OMBUDSMAN V. SANTIAGO
(2007)
The facts are:
On July 27, 2000, the City of
Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay
183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00.
This was received by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B.
Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all
barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical
malversation, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against
respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828.
In a Decision dated May 22,
2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissed him from the service, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
premises considered, respondent CELSO R. SANTIAGO, Barangay Chairman of
Barangay 183, Zone 16 of the Second District of Manila is hereby found GUILTY
of the administrative offenses of DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE with the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE pursuant to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The issue for our resolution is
whether the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring government officials or
employees.
Section 13(3), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 13. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(3) Direct the officer
concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
At any rate, the power of the
Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been
jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada,11 we ruled:
The powers of the Ombudsman are
not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this
constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. (Emphasis
supplied).
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the
petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66744 are REVERSED. The Decision dated May 22, 2001 of the
Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.
CSC V. TINAYA (2005)
On November 16, 1993, Pastor B. Tinaya,
respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the
Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.
On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only astemporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards.
On the same day his appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of his office.
On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.
Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.
The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approvedrespondent’s appointment as permanent.[4]
Sometime between 1995 and 1999, then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was elected vice-mayor of Tabontabon, while her political opponent, Bienvenido Balderian, was elected mayor.[5]
On June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor Bienvenido Balderian. This prompted respondent to report the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII with a request to conduct an “on-the-spot physical audit” of the municipal employees’ 201 files. In response, the CSC scheduled an audit on August 3, 1999.
In the meantime, on July 5, 1999, respondent’s service record was released.[6]
As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled.
On the basis of the above report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999[7] recalling respondent’s appointment, thus:
On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only astemporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards.
On the same day his appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of his office.
On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.
Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.
The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approvedrespondent’s appointment as permanent.[4]
Sometime between 1995 and 1999, then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was elected vice-mayor of Tabontabon, while her political opponent, Bienvenido Balderian, was elected mayor.[5]
On June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor Bienvenido Balderian. This prompted respondent to report the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII with a request to conduct an “on-the-spot physical audit” of the municipal employees’ 201 files. In response, the CSC scheduled an audit on August 3, 1999.
In the meantime, on July 5, 1999, respondent’s service record was released.[6]
As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled.
On the basis of the above report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999[7] recalling respondent’s appointment, thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the approval of the
appointment of Pastor Tinaya as Municipal Assessor, LGU – Tabontabon, Leyte, is
hereby RECALLED for having been issued in violation of the law on nepotism.
On
March 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside
petitioner’s questioned Resolutions, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE,
and petitioner (now respondent) is hereby entitled
to his office as municipal assessor of Tabontabon, Leyte by virtue of his permanent appointment dated 16 November 1993.
SO ORDERED.”
SO ORDERED.”
This ruling is based on the Appellate Court’s finding that respondent’s original appointment as
municipal assessor on November 16, 1993 was permanent in nature,
although approved by the CSC on December 1, 1993 as temporary. Being permanent
in character, he enjoys security of tenure and cannot be removed from office
without valid cause. Thus, his reappointment to the same
post onDecember 1,
1994 was unnecessary or “a mere superfluity.”[10] Moreover,
respondent cannot be held guilty of nepotism as he was not yet married to the
daughter of former Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste at the time the latter appointed
him municipal assessor.
We
rule in favor of petitioner.
In Lazo vs. Civil Service Commission,[11] we held that “under the Constitution, the Civil ServiceCommission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.”
The powers and functions of petitioner are defined in Section 9 (h) of the Civil Service Law, thus:
In Lazo vs. Civil Service Commission,[11] we held that “under the Constitution, the Civil ServiceCommission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.”
The powers and functions of petitioner are defined in Section 9 (h) of the Civil Service Law, thus:
“SECTION. 9. Powers and Functions
of the Commission. – The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and
functions:
x x x
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter;
x x x
(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter;
In Mathay, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission,[19] we held that
the Civil Service Commission is empowered
to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and
that such power “includes the authority to recall an appointment initially
approved in disregard of applicable provisions of the Civil Service law and
regulations.”
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63051 areREVERSED. The Resolution No. 002470 dated October 26, 2000 and Resolution No. 010126 dated January 12, 2001 of petitioner CSC are AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63051 areREVERSED. The Resolution No. 002470 dated October 26, 2000 and Resolution No. 010126 dated January 12, 2001 of petitioner CSC are AFFIRMED.
HDMF V.COA (2004)
On November 29, 1996, the grant of productivity incentive bonus to the
HDMF personnel in the total amount of P5,136,710.91 was disallowed in audit under Notice
of Disallowance No. 96-006-101 (91).[4]The
disallowance was based on COA Decision No. 96-288, dated June 4, 1996, stating
that Republic Act No. 6971 does not apply to government-owned or controlled
corporations or to government financial institutions with original charters
performing proprietary functions, such as the HDMF.[5]
In a letter-request dated May 28, 1997, HDMF, through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Zorayda Amelia C. Alonzo, requested for the lifting of the disallowance.[6] Alonzo argued that Republic Act No. 6971 applies to the employees of HDMF since the coverage of the said law includes government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions, and the supplemental rules excluding it from coverage was issued after the HDMF had already granted the productivity incentive bonus to its employees.
In a letter-request dated May 28, 1997, HDMF, through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Zorayda Amelia C. Alonzo, requested for the lifting of the disallowance.[6] Alonzo argued that Republic Act No. 6971 applies to the employees of HDMF since the coverage of the said law includes government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions, and the supplemental rules excluding it from coverage was issued after the HDMF had already granted the productivity incentive bonus to its employees.
In
its Decision No. 98-245[7] dated June 16, 1998, the Commission on Audit affirmed
the auditdisallowance. It ruled, thus:
x x x x x x x x x
Appellant (petitioner
herein) further averred that while the Supplemental Rules Implementing R.A. No.
6971 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment and the Department of
Finance dated December 27, 1991, exclude from the coverage of R.A. No. 6971
GOCCs whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law (like
the HDMF), payment of the incentive bonus have been effected prior to the
issuance of the said supplemental rules. Simply stated, it is the position of
the appellant that the supplemental rules should not be given retroactive
effect.
The Commission finds the appellant’s arguments untenable. It must be noted that the grant of the Productivity Incentive Bonus was made on November 21, 1991 or after receipt of the advice of the Department of Budget and Management Undersecretary dated August 26, 1991 to defer payment of Productivity Incentive Bonus to all GOCCs/GFIs with original charters performing proprietary functions, pending definite ruling of the Office of the President. Despite the said notice, management proceeded with the payment.
Likewise, the issue as to whether or not GOCCs/GFIs with original charters which are performing proprietary functions are covered by R.A. No. 6971 had been resolved by the Secretary of Justice in his letter dated November 8, 1995, stating that GOCCs with original charter, being covered by the Civil Service Law, and not by the labor laws, are clearly outside the ambit of R.A. No. 6971.
The Commission finds the appellant’s arguments untenable. It must be noted that the grant of the Productivity Incentive Bonus was made on November 21, 1991 or after receipt of the advice of the Department of Budget and Management Undersecretary dated August 26, 1991 to defer payment of Productivity Incentive Bonus to all GOCCs/GFIs with original charters performing proprietary functions, pending definite ruling of the Office of the President. Despite the said notice, management proceeded with the payment.
Likewise, the issue as to whether or not GOCCs/GFIs with original charters which are performing proprietary functions are covered by R.A. No. 6971 had been resolved by the Secretary of Justice in his letter dated November 8, 1995, stating that GOCCs with original charter, being covered by the Civil Service Law, and not by the labor laws, are clearly outside the ambit of R.A. No. 6971.
Verily, the grant of the incentive bonus is contrary to the
Supplemental Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6971 issued by the Department of Labor
and Employment and the Department of Finance dated December 27, 1991, portion
of which pertinently reads as follows:
‘All business enterprises x x x established solely for business
of profit or gain and accordingly, excluding those created,
maintained or acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the
constitution or by law, and those whose officers
and employees are covered by the Civil Service(underscoring supplied).’
Moreover, the issue
raised by the appellant that the supplemental rules excluding GOCCs/GFIs from
the coverage of R.A. No. 6971 should not be given retroactive effect is not
tenable since the HDMF from the very beginning is not covered by the aforesaid
law.
Premises considered, the audit disallowance is hereby affirmed, and the refund of the amount of P5,136,710.91 granted as Productivity Incentive Bonus to HDMF personnel based on the provisions of R.A. No. 6971 shall be enforced accordingly.
Premises considered, the audit disallowance is hereby affirmed, and the refund of the amount of P5,136,710.91 granted as Productivity Incentive Bonus to HDMF personnel based on the provisions of R.A. No. 6971 shall be enforced accordingly.
HDMF filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied by
the Commission on Audit in
Resolution No. 2000-086 dated March 7, 2000. [8]
Hence, this petition.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner
raises three issues:[9]
1.
What is the applicable
rule at the time of the grant of the Productivity Incentive Bonus?
2.
Whether the Memorandum
from the Department of Finance signed by Secretary Jesus P. Estanislao dated
January 16, 1992 constitutes appropriate authorization for the grant of
Productivity Incentive Allowance for 1991.
3.
Whether the
Supplemental Implementing Rules are valid? If so, whether it may be given
retroactive effect?
In ADEPT v. Commission on Audit, docketed as
G.R. No. 119597, the Court sustained the decision of the Commission on Audit affirming the
disallowance by the Corporate Auditor of the productivity incentive bonus
granted to ADEPT (an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism
Authority) for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971. ADEPT v. Commission on Audit was
consolidated with four other cases, which did not involve the application of
Republic Act No. 6971. It was in the other cases, docketed as G.R. Nos. 109406,
110642, 111494 and 112056, that the Court enjoined further deductions from the
salaries and allowances of petitioners therein.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the audit disallowance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent Commission on Audit’s Resolution No. 2000-086, dated March 7, 2000, which affirmed COA Decision No. 98-245, dated June 16, 1998, is herebyAFFIRMED.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the audit disallowance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent Commission on Audit’s Resolution No. 2000-086, dated March 7, 2000, which affirmed COA Decision No. 98-245, dated June 16, 1998, is herebyAFFIRMED.
EMIN V CSC (2002)
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. He called the Head Civil Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be authentic, the signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to CivilService Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. The appointment papers of the same nature subsequently submitted to the Field Office were likewise forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil serviceeligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never issued to any one.
Two separate investigations[1] were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[2
Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. He called the Head Civil Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be authentic, the signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to CivilService Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. The appointment papers of the same nature subsequently submitted to the Field Office were likewise forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil serviceeligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never issued to any one.
Two separate investigations[1] were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[2
On
June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report[5] to the Chairman
of the Civil ServiceCommission. The CSC found that
there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner. On May
14, 1996, the Civil Service Commission in its
resolution decreed:
WHEREFORE, Martin S. Emin is hereby found guilty of Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the service including all its accessory penalties is
imposed upon him.[6]
Petitioner
is now before us raising the following issues:
I.WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THECIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES AGAINST PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS.
II.WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT ACCORDED
HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
III.WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND
TO DISMISS THE PETITIONER FROMSERVICE.
IV.WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE.[13]
Notwithstanding petitioner’s formulation, we find that the
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction
over the present case; and (2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due
process.
As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating Committee
that should have investigated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670,
now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999,
otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure.[20]
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
WHEREFORE, there being no
reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals and the respondent officials
of the CSC, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 30, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46549 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
OMBUDSMAN V. ANDUTAN (2011)
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. [4] On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF. [5]
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. [6] As government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. [7]
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. [8]
On July 30,
2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect
of Duty. [11] Having been separated from the service, Andutan
was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other
benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement
and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations. [12] ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:
I.Does
Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year after the
act was committed?
II.Does
Andutan's resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
III.Assuming
that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman's findings supported by substantial evidence?
THE COURT'S RULING
We rule to deny the petition.
The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory;
the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an
investigation a year after the supposed
act was committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by jurisprudence. [34] In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, [35] the Court, speaking through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is
the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer
v. Doblada, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218;Melchor
v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476;Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824
(2004);Floria v. Sunga,420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and
employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is
not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in our government
[Melchor v. Gironella,G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476,
481;Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
SEC. 20.Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsmanmaynot conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative
act or omission complained of if it believes that:
x x x x
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. (Emphasis supplied)
Conclusion
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMthe decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMthe decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)
Petitioner
Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the
position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal
on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by
private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations
with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision
of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of
his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had
not acted on his protest, Junsay went to theCivil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on
the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated
February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows:
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. In the
comparative evaluation sheets, the parties were evaluated according to the
following criteria, namely: eligibility; education; work experience;
productivity/performance/attendance; integrity; initiative/leadership; and
physical characteristics/personality traits. The results of the evaluation are
as follows:
|
JUNSAY, Juanito
|
- 79.5
|
||
|
VILLEGAS, Benjamin
|
- 79
|
||
|
LAPINID, Renato
|
- 75
|
||
|
DULFO, Antonio
|
- 78
|
||
|
MARIANO, Eleuterio
|
- 79
|
||
|
FLORES, Nestor
|
- 80
|
||
|
DE GUZMAN, Alfonso
|
- 80
|
||
|
VER, Cesar
|
- 80
|
It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
In
Luego v. Civil Service Commission,[1] this Court
declared:
The issue is starkly
simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter?
. . . . . . . . .
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
Whatever the reasons for its conduct, the Civil Service Commission is ORDERED to
desist from disregarding the doctrine announced in Luego v. Civil Service Commission and the
subsequent decisions reiterating such ruling. Up to this point, the Court has
leniently regarded the attitude of the public respondent on this matter as
imputable to a lack of comprehension and not to intentional intransigence. But
we are no longer disposed to indulge that fiction. Henceforth, departure from
the mandate of Luego by the Civil Service Commission after the date
of the promulgation of this decision shall be considered contempt of this Court
and shall be dealt with severely, in view especially of the status of the
contemner.
While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body, we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department and office in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even if the Commission may not agree with them.
The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil ServiceCommission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT.
While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body, we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department and office in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even if the Commission may not agree with them.
The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil ServiceCommission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT.
REYES V. COA (1999)
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC[1] Provident Fund
Board of Trustees, filed this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996,
as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the decision[2] of the Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowing the refund of the government share in the fund to the
employee-members, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.[3]
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees,
appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit. On October 12, 1995, the Commission on Audit denied the
appeal per Decision No. 95-571.[13] The Commission ruled that the
government's share in the Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and not
be given to the employees. It held that since the primary purpose of the
Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its discontinuance and dissolution,
then the employees were not entitled to the government's share in the Fund.
On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA Decision No. 95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on Audit denied the motion for reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236.[14]
Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not render illegal the distribution of government's share to the members. He avers that when TLRC made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested itself of the ownership of whatever contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money contributed to the fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the members. Upon the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged in the members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not only on their own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the Fund's pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to deprive them of the government share to which they are entitled.
We are not impressed. We deny the petition.
On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA Decision No. 95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on Audit denied the motion for reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236.[14]
Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not render illegal the distribution of government's share to the members. He avers that when TLRC made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested itself of the ownership of whatever contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money contributed to the fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the members. Upon the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged in the members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not only on their own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims that since the Fund's pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members' fault, then it would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to deprive them of the government share to which they are entitled.
We are not impressed. We deny the petition.
To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that
decision, orders of rulings of theCommission on Audit may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.[15]Under Rule 64,
Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the Commission onAudit may be brought
by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the
petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases
decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court
was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987
Constitution.[16] The judgments
and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to
this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.[17] Hence, a
petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any
order, ruling or deciThere is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members
of the Provident Fund acquired a vested right over the government
contributions. "A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency,"[19] As previously
stated, the government contributions were subject to the condition that the
funds would be used to augment the retirement and other fringe benefits of TLRC
employees.
What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissionon Audit.
What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissionon Audit.
PEZA V.COA (2012)
The Facts
The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include the Undersecretaries of the Department of Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Energy. Said Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity and were granted per diems by PEZA for every attendance in a board meeting.
On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españo issued Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2006-001-101 (02-06) to 2006-021-101 (01-03) on the following payments of per diems to ex officiomembers of the PEZA Board for the period 2001-2006:
|
N.D.
No.
|
DATE
|
PAYEE
|
TOTAL
AMOUNT
|
|
2006-001-101 (02-06)
|
7/26/07
|
Eduardo R. Soliman, Jr.
|
P
632,000.00
|
|
2006-002-101 (02-05)
|
7/16/07
|
Juanita D. Amatong
|
448,000.00
|
|
2006-003-101 (01-02)
|
7/16/07
|
Anselmo S. Avenido
|
162,000.00
|
|
2006-004-101 (01)
|
7/16/07
|
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz
|
45,000.00
|
|
2006-005-101(05)
|
7/16/07
|
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr.
|
56,000.00
|
|
2006-006-101 (05-06)
|
7/19/07
|
Manuel M. Bonoan
|
112,000.00
|
|
2006-007-101(01-02)
|
7/19/07
|
Arturo D. Brion
|
177,000.00
|
|
2006-008-101(05/06)
|
7/19/07
|
Armando A. De Castro
|
144,000.00
|
|
2006-009-101(02-06)
|
7/19/07
|
Fortunato T. De La Peña
|
904,000.00
|
|
2006-010-101(01)
|
7/19/07
|
Roseller S. Dela Peña
|
36,000.00
|
|
2006-011-101(01-05)
|
7/23/07
|
Cyril Del Callar
|
762,000.00
|
|
2006-012-101(03)
|
7/23/07
|
Renato A. De Rueda
|
48,000.00
|
|
2006-013-101(01-06)
|
7/23/07
|
Cesar M. Drilon, Jr.
|
811,000.00
|
|
2006-014-101(03-05)
|
7/23/07
|
Josephus B. Jimenez
|
336,000.00
|
|
2006-015-101(01)
|
7/23/07
|
Rufino C. Lirag, Jr.
|
63,000.00
|
|
2006-016-101(06)
|
7/26/07
|
Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr.
|
16,000.00
|
|
2006-017-101(03-04)
|
7/26/07
|
Rolando L. Metin
|
256,000.00
|
|
2006-018-101(01-02)
|
7/26/07
|
Edmundo V. Mir
|
124,500.00
|
|
2006-019-101(05-06)
|
7/26/07
|
Melinda L. Ocampo
|
104,000.00
|
|
2006-020-101(05-06)
|
7/26/07
|
Luzviminda G. Padilla
|
56,000.00
|
|
2006-021-101(01-03)
|
7/26/07
|
Ramon J.P. Paje
|
_____159,000.00
|
|
TOTAL
|
P5,451,500.00[4]
|
PEZA
now comes to this Court seeking to annul the assailed decision on the following
grounds:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7916, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8748
ALLOWS THE PAYMENT OF PER DIEMS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
THE EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THE PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS SHOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED TO REFUND THE PER DIEMS ALREADY RECEIVED BECAUSE THEY WERE OF THE HONEST BELIEF THAT THEY WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE SAME.[16]
THE EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS OF THE PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS SHOULD NO LONGER BE REQUIRED TO REFUND THE PER DIEMS ALREADY RECEIVED BECAUSE THEY WERE OF THE HONEST BELIEF THAT THEY WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE SAME.[16]
The Issues
Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex officio members of its Board? And if there is no legal basis, was there good faith in PEZA’s grant and the ex officio members’ receipt of the per diems?
Our Ruling
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board, including their representatives, has already been settled by no less than the Court En Banc in the case of Bitonio, Jr.where we held that the amendatory law, R.A. No. 8748, purposely deleted the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7916 that authorized the grant of per diems to PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription laid down in the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, in light of
the foregoing, the present petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
COA Decision No. 2009-081 dated September 15, 2009 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
OMBUDSMAN V. SANTIAGO (2007)
The facts are:
On July 27, 2000, the City of
Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay
183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00.
This was received by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B.
Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all
barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical
malversation, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against
respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828.
n a Decision dated May 22,
2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and dismissed him from the service, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
premises considered, respondent CELSO R. SANTIAGO, Barangay Chairman of
Barangay 183, Zone 16 of the Second District of Manila is hereby found GUILTY
of the administrative offenses of DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE with the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE pursuant to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The issue for our resolution is whether the Ombudsman has the power to
dismiss erring government officials or employees.
At any rate, the power of the
Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been jurisprudentially
settled. In Estarija v. Ranada,11 we ruled:
The powers of the Ombudsman are
not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this
constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has
the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. (Emphasis
supplied).
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the
petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66744 are REVERSED. The Decision dated May 22, 2001 of the
Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.
OMBUDSMAN V. MADRIAGA
(2006)
The factual antecedents of the
case are as follows:
By letter-complaint1 of September 8, 2000 filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, the San Juan School Club (the Club), through its
president Teresa Nuque (Teresa), charged respondents with violation of Section
1 of Rule IV2 and Section 1 of Rule VI3 of the Rules Implementing Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.
After respondents had given
their side of the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Acuña, by
Decision of May 28, 2001, found respondents guilty of violation of Section 5(a)
of R.A. No. 6713 reading:
SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and
Employees. – In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and
requests. – All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working days
from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of
communications sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken
on the request (Emphasis supplied),
and imposed upon them the
penalty of reprimand.
By Memorandum Order dated June
28, 2001, however, Graft Investigation Officer Julita Calderon "set
aside" Helen Acuña's decision, the former finding that respondents were
guilty also of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension. Thus Julita
Calderon's order disposed:
WHEREFORE,
foregoing premises being considered and there being substantial evidence to
establish the guilt of respondent GERTRUDES MADRIAGA for violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 for not promptly responding to the
letter request of the complainant for copies of the school canteen's financial
statements for the period from February to August 2000 and against respondents
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO for [C]onduct
Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service under Section 22(t) of Rule XIV, of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is hereby imposed as against both
these respondents.
Accordingly,
the Decision dated May 28, 2001 of GIO Acuña is therefore SET ASIDE.
Finding the issues that called
for resolution in the petition to be
A.
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials; and
B. What
is the nature of the functions of the Ombudsman as envisioned by the
Fundamental Law,7
The word "recommend"
in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
In fine, petitioner's authority
to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.
WHEREFORE, the
challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be
remanded to the office of origin, Office of the Ombudsman, for appropriate
action consistent with the ruling in this case.
SO ORDERED.
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