofar as it
prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as
department manager III of the Labor and Employment Center
G.R. NOS. 174730-37, FEBRUARY
09, 2011
ROSALIO S. GALEOS, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 174845-52]
PAULINO S. ONG, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[VILLARAMA, JR.]
Facts:
The
consolidated petitions seek to reverse the seek to reverse the decision of the
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioners of falsification of public documents
under Article 171 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Ong
was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu
on April 16, 1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and
served as such until 1998. On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments
to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the positions of Construction and
Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal
Engineer. In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered "No" to the question:
"To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?"
while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names
of relatives referred to in the said query. In the subsequents SALNs the said
query was either marked “No” or left blank by Galeos and Rivera. Ong's signature
appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath
when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
Ong
and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia signed a certification addressed to
the CSC Region 7 that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to
creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the
limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental appropriation of a
local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.;
Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on
nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section
81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied with in the issuance of this
appointment. The certification also states that faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements
was made in accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission
before the appointment was submitted for review and action.
Acting
upon a complaint filed by the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, the OIC-Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas filed criminal charges against petitioners for falsification
of public documents consisting of the SALN filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos
and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made
it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well knew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused
Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
Both petitioners said that they were not aware that they were relatives within
the fourth degree of consanguinity.
On August 18, 2005,
the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners guilty of the crime charged.
Issue/s:
Whether
the petitioners’ lack of knowledge of their relationship at the time of the
execution of the public document could exempt them from the criminal liability
of falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that
falsification of public documents by a public officer includes making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts. The elements of falsification are: (a) the offender makes in a
public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c)
the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the afore-cited
elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In
falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken
advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare
or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies.
The
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of falsification in the case
at bar. The required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves
merely a description of such relationship. When a government employee is
required to disclose his relatives in the government service, such information
elicited therefore qualifies as a narration
of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his
1993 SALN and left it blank in other years if he has relatives in the government
service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact
he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are
sisters). By withholding information on his relative/s in the government
service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering
that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would
have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to
Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which
specifically provides that no person shall be appointed in the local government
career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.
The
second element of legal obligation to
disclose the truth is also present as there is a law requiring it. Permanent
employees employed by local government units are required to file the
following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b)
lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
in government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d) personal
data sheets as required by law. A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8
(B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The
evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos' negative answer reflected in his
SALN is absolutely false. During the
trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied
having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were
executed. The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware
that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the
Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it
was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a
prominent public figure having ran and won in the local elections four times
(three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving
as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The
same thing can be said of Ong whose statement of having no knowledge of their
relationship as cousins is unthinkable being a resident of Naga, Cebu since
birth. Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject
SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false
statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding that Ong connived
with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government
service.
By
Ong’s issuance of the certification that the appointee is not related to him
despite the fact that they are, he was also guilty of falsification of public
document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took
advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the
Civil Service rules, is required to issue such certification.
The petitions were
DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan
AFFIRMED.
G.R.
NO. 155784, OCTOBER 13, 2005
CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, PETITIONER, VS.
RANULFO
P. ALBAO, RESPONDENT.
[AZCUNA]
Facts:
On
September 1, 1998, the Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines issued an original and permanent appointment for the position of
Executive Assistant IV to respondent Ranulfo P. Albao. Respondent was then a
contractual employee at said Office. In a letter dated September 28, 1998
addressed to the Director of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, Manila
On
October 5, 1998, petitioner issued an order that a prima facie case against
respondent for Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Documents by declaring
in his Personal Datasheet (PDS) to support his appointment that he passed the
Assistant Electrical Engineer Examination with a rating of 71.64% and attaching
thereto a Report of Rating purportedly issued by the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC). Upon validation with the PRC, petitioner found that his name
does not appear in their list and the examinee number as appearing in the
report belongs to one Bienvenido Aniño, Jr.
In
his answer on February 18, 1999, respondent contended that the CSC has no
jurisdiction over the matter since his appointment was disapproved, and he has
already resigned from government service since the closing hours of October 30,
1998. As he is no longer with the civil service, the Commission has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over him as a private person.
The Court of
Appeals decided in favor of the respondent.
Issue/s:
Whether
the CSC has jurisdiction to institute administrative proceedings over
respondent and whether the power of the CSC to hear and decide administrative
cases includes the power to initiate and prosecute said cases.
Ruling:
In
the case at bar, the following are the relevant provisions of the law which
will give light to the resolution of the issue:
1. Title A, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292
i.
Section
12, paragraph 11 on the Powers and Functions of the commission states that it
has the power to “hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. . . .
“
ii.
Section
47, on the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC provides that “The Commission
shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. . .” (par. 1). Paragraph 2 of the same
section states that “the Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction
to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
iii.
Section
48 provides the procedure in administrative cases against non-presidential
appointees which may be commenced by the Secretary or head of office of
equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.
2.
Article
IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution also provides that The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish
a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability.
From
the foregoing provisions of the law, it is the Vice-President who is vested
with jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action against respondent. However,
the court ruled that petitioner can act directly and motu proprio, on the
alleged acts of dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by
respondent in connection with his appointment to a permanent position in the
Office of the Vice President.
The
present case partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the
civil service system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary
actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on
administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its
duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect
its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by
removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications.
This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a
bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.
The petition was GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals, REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
G.R.
NO. 191771, MAY 06, 2010
LIBERAL
PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND SECRETARY GENERAL
JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR AND
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION,
ALLEGEDLY
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., RESPONDENTS.
[BRION]
Facts:
For
the first ever automated election system in the country, the COMELEC set the
following deadlines:
1.
August
17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of
political partiesl; and
2.
February
12, 2010 as the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation for the
determination of the dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten
major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010
elections.
On
February 12, 2010, the Liberal Party (LP) filed with the COMELEC its petition
for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the
Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a
petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized
and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010
elections."
LP
filed its opposition to the petition of on the grounds that NP-NPC is not a
duly registered coalition, the petition for registration should have been brought
to the proper Division and not the COMELEC en banc, the petition for
registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the Commission instead
of the Law Department in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
petition for registration was filed beyond the August 17, 2009 deadline; and the
respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the NPC separately
cannot be taken into account for purposes of accreditation as dominant minority
party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is an entirely different entity
On
April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPC's petition for registration as a
coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present case. In the same
Resolution, the en banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPC's application for
accreditation as dominant minority party.
Issue/s:
- Preliminary
issues
- Whether petition has to be dismissed
outright for technical infirmities.
- Whether present petition premature since its
object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue.
- Whether the NP-NPC petition for registration
is time-barred.
- Whether
the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction at first instance to entertain the
petition.
- If
with jurisdiction, whether it gravely abused its jurisdiction when it
allowed the registration.
- Was due process observed?
- Did the coalition take place as required by
law.
Ruling:
On
the preliminary issues on technical infirmities, the court ruled to be liberal
in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably
important to the coming electoral exercise. The registration of political
parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these
recognitions provide. To the public, the proper registration and the
accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party
representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small
measure to transparency and to the election's credibility.
While
the respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition,
their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and basic
correctness of these attachments. The court sees no resulting harm or prejudice
therefore if we overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the
counterbalancing factors considered above. The court further found that the
failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the
petition outright. Without any finally confirmed registration in the
coalition's favor, NPNPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a
personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. The
court found it sufficient that the NP and the NPC have separately been impleaded;
as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties
truly interested in legally establishing the existence of their coalition. The
court also ruled that the petition passed the facial objection test.
On
the issue of prematurity, the court ruled that there is absolutely no
prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event - the
accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place.
From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the
registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a
past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG
objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless.
As
to the timeliness of the registration, the court ruled that the NP-NPC's
petition for registration as a coalition is time-barred. Thus, the en banc was
wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition. Given
the mandatory nature of the deadline, the en banc acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond
the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political
parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline.
Political
coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures,
if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law
to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other
similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without
the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise
of their and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot
receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure
the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges
accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant
majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these
constitutional terms.
The
court ruled that COMELEC the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a
coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration
raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate
with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should
be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and
procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.
Petition GRANTED and,
accordingly, assailed resolution of the COMELEC NULLIFIED.
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