DIGEST/CHERRIE MAY BAES PANCHO/NESTOR JACOT VS ROGEN DAL/NOVEMBER 27,2008

G.R. No. 179848             November 27, 2008

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner,
vs.
ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents

FACT

Nestor Jacot was a natural-born Filipino Citizen, and on December 13, 1989, he became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. Nestor Jacot appealed to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. Nestor Jacot filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. On June 19, 2006, the Los Angeles Philippine Consulate General (PCG) was issued an Order of Approval of Nestor’s request. Nestor took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice-Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing the petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. On March 26, 2007, Nestor Jacot filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

On May 2, 2007, Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against Nestor Jacot arguing that he failed to renounce his US citizenship as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. On May 6, 2007, Nestor Jacot countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines was made before the Los Angeles Philippine Consulate General (PCG). The oath of Allegiance contained his Certificate of Candidacy as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On May 14, 2007, the National and Local Election was held. Nestor Jacot garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution to disqualifying Nestor Jacot from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, and for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.

On June 29, 2007, Nestor Jacot filed a motion for reconsideration for withdrawing the position of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles Philippine Consulate General (PCG). The Oath in his Certificate of Candidacy satisfied as a renunciation of Nestor Jakot’s US citizenship. On September 28, 2007, The COMELEC en banc to dismissed Nestor Jacot’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE

Whether Nestor Jacot is disqualified from running as a Vice Mayor candidate on May 14, 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

RULING

Yes, the court found that Nestor Jacot is disqualified from running as a Vice-Mayor candidate in Camiguin. Nestor Jacot’s Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before Philippine Consulate General (PCG) and his Certificate of Candidacy does not comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are the requirements to comply with different purposes. Section 3 of the Republic Act No. 9225 requires that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. The Oath of Allegiance stated the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Under Republic Act No. 9225 stated that Filipino has dual citizenship by reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

Under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 stated that the natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship: First, to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225; Lastly, for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code stated that the following persons who are disqualified from any elective local position are those with dual citizenship. The court stated the term "dual citizenship" vis-à-vis the concept of "dual allegiance." Nestor Jacot presents to the court in the Petition for Certiorari an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and any Foreign Citizenship,” which he executed on February 7, 2007, before he filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 26, 2007.

Nestor Jacot took before the COMELEC that he complied with the requirement of renunciation by his Oaths of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles Philippine Consulate General (PCG) and in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation. Nestor Jacot was guilty of negligence, and he believed that his counsel was inexpert. The court stated, Nestor Jacot took an action to discharge his counsel of insisting of the submission of affidavit on February 7, 2007, to the COMELEC, instead waiting a decision was rendered disqualifying him and the resolution issued to dismissed his motion for reconsideration. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If he or she seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he or she must owe his or her loyalty to this country abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

The instant appeal is DISMISSED. The COMELEC en banc is AFFIRMED. Nestor Jacor is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin on May 14, 2007. 

DIGEST/CHERRIE MAY BAES PANCHO/JULIET B. DANO vs COMISSION ON ELECTION (COMELEC)/SEPTEMBER 13, 2016

G.R. No. 210200, September 13, 2016

JULIET B. DANO, Petitioner, 
vs 
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARIE KAREN JOY B. DIGAL, Respondents.

MARIA EMILY D. DAGAANG, Petitioner-Intervenor

FACT

Juliet Dano was a natural-born Filipino citizen, who lived from the Municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol. Juliet worked as a nurse in the U.S and acquired American Citizenship. On February 2, 2012, Juliet has acquired a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the municipal treasurer of Sevilla. On March 30, 2012, Juliet took her Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles, California. Juliet went back to her hometown in Sevilla to apply for voter registration. After eight days of applying for voter registration, Juliet went back to the U.S and she stayed there until September 28, 2012. Juliet admitted that she went back to the U.S to sell her house in Stockton, California and she shares of stocks in the companies. On September 30, 2012, Juliet returned to the Philippines and she executed a Sworn of Renunciation of any Foreign Citizenship.

On October 4, 2012, Juliet Dano filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Sevilla. Juliet was the one who represents herself as one a resident of Sevilla for 1 year and 11 days from May 2, 2012, before the elections of May 13, 2013. On October 10, 2012, Marie Karen Joy Digal filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of Juliet Dano’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Mary Karen Digal was the daughter of Ernesita Digal was the daughter of Ernesita Digal. Juliet Dano and Ernesita Digal are the candidates for the mayoralty position in the 2013 elections. Mary Karen Digal argued that Juliet Dano had made a misrepresentation of fact in the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) and failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the LGC. Mary Karen Digal presented the following document: First, Certification of the Office of the Municipal Assessor where Juliet Dano had no real property declared under her name in Sevilla as of October 30, 2012; Second, Certification of the COMELEC Election Officer that Juliet Dano had no available voting record as of October 30, 2012; Lastly, an Affidavit executed by Ceferino Digal, a husband of Ernesita Digal’s rival for the mayoralty position.

Juliet Dano presented the following evidence to enact the fact of her residence in Sevilla: First, Certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Sevilla was issued upon Juliet Dano’s request on January 30, 2012; Second, Community Tax Certificate issued on February 2, 2012; Third, Application for Registration as a voter on May 2, 2012; Fourth, Philippine passport was issued on April 27, 2012. Fifth, Deed of Absolute Sale of parcels of land in favor of Juliet Dano was executed on May 18, 2012; Sixth, Affidavit executed by Tristan Cabagnot, who was then the incumbent punong barangay of Poblacion, Sevilla; Lastly, Affidavit executed by Praxides Mosqueda, a retired public-school teacher and member of the Parish Pastoral Council of Sevilla. Juliet Dano moved for reconsideration, and she argued that she had reestablished her domicile in Sevilla. On December 15, 2013, Juliet Dano received the COMELEC En Banc Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration and upholding the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy (COC.) Maria Emily D. Dagaang, Sevilla’s Vice-Mayor-Elect, filed a Petition-In-Intervention. Maria Emily Dagaang claimed under Section 44 of the LGC, and she was the who proclaimed as mayor of Sevilla in case of Juliet Dano’s Certificate of Candidacy were to be canceled.

ISSUE

Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Juliet Dano had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

RULING

Yes, the court resolves the issue, and COMELEC’s action violates the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable. The court is not obliged but constitutionally mandated to intervene. The court evaluating the prohibitive value of the evidence presented by Juliet Dano. COMELEC concluded that Juliet Dano to reestablish her domicile in Sevilla because she was absent from the municipality for four months. The court reminding the COMELEC that the proceedings under Section 78 allow to rule on misrepresentations of facts, not concluding law that contrary to jurisprudence. Animus Manendi et Revertendi is an essential requirement for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. The law does not require the physical presence to be profound.

In the Doctrine of Japzon v. Comelec, the Court held that to be considered a resident of a municipality, the candidate is not required to stay and never leave the place for a full one-year period before the date of the election. In the Doctrine of Sabili v. Comelec, the Court restated that the law does not require a candidate to be at home 24 hours a day 7 days a week to fulfill the residency requirement. The following evidence was performed by Juliet Dano of one year before the elections, or by May 13, 2012, which demonstrated her Animus Manendi et Revertendi: First, Juliet Dano made her intention to run for the mayoralty position. There is a preparation to qualify for the position, Juliet Dano went through the reacquisition process under Republic Act No. 9225; Second, Juliet Dano started to reside in an ancestral home, and obtained a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) during the first quarter of 2012; Third, Juliet Dano applied for voter’s registration in Sevilla. Lastly, Juliet Dano went back to the US to fixed of her properties.

COMELEC was misrepresent in disregarding the affidavits of the punong barangay and a long-time resident of Sevilla for not being "substantiated by proof."
In the Doctrine of Sabili vs Comelec, the court stated the certification of the punong barangay should be given due consideration. In the Doctrine of Mitra vs Comelec, the court stated that the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was reversed because the COMELEC failed to attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact render for Juliet Dano’s ineligible for the position of the Mayor of Sevilla. The court concluded that they cannot sustain the cancellation of Juliet Dano’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC). 

The Petition is hereby GRANTED.

DIGEST/ ALBERTINE DIN/ Tecson & Desiderio v COMELEC, 2004

Tecson & Desiderio v COMELEC

GR. 161434, March 3, 2004, J. Vitug

 

Facts:

            In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a. FBJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President. FPJ was born on August 20, 1939. Petitioners question his nationality on the following grounds:

-       FPJ’s parents were foreigners:

o   Besie Kelley was an American

o   Allan Poe was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish national.

-       Arguendo Allan was a Filipino, he could not transmit this citizenship because FPJ was allegedly an illegitimate child of an alien mother, since Allan allegedly had a prior marriage to Paulita Gomez

Respondent presented a certification by the Officer-in-charge of the archives division of the national archives that no available info could be found about the marriage of Allan and Paulita.

 

Issue: W/N FPJ is a natural-born Filipino.

 

Held: FPJ is a natural-born Filipino. 

 

           FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution adopted jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis of Filipino citizenship, that is, “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines” are considered Filipinos. As such, whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen depended on whether or not his father, Allan was a Filipino.

            FPJ’s father is Allan, and his paternal grandfather is Lorenzo Pou. 

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

 

 

Doctrine:

 

-       Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition," that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.

-       Four modes of acquiring citizenship: naturalization, jus soli, jus sanguinis and res judicata

-       Two modes of acquiring citizenship which could qualify as “natural-born citizen”: jus soli and jus sanguinis. But jus soli did not last long, thus, jus sanguinis is the primary basis of citizenship by birth

-       "natural-born citizens": includes "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

-       Jurisdiction of the SC to review decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases:

o   Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 

o   Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution:

§  “…any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

o   Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution:

§   judicial power is vested to the SC

·      includes the duty of the courts…to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

o   Par. 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:

§  SC, en banc, “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

HISTORY

-       Concept of citizenship

o   Civil citizenship (18^th c.)

o   Political citizenship (19^th c.)

o   Social citizenship 

-       No “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime. Only “Spanish subjects”

-       Royal Decrees that applied to Spaniards in the PH:

o   Order de la Regencia (08.14.1841)

o   RD of 08.23.1868 (re political status of children born in PH islands)

o   Ley Extranjera de Ultramar (07.04.1870)

-       1889 Civil Code of Spain: enumerated the Spanish citizens

o   Persons born in Spanish territory

o   Children of Spanish father OR mother born outside Spain

o   Foreigners who naturalized

o   Event without naturalization papers become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy

-       1898 Treaty of Paris:

o   Political status of native inhabitants to be determined by US Congress

o   Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.

-       Philippine Bill of 1902 (a.k.a. Philippine Organic Act): first use of the term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”

o   one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. 

o   The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 

§  1) a native-born inhabitant

§  2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 

§  3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1899

o   For children born between April 1899 and July 1902 (passage of the PH Bill), the principle of jus soli (territoriality) applied

-       1916 PH Autonomy Act (or Jones Law)

o   a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

-       1935 Constitution:      

o   Adopted jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis of Filipino citizenship

o   “Those whose fathers are citizens of the PH”

-       Law at that time: 

o   women were incapacitated from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children 

o   illegitimate children of Filipino mothers were required to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

-       1973 Constitution:

o   PH citizens include “those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the PH

Case Digest: Marie Beth Revilla / MARIALEN C. CORPUZ Vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 162214 : November 11, 2014

 

MARIALEN C. CORPUZ Vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 162214 : November 11, 2014

                                               

FACTS:

The Ombudsman's office released a Resolution citing reasonable cause against petitioners Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, respectively, the President and Vice-President of FILSYN Corporation, and many others. The complainants, as well as Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P. Belicena and Petron Corporation officials, were charged with violating Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2019 in connection with the so-called tax credit racket. But apart from the above situation, the Office of the Ombudsman has filed sixty-one related complaints against fifty public authorities and private citizens in connection with the issuing of tax credit certificates.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial.

RULING:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and a speedy resolution of the case against him was created to discourage civilian persecution by suspending criminal proceedings for an unlimited period of time, as well as to avoid disruptions in the administration of justice by requiring courts to proceed with fair dispatch in criminal cases. Only where the proceeding is accompanied by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays is the right to a timely trial and a timely resolution of a lawsuit denied. The question of whether or not an accused has been deprived such a right is not one that can be answered with precision. The expression "fast disposition" is a relative term that may be interpreted in a variety of ways.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) Length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.

No less than Section 16 Artticle II of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The judicial bodies envisaged in the said provision include the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The petitioners, as well as the other defendants, were undoubtedly prejudiced by the pause in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission of the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor's opinion thereon. The state was as well. The people have yet to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioners are guilty of the offences alleged. The court agreed with the Sandigan bayan's decision that, before resorting to the harsh punishment of withdrawing the cases without giving the complainant a chance to prove its argument, the Sandigan bayan should request the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor to clarify the delay in submitting his opinion on his reinvestigation under penalty of contempt.

DIGEST/CHERRIE MAY BAES PANCHO/PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PABLO MOLERO/SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

G.R. No. L-67842  September 24, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO MOLERO, defendant-appellant.

FACT

On February 5, 1976, at 9:00 a.m., Pablo Molero, Pacita’s father, told her to go with him to the Siaton River at Tamlang, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. The Siaton River is about a kilometer away from their house. Pacita and her father, Pablo wanted to catch shrimps and fish presumably to feed the family. Pacita Molero was the third among the seven children of Pablo Molero. Pacita went with his father, Pablo to the Siaton River was a secluded area in the mountain barrio of Tamang. As Pacita and her father, Pablo reached the river and while walking along its bank, Pacita was hugged from behind by her father, and she staggered and fell to the ground face up. Pablo fell too, and he was holding her daughter’s left hand placing it on her back while he knelt on her right arm. Pacita tried to struggle but her Father, Pablo takes out his harp bolo, which was locally known as PINUTI, and placed it along her side. Pablo proceeded to pull up her daughter’s dress and remove her short pants and panty. Pacita cried and says, “why are you doing this to me,” and her father, Pablo answered, “you shut up!” Pablo unbuttoned his pants, let out his penis and lay on top of her daughter, Pacita, and did the push and pull movement in sexual intercourse.

Pacita tried to kick her father, Pablo, but her father, Pablo again held the unsheathed bolo which was placed on her side. Pacita was afraid that her father, Pablo might do her harm with the bolo if she continued to put up in resistance and plan to escape. After Pablo succeeded in having sexual intercourse with his daughter, Pablo warned her daughter, Pacita, not to tell her mother of what happened otherwise Pablo would kill them. Pacita noticed that her father, Pablo did not proceed in catching fish or shrimps. Pacita assumed that her father followed her, so would not have the opportunity to tell her mother of what happened until three days later. Pacita decided to report the matter to her mother whether her father, Pablo will kill all of us because she could no longer endure what her father had been doing to her. Pacita’s mother told her to keep quiet as for the moment and they would report the matter to the authorities. Pacita and her mother were secretive about their plan to report to the police because the whole family knew that Pablo was quite a fierce man, a cruel husband, and a merciless father. On February 11, 1976, Pacita Molero and her mother went to the office of the Station Commander of Pamplona, Negros Oriental, to report the incident.

Pablo was also called to the office; he and his daughter had a confrontation before the Station Commander. Pablo was asked his daughter, Pacita. Pacita answered that the incident would happen if her father did not abuse him. The rape case was too serious for the station Commander of Pamplona to handle, so the complainants were advised to report to the PC Headquarters at Barrio Palanas. The complaint was investigated by Patrolman Arturo Adriatico Sr. who took down the statement of Pacita Molero and her mother. On February 25, 1976, Pablo was investigated by P01 Adriatico, but Pablo did not want the investigation to be continued because according to him this was just her daughter and her wife’s problem. During the investigation, Pablo denied the rape charge filed against him by his daughter. The trial court found that Pablo Molero was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Pablo Molero was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Pacita Molero, her daughter, the sum of P10,000.00 to pay the cost. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Pablo Molero was placed under double jeopardy

RULING

No, On March 22, 1977, the complaint of Pacita Molero was charged Pablo, her father, with the crime of rape committed on February 13, 1976. On February 5, 1976, and March 30, 1978, the two stated months were the same. Pablo Molero was originally arraigned on March 22, 1977, criminal complaint. The trial court pleaded Pablo Molero not guilty. Pacita Molero complained and testified that she was raped by her father, Pablo on February 5, 1976. In Pacita’s testimony, the complaining witness testified that she was raped by her father on February 5, 1976. The court granted the motion. The motion of reconsideration was filed by Pablo Molero. The court stated that on March 30, 1978, a corrected criminal complaint was filed. Pablo Molero filed a motion to quash the criminal complaint on the ground that he had been previously in double jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged citing Section 1(h) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion to quash was denied. After the arraignment, Pablo Molero pleaded not guilty, and the hearings were conducted is resulting in the conviction to him. Pablo Molero contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the instant case was filed, and he was brought to trial to answer for the crime of rape committed on February 5, 1976.

Under Article IV Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution stated that “no person shall be put twice in a double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Under Section 7, Rule 117  in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and one of the requisites in order that defense of double jeopardy provides “when defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.” The order of the trial court was dismissed the Criminal Case No. 2148 without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint or information charging Pablo Molero with the proper offense. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148 did not amount to Pablo’s acquittal.

The court stated there was no need to dismiss the case without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint. Under Section 12, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court applies when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense but not when an honest error of a few days is sought to be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of the accused. The prosecution in Criminal Case No. 2148 had already moved for the amendment of the date of the commission of the crime. The dismissal of the case under Section 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court was made only for that precise purpose. In the Doctrine of People v. Reyes stated that the judge relies on the change sought was from 1964 to 1969, a difference of five (5) years, which gap of five years as to defy approximation in the commission of the same offense. The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148 did not amount to Pablo’s acquittal. The order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. The court concluded the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is no second proceeding to speak and, therefore, no double jeopardy happened.

The decision appealed is AFFIRMED in all respects.

DIGEST/CHERRIE MAY BAES PANCHO/ROQUE VICARIO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/ JUNE 1, 1999

 

G.R. No. 124491 June 1, 1999

ROQUE VICARIO Y MENDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents

FACT

Roque Vicario was charged with libel by the Provincial Prosecutor of Catarman, Northern Samar, with Judge Proceso Sidro, as a complaining witness of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mondragon San Roque, Northern Samar. The crime was committed when Roque Vicario allegedly distributed and circulated in the local area of the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman, a photocopy of page 7 of the March 20, 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer which contained the following article1. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan graft charges against a Northern Samar, Judge Proser who pocketed the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a respondent in one of the cases pending in his sala. Investigation showed that Judge Proceso Sidro failed to deposit the cash bond with his clerk-of-court and refused to return the money even after Roque Vicario who filed the bond was acquitted in the case. Judge Proceso Sidro alleged that Roque’s act prejudiced his reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Roque Vicario disclaimed the responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article. The libel suit against Roque Vicario had filed a criminal charge for graft and corruption against Judge Proceso Sidro before the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint about dishonesty with the Supreme Court. It is an unjustified refusal and failure to return Roque’s cash bond of P1,000.00.

The court a quo found Roque Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of P200.00 with imprisonment in case of insolvency.  The trial court justified its decision by declaring that there was no evidence presented to show that Roque Vicario distributed copies of the news article to several persons that he gave one photocopy to prosecution Amador Montes which amounted to publication. The act was tainted with malice as it derived from Roque’s hatred, as evident from his testimony was delivered towards complaining witness Judge Proceso Sidro. 

ISSUE

Whether the distributing a photocopy of an article in a newspaper reporting that graft charges had been filed against Judge Proceso Sidro constitutes libel.

RULING

Yes, Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. There are four elements of a libel: First, imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another. Second, publication of the imputation. Third, the identity of the person defamed, and Lastly, the existence of malice. The evidence on record shows that the elements of a libel that was enumerated have not been established to conclude that libel was committed by Roque Vicario. The court stated there was no evidence to show that Roque Vicario was the source of the statements contained in the news item published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The appellate court disagrees, and they found out that the news item was chosen from the Affidavit-Complaint of the appellant imputing a criminal act on Judge Proceso Sidro filed with the Ombudsman. There was no factual or legal, exists for the ruling. The Affidavit-Complaint was a narration of the facts constituting the cause of action of Roque Vicario. 

The content never appeared in the news article which spoke of the filing by the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan of graft charges against Judge Proceso Sidro after the investigation of a complaint that the judge refused to return the cash bond of an accused after the latter's acquittal in a criminal case. The court stated there is no specific reference to Judge Proceso Sidro to his Affidavit-Complaint. It has not been established that he caused the publication of the article was the source and it would be inappropriate to conclude that through the news item he ascribed a criminal act to Judge Proceso Sidro. Roque Vicario disputes the existence of the elements of publication and malice arguing that since he was not the author or originator of the subject article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, he could not be liable for its publication. Roque Vicario argues the elements of publication and malice since he was not the author of an article in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that he could not be liable for a publication. The appellate court stated there was no evidence to show that Roque Vicario photocopied himself the article. The evidence mentioned proving that Roque Vicario distributed photocopies of the news item. The trial court rule as hearsay the testimony by Judge Proceso Sidro and his protégé Amador Montes. The prosecution offered other witnesses with objective dispositions than Amador Montes. The courts concluded that Roque Vicario was liable for the republication of the news article to be libelous.

Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code stated “every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” Under paragraph 2 of Article 354 defined as a privileged communication, the character is a matter of defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the accused. The prosecution failed to establish express malice on the part of Roque Vicario by positive proof that cause perforce failed. 

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar finding Roque Vicario GUILTY of libel. The decision of Court of Appeals is REVERSED, SET ASIDE and ACQUITTED of the crime. 

DIGEST/CHERRIE MAY BAES PANCHO/PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO/SEPTEMBER 13, 2000

G.R. No. 127444               September 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.

FACT

A small-town of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, there was a gun fire in a rapid succession Alex Vinculado  died by a gunshot and his twin brother Levi permanently lost his left vision. Miguel Vinculado, Alex’s uncle, was also shot. In Alex Vinculado's case, a lambasted tunnel through his right arm pierced the right side of his body and channeled in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. There are three criminal informations: First, for homicide and lastly, the two frustrated homicides were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, a Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and a bodyguard of the mayor. On December 14, 1993, the criminal charges for homicide and frustrated homicide were withdrawn. There was a new set of criminal cases filed against Mayor Honorato Galvez in the crime of murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Honorato Galvez was charged with violation of PD 1866 for the unauthorized carrying of a firearm outside his residence. It was the fourth piece of information that had to be filed. 

The venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. The fourth cases were raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar. Judge Jaime Salazar felt uncomfortable about the four cases that he wanted to preside. The four cases were re-raffled to Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89. On October 8, 1996, the decision on the four cases was promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. Mayor Honorato Galvez was acquitted in the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. Mayor Honorato Galvez was absolved from the charge of illegal carrying of a firearm, and the court found that the act was not a violation of the law. 

The acquittal of Mayor Honorato Galvez is strongly challenged by the Government before the Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the 1987 Constitution. The exculpation of the accused Mayor Honorato Galvez from all criminal responsibility by Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mayor Honorato Galvez believed that Judge Tirso Velasco deliberately and wrongfully disregarded the facts and evidence on record if judiciously considered, it would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The petitioner proposes that the gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court of a determination that a review of the case will not misbehave the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. The Court is not insensitive nor unconscious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether or not the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result intended is reversal of the acquittal of Mayor Honorato Galvez.

RULING

Yes, The Doctrine of United States v. Scott, the U. S Supreme Court the two principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, it is an appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge. Lastly, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminated the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal. The Court is not insensitive to nor unobservant of the nature and object presented by the Government considering alleged the new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. In the Doctrine of Wilson stated the Court expressed that the interests of these three protections are quite similar. In the Doctrine of Kepner v. United States stated, in the jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should be allowed to take the same directional course. The Petitioner urges the Court to take a second look at the Doctrine of Kepner, and it is being the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" In the Doctrine of United States v. Ball stated that the double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when an appeal of a conviction had been set aside.

In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, the petitioner insists that the Doctrines of Wilson and Scott have unquestionably the view of double jeopardy navigated by another Doctrine of Kepner and Ball. In the Doctrine of Wilson stated that the acquittal is possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial. It argues that the case at bar and in a review of the acquittal of Mayor Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial since the Court will only have to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused. The dismissal of the charges against Mayor Honorato Galvez was not upon his own instance. Mayor Honorato Galvez seeks to avoid trial, as stated in a Scott Doctrine and it is to be considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. The double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran observed in the doctrine of People v. Tarok stated there are not indigenous but a matter of constitutional. Under Section 20 of Article III of the 1935 Philippine Constitution stated "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, in Sec. 22, Art. IV reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. So, 1987 Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

The court agrees that the office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order the superior court may determine from the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded according to the requirements of the law. The scope and function of certiorari are found of those who relate to the right of the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. The petition seeks to nullify the decision of a judge acquitting the accused Mayor Honorato Galvez goes into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties. The testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location, and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. The act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. It becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

DIGEST/ ALBERTINE DIN/ Cruz v Enrile, 1988, G.R. No. 75983

 Cruz v Enrile, 1988, G.R. No. 75983

 

Facts: 

            Even until 1986, there were still around 157 civilians who were imprisoned by courts martial during the nine-year Martial Law. Habeas corpus proceedings were filed to question their detention.

 

Issue: 

1.     W/N courts martial have jurisdiction over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive or military process.

2.     If the civilians are released, can those who committed crimes still be prosecuted under civilian courts?

 

 

Held: 

1.     A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

2.     The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been committed, and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses.No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offensewould result from the retrial of the petitioners’ cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardyfrom attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution.