expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare. 14 It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 15 Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. 16 The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. 17 Thus, our own Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 18 Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses 19 act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, 20 the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila vs.Chinese Community of Manila we said: 21

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Gal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law. 22

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law. 23 In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it is directly exercised by the national legislature. 24

The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with by the local government unit concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 25

xxx

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 27

Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

xxx

The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more apparent than real, in Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 29 which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 135087             March 14, 2000
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use

Eminent domain is the power of the State to take private property for public use.³ It is an inherent power of State as it is a power necessary for the State’s existence; it is a power the State cannot do without.⁴ As an inherent power, it does not need at all to be embodied in the Constitution; if it is mentioned at all, it is solely for purposes of limiting what is otherwise an unlimited power. The limitation is found in the Bill of Rights⁵ – that part of the Constitution whose provisions all aim at the protection of individuals against the excessive exercise of governmental powers.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution (which reads "No private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.") provides two essential limitations to the power of eminent domain, namely, that (1) the purpose of taking must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the private property.

It is not accidental that Section 9 specifies that compensation should be "just" as the safeguard is there to ensure a balance – property is not to be taken for public use at the expense of private interests; the public, through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is taken, value for value.

Nor is it accidental that the Bill of Rights is interpreted liberally in favor of the individual and strictly against the government. The protection of the individual is the reason for the Bill of Rights’ being; to keep the exercise of the powers of government within reasonable bounds is what it seeks.⁶

The concept of "just compensation" is not new to Philippine constitutional law,⁷ but is not original to the Philippines; it is a transplant from the American Constitution.⁸ It found fertile application in this country particularly in the area of agrarian reform where the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers has been equated to the "public use" that the Constitution requires. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,⁹ a valuation case under our agrarian reform law, this Court had occasion to state:

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.¹⁰ [Emphasis supplied.]

EN BANC

G.R. No. 164195               October 12, 2010

APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.

These consolidated petitions under consideration essentially assail the failure and/or refusal of respondent Congress of the Philippines (the Congress), composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, to convene in joint session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No. 216 issued on May 23, 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte). Through Proclamation No. 216, President Duterte declared a state of martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days effective from the date of the proclamation's issuance.In the Petition for Mandamus of Alexander A. Padilla (Padilla), Rene A.V. Saguisag (Saguisag), Christian S. Monsod (Monsod), Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Rosales), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), and Senator Leila M. De Lima (Senator De Lima), filed on June 6, 2017 and docketed as G.R. No. 231671 (the Padilla Petition), petitioners seek a ruling from the Court directing the Congress to convene in joint session to deliberate on Presidential Proclamation No. 216, and to vote thereon.^[1]

^{x x x x}

We now come to the crux of the present petitions - the issue of whether or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, it is mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or any part thereof.

The Court answers in the negative. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension.

By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress. is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution fully reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)

Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the Commander-in-Chief clause in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution vests on the President, as Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces,^[66] in recognition that the President, as Chief Executive, has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.^[67] However, to safeguard against possible abuse by the President of the exercise of his power to proclaim martial law and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the 1987 Constitution, through the same provision, institutionalized checks and balances on the President's power through the two other co-equal and independent branches of government, i.e., the Congress and the Judiciary. In particular, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requires the President to submit a report to the Congress after his proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and grants the Congress the power to revoke, as well as extend, the proclamation and/or suspension; and vests upon the Judiciary the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis tor such proclamation and/or suspension.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 ]

ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, RENE B. GOROSPE, AND SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, PETITIONERS, VS. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AS REPRESENTED BY HOUSE SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS.

fundamental principle in constitutional construction

o interpret the foregoing provision, petitioners adamantly assert that the language of the Constitution should prevail; that the primary method of interpreting it is to seek the ordinary meaning of the words used in its provisions. They rely on rulings of this Court, such as the following:

“The fundamental principle in constitutional construction however is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.”^[32]

Very recently, in Francisco v. The House of Representatives,^[33] this Court indeed had the occasion to reiterate the well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

“First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. x x x.

x x x                    x x x                 x x x

“Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. x x x.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 127882, December 01, 2004 ]

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Ratio legis est anima

It is a consecrated legal axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the law. Ratio legis est anima, which means the reason of the law is its soul.1 The reason of a law may cease in a given situation. This may happen when the purpose of the law sought to be achieved is accomplished, or the mischief sought to be repressed is prevented, by an act or event independent of the statute itself. The law, in such a case, though remaining in force and effect, finds no application in the given situation.2

doctrine of operative fact

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.55 Hence, any act of the government or of a public official or employee which is contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void.

As to the effect of the Court’s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.56 This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,57the Court explained:

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.1âwphi1 It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.

Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is not written therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article

VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Verba legis non est recedendum

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.33 Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.34

The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;35 and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. 36

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter.38 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.39 In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202242               July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.⁹ As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."¹⁰

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400               October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

Ratio legis est anima legis (Jenk. Cent. 45), the reason of law is the soul of law.

ut res magis valeat quam pereat.. It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void.

"The primary rule of construction has been expressed by the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat or as paraphrased in English, a deed shall never be void where the words may be applied to any extent to make it good....

"Every effort should be made by a Court to find a meaning, looking at substance and not mere form, and that difficulties in interpretation do not make a clause bad as not being capable of interpretation, so long as a definite meaning can properly be extracted. In other words, every clause in a contract must, if possible, be given effect to.

"If the real intentions of the parties can be collected from the language within the four corners of the instrument, the Court must give effect to such intentions by supplying anything necessarily to be inferred and rejecting whatever is repugnant to such real intentions so ascertained....

"If I can possibly derive a sensible meaning from the clause I must do so. At the same time I must not develop from the words of the clause (read in their context) any conception more elaborate than they express or fairly imply; nor must I develop something which is at variance with any of the language of the clause."

a liberal construction shall be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties....

"In the case of an agreement, also, the Courts are bound so to construe it, ut res magis valeat quam pereat - so that it may be made to operate rather than be inefficient; and, in order to effect this, the words used shall have a reasonable intendment and construction.

undue haste in declaring a law unconstitutional

R.A. No. 8050,^[1] entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,"otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100^[2] and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,^[3] which were respectively approved by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference Committee.^[4] The Reconciled Bill^[5] was then separately ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives^[6] and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995.

On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.^[7] As grounds for their petition, the private respondents alleged that:

1.  There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel, thereby derogating the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent;

2.  R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law in that it authorizes optometrists to engage in acts of practice within the zone of medical practice through permitted use in certain kinds of diagnostic pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of the services of optometrists to definite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment of vision, resultant blindness, or possible loss of life;

3.  R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power when it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of eight years and a fine not exceeding P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to said law;

4.  R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and

5.  R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.

tHIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996 ]

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, DR. PRIMITIVA Y. PEREZ-SISON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER, HERMOGENES P. POBRE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DR. HILARION M. RAMIRO, BUREAU OF FOODS AND DRUGS, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, DR. QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., AND BUREAU OF HIGHER EDUCATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, MONA D. VALISNO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANGEL B. COLET, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 29, ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, MIGUEL P. ACEBEDO, OPTOMETRY PRACTITIONERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (OPAP), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. MIRIAM F. LLAVE, CENEVIS OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION (COA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ROBERTO RODIS, JR., ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM OPTOMETRIST (ACMO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. CYRIL CORALES, SOUTHERN MINDANAO OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., INC. (SMOAP), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ELMER VILLAROSA, AND REPUBLICA A. PANOL, NO. 9 GEN. MALVAR ST., ARANETA CENTER, CUBAO, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS. 

PURPOSEFUL HESITATION: In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.^[5]

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 112497, August 04, 1994 ]

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS. 

Probation qualifications: multiple offenses in single proceeding

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code,^[16] and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 108747, April 06, 1995 ]

PABLO C. FRANCISCO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, RESPONDENTS.