EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987 ]
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, PETITIONERS,
VS. SALVADOR MISON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, RESPONDENTS,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, INTERVENOR.
D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional
boundaries. In this petition for
prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to
enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for
stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether
prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's
right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the
petitioners have a standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed
the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in
intervention. Comment was required of
respondents on said petition. The
comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply
thereto. The parties were also heard in
oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it
involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the
Executive and Legislative Departments.
It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of
relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad
Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp., vs. Rodriguez[1],
that:
"The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves".
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative
department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and
provide.
Section
16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution says:
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress".
It is readily apparent
that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four
(4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the excutive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution[2];
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law[3];
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank[4] whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.[5]
The second, third and
fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President
with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments?
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. But we need not rely
solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well
as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups,
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of
Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
"In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)[6]".
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, it is provided that -
x x x x x
"(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
"(4) The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
x x x x x
"(7) x x x, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls x x x."
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that -
"Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General or Commodore, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices".
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. It is now a sad part of
our political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935
Constitution, transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of
"horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and re-molded by successive
amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with
hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution
and the other, in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to
state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck
a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to
the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers,
i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth
group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support
this conclusion. The original text of
Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
"Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments[7]" (Emphasis supplied).
The above text is almost a
verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935
Constitution. When the framers discussed
on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to
make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments
more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935 Constitution. Thus -
"Mr. Rama: x x x May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized.
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
x x x x x x x x x
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
x x x x x x x x x"[8]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the
debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed
and approved by the Commission. These were
(1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus
from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2)
the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence[9] of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the following:
"MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized.
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words 'and bureaus', and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain' to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is coauthored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed amendment is to delete the words 'and bureaus' on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive department, and to require further confirmation of presidential appointment of heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff directors, because the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervision of the staff bureau directors.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus' on Section 16. Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee?
x x x x x x x x x
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus' on line 26, such that appointments of bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors . . . . '
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments is approved.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized.
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28, I propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment, so that after 'captain' we insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter of fact like those of the different constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate is proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain', add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about: ‘AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENT REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide.
x x x x x x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved[10]" (Emphasis supplied).
It is, therefore,
clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made
by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
It is contended by amicus
curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII reading -
". . .He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint ... x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
with
particular reference to the word "also", implies that the President
shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second
sentence. In other words, the President
shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by
nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word
"also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the
conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the
word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too"
(Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could,
on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence
means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated
in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence.
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word "also" as
used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to
derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination
by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this
use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other
underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established, in
line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in
alien juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be
higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the
same Sec. 16, Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate,
the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely
underscore the purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers whose appointments
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the
first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to
the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable,
if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable
effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations
on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against
them. Such limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to
the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can
appoint, the intervenor Commission on Appointments
underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
"The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to
vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone,
this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to
be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked
officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, abovequoted, merely
declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of
the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not
impressed by both arguments. It is of
the considered opinion, after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word "alone" after the
word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is,
more than anything else, a slip or lapsus
in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935
Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 10,
Article VII thereof -
"x x x ; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." [Emphasis supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately
after the provision which makes practically all presidential appointments
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus -
"3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; x x x"
In other words, since the 1935
Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw
fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may,
however, by law vest the appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to
"officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987 Constitution) in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the
clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII. Consequently, there was no reason
to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone"
after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest
the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have
stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by
law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of
various departments of the government.
In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as
a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII
of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And,
this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments
where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the
President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. The original text of
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as "The Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines", which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
"601. Chief Officials of the Bureau. -- The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the proper department head."
Sec. 601 of
Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27
October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
"Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs. -- The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in
harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he
is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and Power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs, without submitting
his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention
should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., see brief statement.
Melencio-Herrera and Sarmiento, JJ., see concurring in a separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., see separate opinion.
Cruz, J., see dissenting opinion.
[1]
66 Phil. 259, at 264
[2]
The "other officers" whose appointments are vested in the President
in the 1987 Constitution are:
1. Regular
members of the Judicial and Bar Council (ART. VIII, Sec. 8(2);
2. Chairman
and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission (ART. IX-B, Sec. 1(2);
3. Chairman
and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (ART. IX-C, Sec. 1(2);
4. Chairman
and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (ART. IX-D, Sec. 1(2); and,
5. Members
of the regional consultative commission (ART. X, Sec. 18)
[3]
When Congress creates inferior offices and omits to provide for appointments to
them, or provides in an unconstitutional way for such appointment, the officers
are within the meaning of the clause "officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law" and the power to
appoint such officers devolves on the President. (USC, Const., Part II, p. 529, citing Op.,
Atty. Gen. 213.)
[4]
The 1935 Constitution says "inferior officers" while the 1987
Constitution states "officers lower in rank".
[5]
Example: Sen. Raul S. Manglapus was first nominated
by the President for the position of Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (an executive department). After
his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appointed him Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
[6]
66 Phil. 259, at 265.
[9]
The second sentence of Sec. 16, ART. VII of the 1987 Constitution refers to
what this Decision calls the second and third groups of officers appointed by
the President.
DISSENTING OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
The view of the respondent, as adopted by the majority opinion,
is briefly as follows: Confirmation is
required only for the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, to
wit, (1) the heads of the executive departments; (2) ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; (3) officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and (4) other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in the Constitution. No
confirmation is required under the second sentence for (1) all other officers
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and (2) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Neither is confirmation required by the third
sentence for those other officers lower in rank whose appointment is vested by
law in the President alone.
Following this interpretation, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs, who is not the head of his department, does not have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, but the ordinary consul, who is under his
jurisdiction, must be confirmed. The
colonel is by any standard lower in rank than the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, which was created by the Constitution; yet the former is subject to confirmation
but the latter is not because he does not come under the first sentence. The Special
Prosecutor, whose appointment is not vested by the Constitution in the
President, is not subject to confirmation under the first sentence, and neither
are the Governor of the Central Bank and the members of the Monetary Board
because they fall under the second sentence as interpreted by the majority opinion.
Yet in the case of the multi-sectoral
members of the regional consultative commission, whose appointment is vested by
the Constitution in the President under Article X, Section 18, their confirmation is required although their rank
is decidedly lower.
I do not think these discrepancies were intended by the framers
as they would lead to the absurd consequences we should avoid in interpreting the Constitution.
There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be
confirmed under the first sentence of Section 16, but that is not the provision
we ought to interpret. It is the second
sentence we must understand for a proper resolution of the issues now before
us. Significantly, although there was a
long discussion of the first sentence in the Constitutional Commission, there
is none cited on the second sentence either in the Solicitor-General's comment
or in the majority opinion. We can
therefore only speculate on the correct interpretation of this provision in the
light of the first and third sentences of Section 16 or by reading this section
in its totality.
The majority opinion says that the second sentence is the exception to
the first sentence and holds that the two sets of officers specified
therein may be appointed by the President without the concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments. This
interpretation is pregnant with mischievous if not also ridiculous results that
presumably were not envisioned by the framers.
One may wonder why it was felt necessary to include the second
sentence at all, considering the majority opinion that the enumeration in the
first sentence of the officers subject to confirmation is exclusive on the
basis of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. If that be so, the
first sentence would have been sufficient by itself to convey the idea that all other appointees of the President would not need
confirmation.
One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not
need confirmation, it was still felt necessary to provide in the third sentence
that the appointment of the other officers lower in rank will also not need
confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the President
alone. The third sentence would appear
to be superfluous, too, again in view of the first sentence.
More to the point, what will follow if Congress does not see fit
to vest in the President alone the appointment of those other officers lower in
rank mentioned in the third sentence?
Conformably to the language thereof, these lower officers will need the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while, by contrast, the higher
officers mentioned in the second sentence will not.
Thus, a regional director in the Department of Labor and the
labor arbiters, as officers lower in rank than the bureau director, will have
to be confirmed if the Congress does not vest their appointment in the President
alone under the third sentence. On the
other hand, their superior, the bureau director himself, will not need to be
confirmed because, according to the majority opinion, he falls not under the first sentence
but the second. This is carefulness in
reverse, like checking the bridesmaids but forgetting the bride.
It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the
Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers of the Presidency and so
prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship.
Among the many measures taken was the restoration of the Commission on
Appointments to check the appointing power which had been much abused by
President Marcos. We are now told that even as this body
was revived to limit appointments, the scope of its original authority has
itself been limited in the new Constitution.
I have to disagree.
My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the idea expressed in the first
sentence and simply mentions the other officers appointed by the President who
are also subject to confirmation. The
second sentence is the later expression of the will of the framers and so must
be interpreted as complementing the rule embodied in the first sentence or, if necessary,
reversing the original intention to exempt bureau directors from
confirmation. I repeat that there were
no debates on this matter as far as I know, which simply means that my humble
conjecture on the meaning of Section 16 is as arguable, at least, as the suppositions of the majority. We read and rely on the same records. At
any rate, this view is more consistent with the general purpose of Article VII,
which, to repeat, was to reduce
the powers of the Presidency.
The respondent cites the
following exchange reported in page 520, Volume II, of the Record of the
Constitutional Convention:
Mr. Foz: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7, line 28. I propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all' and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
Mr. Regalado: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
However, the records do not show what
particular part of Section 16
the committee chairman was referring to, and a reading in its entirety of this particular debate will suggest that the body was considering the first sentence of the said section, which I reiterate is not the controversial provision.
In any case, although the excerpt shows that the proposed amendment of Commissioner Foz
was accepted by the committee,
it is not reflected, curiously enough, in
the final version of Section 16 as a perusal thereof will readily reveal.
Whether it was deleted later in
the session or reworded by the style committee or otherwise replaced for whatever reason
will need another surmise on
this rather confused Constitution.
I need only add that the records
of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and are at best persuasive
only and not necessarily conclusive. Interestingly, some quarters have observed that the Congress is not
prevented from adding to the list of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments and cite the debates on this matter in support of
this supposition. It is true enough that there was such a consensus, but it is equally true
that this thinking is not at all
expressed, or even only implied, in the language of Section 16 of Article
VII. Which should prevail then - the
provision as worded or the debates?
It is not disputed that the power of appointment is executive in
nature, but there is no question
either that it is not absolute
or unlimited. The rule re-established by the new Constitution is that the
power requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments as a restraint on presidential
excesses, in line with the system of
checks and balances. I submit it
is the exception to this rule, and
not the rule, that should be strictly construed.
In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are
not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and
the Ombudsman and his deputies, who are nominated by the Judicial and Bar
Council; (2) the Vice-President when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and (3)
"other officers lower in rank," but only when their appointment is
vested by law in the President alone. It
is clear that this enumeration does not include the respondent Commissioner of
Customs who, while not covered by the first sentence of Section 16, comes under
the second sentence
thereof as I would
interpret it and so is also subject to confirmation.
I vote to grant the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I join Justice Isagani A. Cruz in his dissent. I agree
that the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should never have
any of its provisions interpreted in a manner that results in absurd or
irrational consequences.
The Commission on Appointments is an important constitutional
body which helps give fuller expression to the
principles inherent in our presidential system of government. Its functions cannot be made innocuous or
unreasonably diminished to the confirmation of a limited number of
appointees. In the same manner that the
President shares in the enactment of laws which govern the nation, the
legislature, through its Commission on Appointments, gives assurance that only
those who can pass the scrutiny of both the President and Congress will help
run the country as officers holding high appointive positions. The third sentence of the first paragraph -- "x x x The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards." -- specifies only "officers lower in rank" as those who
may, by law, be appointed by the President alone. If as expounded in the majority opinion, only
the limited number of officers in the first sentence of
Section 16 require confirmation, the clear intent of the third sentence
is lost. In fact both the second and
third sentences become meaningless or superfluous. Superfluity is not to be read into such an important
part of the Constitution.
I agree with the
intervenor that all provisions of the Constitution on appointments must be read
together. In providing for the
appointment of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Section
9, Article VIII), the Ombudsman and his deputies (Section 9, Article
XI), the Vice President as a member of cabinet (Section 3, Article VII) and, of
course, those who by law the President alone may appoint, the Constitution
clearly provides no need for confirmation.
This can only mean that all other appointments need confirmation. Where there is no need for confirmation or
where there is an alternative process to confirmation, the Constitution
expressly so declares. Without such a
declaration, there must be confirmation.
The 1973 Constitution dispensed with confirmation by a Commission
on Appointments because the government it set up was supposed to be a
parliamentary one. The Prime Minister,
as head of government, was constantly accountable to the legislature. In our presidential system, the
interpretation which Justice Cruz and myself espouse,
is more democratic and more in keeping with the system of government organized
under the Constitution.
I, therefore vote to grant the petition.
CONCURRING OPINION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I concur with the majority opinion and with the
concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento, and simply wish to add my own reading
of the Constitutional provision involved.
Section 16, Article VII, of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
"The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress" (Emphasis and 1st three paragraphings, supplied).
The difference in language used is
significant. Under the first sentence it is clear that the President "nominates",
and with the consent of the Commission
of Appointments "appoints" the officials
enumerated. The second sentence,
however, significantly uses only the term "appoint"
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. Deliberately eliminated was any
reference to nomination.
Thus, the intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude
the appointees mentioned in the second sentence from confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is, to my mind, quite clear. So also is the fact that the term
"appoint" used in said sentence was not meant to include the three
distinct acts in the appointing process, namely, nomination, appointment, and
commission. For if
that were the intent, the same terminologies in the first sentence could have been easily employed.
There should be no
question either that the participation of
the Commission on Appointments in the appointment
process has been deliberately decreased in the 1987 Constitution compared
to that in the 1935 Constitution,
which required that all
presidential appointments be with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The interpretation given
by the majority may, indeed, lead to some
incongruous situations as stressed in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Cruz. The
remedy therefor addresses itself to the
future. The task of constitutional
construction is to ascertain the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and thereafter to assure its
realization (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, G. R.
No. 21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413).
And the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent is
the language of the Constitution itself.
CONCURRING OPINION
SARMIENTO, J.:
I concur. It is clear from
the Constitution itself that not all Presidential appointments are subject to
prior Congressional confirmation, thus:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.[1]
By its plain language, the Constitution has intended that only those
grouped under the first sentence are required to undergo a consenting
process. This is a significant departure
from the procedure set forth in the 1935 Charter:
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain to commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.[2]
under which, as
noted by the majority, "almost all presidential appointments required the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments."[3]
As far as the present Charter
is concerned, no extrinsic aid is necessary to ascertain its meaning. Had its framers intended otherwise, that is
to say, to require all Presidential appointments clearance from the Commission
on Appointments, they could have
simply reenacted the Constitution's 1935 counterpart.[4]
I agree that the present Constitution classifies four types of
appointments that the President may make:
(1) appointments of heads
of executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and those of other officers whose
appointments are vested in him under the Constitution, including the regular
members of the Judicial and Bar Council,[5]
the Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission,[6]
the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections,[7]
and the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit;[8]
(2) those officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
(3) those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower
in rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone.
But like Justice Cruz in his dissent, I too am aware that authors
of the fundamental law have written a "rather confused Constitution"[9]
with respect, to a large extent, to its
other parts, and with respect, to a certain extent, to the appointing clause itself, in the sense
that it leaves us for instance, with the incongruous situation where a consul's
appointment needs confirmation whereas that
of Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, his superior, does not.
But the idiosyncracies, as it were, of the Charter is not for us to judge. That is a question addressed to the
electorate, and who, despite those "eccentricities," have stamped
their approval on that Charter. "The
Court," avers the majority, "will thus
construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how
the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in
accordance with what they say and provide."[10]
It must be noted that the appointment of public officials is
essentially an exercise of executive power.[11]
The fact that the Constitution has provided for a Commission on Appointments
does not minimize the extent of such a power, much less, make it a shared
executive-legislative prerogative. In Concepcion v. Paredes,
we stated in no uncertain terms that "[a]ppointment
to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of
discretion."[12]
Springer v. Philippine Islands[13]
on the other hand, underscored the fact that while the legislature may create a
public office, it cannot name the official to discharge the functions
appurtenant thereto. And while it may
prescribe the qualifications therefor, it cannot
circumscribe such qualifications, which would unduly narrow the President's
choice. In that event, it is as if it is the legislature itself
conferring the appointment.
Thus, notwithstanding the existence of a Commission on
Appointments, the Chief Executive retains his supremacy as the appointing
authority. In case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the appointing power.
It is the essence of a republican form of government, like ours,
that "[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction."[14]
But like all genuine republican systems,
no power is absolutely separate from the other.
For republicanism
operates on a process of checks and balances as well, not only to guard against
excesses by one branch, but more importantly, "to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government."[15]
Viewed in that light, the Commission on Appointments
acts as a restraint against
abuse of the appointing
authority, but not as a means with which to hold the Chief Executive hostage by a possibly hostile Congress, an unhappy lesson as the majority notes, in our history
under the regime of the 1935
Constitution.
The system of checks and balances is not peculiar to the provision
on appointments. The prohibition, for
instance, against the enactment of a bill of attainder operates as a bar against legislative encroachment
upon both judicial and executive domains, since the determination of guilt and
punishment of the guilty address judicial and executive functions,
respectively.[16]
And then, the cycle of checks and balances pervading the
Constitution is a sword that cuts both ways.
In a very real sense,
the power of appointment constitutes a check against legislative
authority. In Springer v. Philippine
Islands,[17]
we are told that "Congress may not control the law enforcement process by
retaining a power to appoint
the individual who will execute the laws."[18]
This is so, according to one authority, because "the appointments clause,
rather than 'merely dealing with etiquette or protocol,' seeks to preserve an
executive check upon legislative authority in the interest of avoiding an undue
concentration of power in Congress."[19]
The President has sworn to "execute [the] laws.[20]
For that matter, no other department of the Government may discharge that
function, least of all, Congress.
Accordingly, a statute conferring upon a commission the responsibility of administering that very
legislation and whose members have been determined therein, has been held to be
repugnant to the Charter."[21]
Execution of the laws, it was held, is the concern of the President, and in
going about this business, he acts by himself or through his men and women, and
no other.
The President, on the other hand, cannot remove his own
appointees "except for cause provided by law."[22]
Parenthetically, this represents a deviation from the rule prevailing in American
jurisdiction that "the power of removal ... [is] incident to the power of
appointment,"[23]
although this has since been tempered in a subsequent case,[24]
where it was held that the President may remove only "purely executive
officers,"[25]
that is, officers holding office at his pleasure. In Ingles v. Mutuc,[26]
this Court held that the President may remove incumbents of offices
confidential in nature, but we likewise made clear that in such a case, the incumbent is not
"removed" within the meaning of civil service laws, but that his term
merely expires.
It is to be observed, indeed, that the Commission on Appointments, as constituted under the 1987 Constitution, is itself subject to
some check. Under the Charter,
"[t]he Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission."[27]
Accordingly, the failure of the Commission to either consent or not consent to
the appointments preferred before it within the prescribed period results in a de facto confirmation thereof.
Certainly, our founding fathers have fashioned a Constitution where the boundaries
of power are blurred by the predominance of checks and counterchecks, yet amid
such a rubble of competing powers emerges a structure
whose parts are at times jealous of each other, but which are ultimately
necessary in assuring a dynamic, but stable, society. As Mr. Justice Holmes had so elegantly
articulated:
xxx xxx xxx
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.[28]
xxx xxx xxx
We are furthermore told:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [I]t will be vital not to forget that all of these "checks and counterpoises, which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens," [W. Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 56 (1908)] can represent only the scaffolding of a far more subtle "vehicle of life." (Id. at 192: "The Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere legal document, to be read as a will or a contract would be. It must, of the necessity of the case, be a vehicle of life.") The great difficulty of any theory less rich, Woodrow Wilson once warned, "is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is ... shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live." (Id. at 56.) Yet because no complex society can have its centers of power not "offset against each other as checks," and resist tyranny, the Model of Separated and Divided Powers offers continuing testimony to the undying dilemmas of progress and justice.[29]
xxx xxx xxx
As a closing observation, I wish to clear the impression that the
1973 Constitution deliberately denied the
legislature (the National Assembly under the 1971 draft Constitution)
the power to check executive appointments, and hence, granted the President absolute appointing power.[30]
As a delegate to, and Vice-President of, the ill-fated 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and more so as the
presiding officer of most of its plenary sessions, I am aware that the
Convention did not provide for a commission on appointments on the theory that
the Prime Minister, the head of the Government and the sole appointing power,
was himself a member of parliament. For
this reason, there was no necessity for a separate body to scrutinize his
appointees. But should such appointees
forfeit the confidence of the assembly, they are, by tradition, required to
resign, unless they should otherwise have been removed by the Prime Minister.[31]
In effect, it is parliament itself that "approves" such
appointments. Unfortunately, supervening
events forestalled our parliamentary experiment, and
beginning with the 1976 amendments and some 140 or so amendments thereafter, we
had reverted to the presidential form,[32]
without provisions for a commission on appointments.
In fine, while Presidential appointments, under the first
sentence of Section 16, of Article VII of the present Constitution, must pass prior
Congressional scrutiny, it is a test that operates as a mere safeguard against abuse with respect to those
appointments. It does not accord
Congress any more than the power to check, but not to deny, the Chief
Executive's appointing power or to supplant his appointees with its own. It is but an exception to the rule. In limiting the Commission's scope of
authority, compared to that under the 1935 Constitution, I believe that the
1987 Constitution has simply recognized the reality of that exception.
[4]
As Justice Padilla further notes, Section 16, of Article VII, was originally a verbatim copy of the 1935 provisions. Upon further deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, however,
the consensus was reached to
amend the same to its present form.
[10]
Supra, 3.
[11]
Concepcion
v. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599 (1921); Government v.
Springer, 50 Phil. 259 (1927); Springer v. P.I., 277 U.S.
189 (1929). The Supreme Court has
been vested with the power to
"(a]ppoint all
officials of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law"
[CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(6)] but that is by fiat of the Constitution itself. (See also supra, art. VII, sec. 16.). In Government
v. Springer, supra, we recognized the authority of the
legislature to appoint its officers but only as "an incident to the
discharge of its functions." (At 278). When the Constitution authorizes Congress to
vest in the President the appointment of other officers, it is not Congress
being empowered to make the appointments; the President retains his appointing
power, through, however, a procedure established by Congress.
[12]
Supra, at 603.
[13]
Supra.
[17]
Supra.
[18]
TRIBE, id., 184.
[21]
Buckley v. Valeo, supra.
[29]
TRIBE, id., 18-19; emphasis in original.
[32]
See Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor and Employment, No. L-58184, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 757 (1981).
CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court has deemed it necessary and proper, in consonance with
its constitutional duty, to adjudicate promptly the issue at bar and to rule
that the direct appointment of
respondent Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
(without need of submitting a prior nomination to the Commission on
Appointments and securing its confirmation) is valid and in accordance with the
President's constitutional authority to so appoint officers of the Government
as defined in Article VII, section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The paramount public interest and the
exigencies of the public service demand that any doubts over the validity of
such appointments be resolved expeditiously in the test case at bar.
It should be noted that the Court's decision at bar does not
mention nor deal with the Manifestation of December 1, 1987 filed by the
intervenor that Senate Bill No. 137 entitled "An Act Providing For the
Confirmation By the Commission on Appointments of All Nominations and
Appointments Made by the President of the Philippines" was passed on 23
October 1987 and was "set for perusal by the House of Representatives." This omission has been deliberate. The Court has resolved the case at bar on the
basis of the issues joined by the parties.
The contingency of approval of the bill mentioned by intervenor clearly
has no bearing on and cannot affect retroactively the validity of the direct
appointment of respondent Mison and other appointees similarly situated as in
G.R. No. 80071, "Alex G. Almario vs. Hon. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago.". The Court does
not deal with constitutional questions in the abstract and without the same
being properly raised before it in a justiciable case and after thorough
discussion of the various points of view that would enable it to render
judgment after mature deliberation. As
stressed at the hearing of December 8,
1987, any discussion of the reported bill and its validity or
invalidity is premature and irrelevant and outside the scope of the issues resolved
in the case at bar.
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