candelaria

Ma. Loumena A. Candelaria LLB-I

Andres Bonifacio College

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

(G.R.  No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

            20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.

            On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

            The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum- Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

            As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with             Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum- Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Ruling: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

GONZALES vs COMELEC,

G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

Facts: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3

i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can become delegates themselves to the Convention. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.Two cases were filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, tax payers, and voters similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend itsConstitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.

Issue: Whether or not a Resolution of Congress  acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution?

May  Constitutional  Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

Ruling: The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justifiable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review .In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are  at best,

Ututalum vs. Comelec

(EN BANC, G.R. No. 84843-44 January 22, 1990)

Facts: Nurhussein A. Ututalum and Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the 30 May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. 30 May was the date reset by the COMELEC from the 11 May 1987 elections.The election returns from Siasi showed that Ututalum obtained 482 votes while Anni received 35,581 votes out of the 39,801 registered voters. On 4 June 1987, during the canvass of votes, Ututalum, without availing of verbal objections, filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the ground that they “appear to be tampered with or falsified” owing to the “great excess of votes” appearing in said returns. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed Ututalum’s objections for having filed out of time. On 11 June l987, in Case SPC 87-180, the COMELEC resolved that there was no failure of elections in the 1st and 2nd Districts of Sulu except in specified precincts in the 1st District. On 14 June 1987, the Sulu Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Anni as the winner. He subsequently took his oath of office and entered upon the discharge of its functions in July 1987. On the other hand, one Lupay Loong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election of local government officials. This Petition was opposed by Anni. Ututalum was not a party to this proceeding. On 16 January 1988, the COMELEC issued, in said SPC 87-624, a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters “on the ground of massive irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable”, and ordering a new registration of voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988. Said Resolution was affirmed by the Court in Anni vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81398, 26 January 1988. A new Registry List was subsequently prepared yielding only 12,555 names. Ututalum’s pending petitions in the Comelec were dismissed. He assailed the Comelec’s resolutions before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the annulment of the list of votes constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation contest.

Ruling: Padded voter’s list, massive fraud and terrorism is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest. The subsequent annulment of the voting list in a separate proceeding initiated motu proprio by the Commission and in which the protagonists here were not parties, cannot retroactively and without due process result in nullifying accepted election returns in a previous election simply because such returns came from municipalities where the precinct books of voters were ordered annulled due to irregularities in their preparation. The preparation of a voter’s list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors, and such challenges should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should have made specific verbal objections. Furthermore, where the winning candidates have been proclaimed, the pre-proclamation controversies cease. A pre- proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point in time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy thereafter is an election protest before the proper forum.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC   

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts: Private respondent Atyy,. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Private initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing thepublication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest LawCenter, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco fileda motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issue :Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Ruling : Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self  executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or notthe petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

 

MOLEN, et.al. (petitioner) VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (respondent)

GR no. 150222, March 18, 2005

Facts: The Commission of Audit (COA) Regional Office No. VI, Iloilo City, conducted a special audit of the accounts of the Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD) for the calendar year 1995. In the course of the audit, benefits/allowances granted to the officers and members of the MWID Board of Directors in the total amount of P730,910.43 were disallowed under Notices of Disallowances. The disallowed benefits and persons held liable for reimbursement are as follows: (1) Cash Gift in the amount of P346,716.00 (2) Representation allowance (3) Rice subsidy (4) Travelling expenses (5)Medical/uniform allowance (6) Wreath and mass cards and (7) Family and group hospitalization insurance premium. The wreath and mass cards were disallowed for being unnecessary and personal in nature and the other benefits were disallowed for want of legal basis. The legal basis cited for the disallowance is Section 13 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768 thus: “Sec. 13 Compensation – Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diem of four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.”Petitioners contend that Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758, under which law they would be entitled to a maximum salary equivalent to salary grade 30 that allegedly exceeds the amount of the disallowed benefits granted to them. They assert that they are covered by R.A. No. 6758 since Section 4 and the last paragraph of Section 9.Petitioners then appealed the decision of respondent Director to the Commission on Audit. Although the COA noted that the appeal was not filed on time, it resolved the case on the merits. COA then affirmed the subject disallowances and the officials determined to be liable thereon should immediately refund/settle the same.

Issues: Whether or not the members of the board of directors of MIWD are entitled to receive the disallowed benefits in addition to the per diem allowed under P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. 768 and1479, the applicable amendments at that time.

Ruling: The Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act 6758) does not apply to petitioners because directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are prohibited from the management of the districts. Section 12 and 17 of the Salary Standardization Law speak of allowances as “benefits” paid in addition to the salaries incumbents are presently receiving makes it clear that the law does not refer to the compensation of board of directors of water districts as these directors do not receive salaries but  per diems for their compensation. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioners’ contention that the provisions of P.D. 198on the compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts are inconsistent with the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law. In the afore cited Baybay Water District, a similar contention was resolved, thus: “. . . The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not stop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors. More specifically, where there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. As already stated, P.D. No. 198 expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of  per diems, as determined by the LWUA  pursuant to P.D. No. 198, to directors of water districts. Practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.”

 

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Commission on Audit dated December 6, 2000 and its resolution dated October 2, 2001 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners concerned need not refund the cash gift, representation allowance, traveling expenses, rice subsidy, and medical/uniform allowance. But petitioners affected have to refund the amount of P4,660.28 for the family and group hospitalization insurance, and P4,810 for the wreath and mass cards.

Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr., petitioner vs.Commission on Audit et.al, respondents

G.R. No. 135913. November 4, 1999

Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a general audit of the transactions of the Lalawigan National Highschool,  Lalawigan,  Borongan, Eastern Samar. On October 19, 1993, the COA audit teamer ported that the acquisition of equipment amounting  to Php 80,000.00 was made through contract and not public bidding, which was a violation of COA Circular 85-55A and resulted in overpricing to Php 35, 100.00.COA Regional Dir. Santos M. Alquizalas recommended to Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) Arturo C. Mojicato file a criminal and administrative case against Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr.,as Director III, Conchita C. Devora, a secondary School Principal I, and Maria A. Alvero, as Bookkeeper.

Issue: WON   the petitioner and his two co- accused violated the COA Circular 85-55A  and  resulted in overpricing with respect to their made transaction?

Facts: Yes. The petitioner, Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr. and his co-accused violated the COA Circular 85-55Aand resulted in overpricing with respect to their made transaction. Based on  the  investigation made by the Commission on Audit (COA), citing COA Circular No. 85-55A (Amended Rules and Regulations on the Prevention of  Irregular, Unnecessary. Excessive or Extravagant Expenditures or Uses of  Funds  and Property, the report states, that the acquisition of equipment amounting to Php 80,000.00 was made through contract and resulted in overpricing to Php 35, 100.00. The term 'excessive expenditures' signifies unreasonable expense or expenses incurred at an immoderate quantity and exorbitant price. It  also includes expenses which exceed what is usual or proper as well as expenses which are unreasonably high, and beyond just measure or amount. They also include expenses in excess  into reasonable limits.

 

            Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate: January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente: CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:WON EO 220 is valid

RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No. 220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.

Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

PHILIPPINES, INC.,  petitioner, vs.  T H E     H O N O R A B L E   C O M M I S SI O N       O N       A U D I T ,       H O N O R A B L E C O M M I S S I O N E R       B A R T O L O M E  C. F E R N A N D E Z     and      H O N O R A B L E C O M M I S S I O N E R       A L B E R T O   P .   C R U Z ,    r e s p o n d e n t s .

Facts:  The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Sec. 8, PD 1956, as amended by EO 137 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments. It will be used to reimburse the oil companies for cost increase and possible cost under recovery incurred due to reduction of domestic prices.COA sent a letter to Caltex directing the latter to remit to the OPSF its collection. Caltex requested COA for an early release of its reimbursement certificates which the latter denied.COA disallowed recover of financing charges, inventory losses and sales tomar copper and atlas but allowed the recovery of product sale or those arising from export sales. Petitioner’s Contention: Department of Finance issued Circular No. 4-88 allowing reimbursement .Denial of claim for reimbursement would be inequitable. NCC (compensation) and Sec. 21, Book V, Title I-B of the Revised Administrative Code (Retention of Money for Satisfaction of Indebtedness to Government) allows offsetting. Amounts due do not arise as a result of taxation since PD 1956 did not create a source of taxation, it instead established a special fund. This lack of public purpose behind OPSF exactions distinguishes it from tax. Respondent’s Contention: Based on Francia v. IAC, there’s no offsetting of taxes against the the  claims that a taxpayer may have against the government, as taxes do not arise from contracts or depend upon the will of the taxpayer, but are imposed by law.

 

Issue: WON Caltex is entitled to offsetting 

Ruling: It is settled that a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.

 Technically, the oil companies merely act as agents for the Government in the latter’s collection since the taxes are, in reality, passed unto the end-users – the consuming public. Their primary obligation is to account for and remit the taxes collection to the administrator of the OPSF.

 There is not merit in Caltex’s contention that the OPSF contributions are not for a public purpose because they go to a special fund of the government. Taxation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue to support the existence of the government; taxes may believed with a regulatory purpose to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry which is affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State.

 The oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as it vitally affects the general welfare.

PD 1956, as amended by EO No. 137 explicitly provides that the source of OPSF is taxation.

Atienza vs. Comelec

Facts:

•Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1988 local elections obtaining a plurality of 126 votes over his nearest rival, herein petitioner Lou A. Atienza. 

•Following Sia's proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questioning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality.

•Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a total of 2,826 votes, a plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent.

•On April 12, 1989 the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856.19 representing petitioner's expenses in the election protest.

•Private respondent appealed the trial court's decision to the COMELEC raising as errors 1) the computation of the number of votes received by the candidates; and 2) the alleged award of "excessive damages in favor of the petitioner.

The case was docketed and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.• The COMELEC, en banc , issued an Order setting aside the preliminary injunction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality of Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal.

•However, following the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC's Second Division issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioner's appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the Commission's decision in Resolution No. 2494 declaring the election protest and appeal cases as well as petitions for special relief  arising out of the January18, 1988 elections dismissed and terminated as of June 30,1992.

•On January 28, 1993, respondent Commission en banc released its questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which states: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the dismissal of the appeal by the Commission(Second Division) for being moot and academic because of the expiration of the term of office of the contested position did not thereby revive the vacated judgment of the Regional Trial Court, said appealed judgment to remain vacated, not having been resolved on the merits by the Commission for or against any of the parties; and the judgment directing the protestee-appellant to reimburse the protestant-appellee the amount of P300,856.19 representing his expenses in the election protest, is hereby REVERSED, said judgment not being in accordance with law in the absence of any evidence of any wrongful, or negligent act or omission on the part of the protestee appellant to justify the award.

Ruling: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued its Resolution of January 28, 1993 reversing the lower court's judgment awarding damages to herein petitioner after it had earlier dismissed for being moot and academic.

•The Omnibus Election Code provides: Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law.

•Provisions for actual or compensatory damages under the law are embodied in various Civil Code articles allowing claims for damages under specific circumstances. Thus, Article 2176 provides: Who ever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi delict, and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

•Specifically, Article 2199 of the Civil Code mandates that: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

•Given this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the absence of the conditions specified under Articles 2201 and2202 of the Civil Code, or in the absence of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. It follows, naturally, that in most election protest cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or quasi -contract or a tortuous act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for election protest expenses against the losing party . This, petitioner has been unable to do.

•Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. That it was the intent of the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obligation.

PATRICIO DUMLAO,  ROMEO B. IGOT, and  ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,

petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980    

Facts:Petitioner Dumlao, a former governor of Nueva Vizcaya who has filed a COC for said post for the January30, 1980 elections, assails the constitutionality of Sec 4 of BP Blg 52 for being discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Petitioners Igot, a taxpayer and a qualified voter and member of the Bar, and Salapantan, a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo, assail Sec. 7 of said law:Sec 7. Terms of Office

Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials herein above mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980..... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.Sec. 4. ...Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.

Issues:1.If the petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities as petitioner Dumlao’s interest (he a former governor of N. Vizcaya who has filed a COC for the 1980 elections) is alien to the taxpayers’ suit of  petitioners Igot and Salapantan.

2.If petitioners Dumlao, Igot and Salapantan are proper parties to the suit.

3.Constitutionality of said sections of BP Blg 52.

Ruling:1. Yes. Procedurally, there is a misjoiner of parties and actions, as Dumlao’s interest is alien to the other petitioners’. There are also

standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, as held in People vs Vera (65 Phil 56 [1937]): the existence of an appropriate case; an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; an the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and the necessity that the constitutional question be assed in order to decide the case. This petition has complied only with the requisite that the parties raised the issue early in their proceedings; the other three criteria are wanting. Thus, Furthermore, Petitioner Dumlao assails BP Blg 52 as being contrary to the EPC and seeks to prohibit the Comelec from implementing it, but he is not adversely affected by said provision. There is no petition before the Comelec seeking to disqualify him, and his question is posed in an abstract, hypothetical issue.2. Igot and Salapantan cannot claim locus standi, even as taxpayers. Assailed portions of BP Blg 52 didn’t directly involve the Disbursement of public funds; even as election involves the expenditure of public moneys, they do not seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through then forcement of any invalid or unconstitutional law.3.Dumlao’s contention that Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 is discriminatory or contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is not well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although , as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons.

                On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office

 

from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new  blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that in equality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does itpermit of such denial

(see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966];Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc.,et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" Furthermore, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. It’s within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided that said qualifications are reasonable. Said portion of the law is hereby declared valid. However, second paragraph of Section 4 of BP Blg 52providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void , for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and an accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Challenged proviso contravenes this policy, it condemns before it is heard. No distinction is made in this provision between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty from one who is accused of such.

Lidasan vs. Comelec

GR NO. L-280892

Petioner: BARA LIDASAN Respondent: COMELEC

Facts: The Chief Executive signed the House Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790,“An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianat on in the Province of Lanao del Sur”.

Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato.(From Lanao: Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, andMagolatung and From Cotabato:Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,  Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). The Comelec,  prompted by the comingelection adopted the resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in Lanao del Sur.Apprised by this happening, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This events triggered the original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan now questions the constitutionality of the said Act.

Issue:Is Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a Municipality which includes barrios fromanother province. \

Ruling: RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID.1.)Constitutional requirement “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”. This provision imposes limitations uponthe legislative power. a.)Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogenous subjects.

b.) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. These were all not complied with because the title of the Act provides that it is “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”. The part which says “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects that it is just Lanao del Sur which is affected by the creation of Dianaton, wherein truth it also affects barrios in two municipalities of Cotabato. Therefore, the Court finds the title deceptive for the Act has actually two purposes , and those are : 1.) to create the municipality of Dianaton

allegedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanaodel Sur ; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao delSur.

            The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thus, the limitations on the provision of one subject in a bill and the requirement as to the languageof the bill were violated. Removal of the barrios of Cotabato included in the new municipality of Dianaton will not treat the defects of the Act and shall still render the Act unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent of the invalid portion