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LAMBINO vs. COMELEC, G.R. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735”). The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. In 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUE(s):

a.) Was Lambino Group’s initiative for amendments or revisions of the Constitution?

b.) Did the Lambino Group comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative?

c.) Is there a need to re-visit Santiago vs. Comelec?

RULING:

The majority of the court ruled that there is no merit to the petition.
a.) Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.

b.) The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The LambinoGroup's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."

c.) A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.

TECSON vs. COMELEC, GR No. 16134, March 3, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. they asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING:

No. the examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13 and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,” promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the “President” or ”Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office. In such context, the election context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

LAUREL V vs. CSC, GR No. 71562, October 28, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel o promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as “primarily confidential” pursuant to P.D. No. 868.

ISSUE:

Does nepotism apply to designation?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service. Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Sections 49 of P.D. No. 807does not suggest the designation should be differentiated from appointment.   Reading the section with Section 25of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill up because it is vacant, is necessary included in the appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose.

CSC vs. ANDAL, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009

FACTS:

Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:

Does the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?

RULING:

The instant petition is DENIED. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, thus:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him.

DESIERTO vs. CARANDANG, G.R. No. 148076, January 11, 2011

FACTS:

Antonio Carandang is the general manager if the television network RPN. In his tenure, he was charged with grave misconduct before the Ombudsman. The charge says that he had entered into a contract with AT Broadcasting Incorporated in which he had financial and material interests. The said transaction is tantamount to grave misconduct under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
In this said petition, Carandang challenges the jurisdiction over him of the of the Ombudsman and of the Sandiganbayan on the ground that he was being held to account for acts committed while he was serving as general manager and chief operating officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), which was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation; hence, he was not a public official or employee.

ISSUE:

As general manager and chief operating officer of Radio Philippines Network, Inc. does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over Carandang?

RULING:

The Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over administrative cases committed “exclusively” by the officials and employees if government owned and gov’t controlled corporations(in which a government directly or indirectly owns or controls at least majority or 51% share of the capital stock. Consequently, RPN is neither a government owned or controlled corporation. The government may have shares in RPN’s capital stock but it is only 32.4%. In conclusion, the petition is meritorious and Carandang is correct that the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan have no jurisdiction over him for being an employee of a private company.

OMBUDSMAN vs. CSC, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007

FACTS:

The Court is called upon to settle once again a controversy between two independent constitutional bodies and delineate the limits of their respective powers. In the exercise of its mandate, this Court reaffirms its commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of law. The controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo’s letter dated July 28, 2003 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standards for Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman. Acting thereon, the CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 dated January 23, 2004 disapproving the request.

ISSUE:

What is the extent of CSC’s power of the personnel organization, staffing and qualification over the employees of the Ombudsman?

RULING:

Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. As a guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office. To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been vested with the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office. This includes the authority to organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure and staffing pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and establish the qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services of the Office. This must be so if the constitutional intent to establish an independent Office of the Ombudsman is to remain meaningful and significant. Since the responsibility for the establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency, especially in a case like this in which an independent constitutional body is involved.

OMBUDSMAN vs. SAMANIEGO, G.R.  No. 175573, Oct. 5, 2010

FACTS:

This is a resolution of the second motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman to our decision dated September 11, 2008, particularly a pronouncement with respect to the stay of the decision of the Ombudsman during the pendency of an appeal:
Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, the court held that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity. The execution of petitioner’s joint decision against respondent should be stayed during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.

ISSUE:

Is the Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year immediately executor pending appeal?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled, “The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of the appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.” An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to “promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties” and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 15: Ill-gotten Wealth and Prescription

BSP vs. COA, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011

FACTS:

The COA issued a resolution in 1999 defining its policy with respect to the audit of theBoy Scouts of the Philippine, which was created as a public corporation and that in BSP vs.NLRC, the SC ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a GOCC within themeaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the BSP is regarded as a governmentinstrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit supervision, the BSPshall be classified among the government corporations to be audited by employing the teamaudit approach. The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed bythen BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE(s):

a.) Is CA. no. 111, as amended by R.A. 7278 constitutional and consistent with section 16, Article XII of the constitution?

b.) Does the test of economic viability apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions?

RULING:

a.) Yes. The BSP (CA no. 111, as amended by RA 7278) is a public corporation or a government agencyor instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutionalprohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be consideredprivate corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations or charteredinstitutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations aretreated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to thetests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to theirpublic purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrativerelationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

b.) No. Section 16, Article XII deals with “the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations,” which should be done through a general law enacted by Congress, provides for an exception that is: if the corporation is government owned or controlled; its creation is in the interest of the common good; and it meets the test of economic viability. The rationale behind Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution was explained in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,Art. XII, Sec. 16 bans the creation of private corporations by special law, however saidconstitutional provision should not be construed so as to prohibit the creation of publiccorporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to serve apublic interest or purpose. This should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, butaccording to the public interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by par. 2, Art. 44 of the CivilCode, and of the Administrative Code.

KMG vs. COA, GR No. 150769, August 31, 2004

FACTS:

The KMG, the recognized employees in the GSIS, appealed the disallowance of allowances under RA No. 7305 to the SIG personnel to the COA. However, the COA rendered the decision affirming the disallowance of allowances under RA No. 7305 for the SIG personnel. The KMG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but on November 13, 2001, the COA issued its Resolution No. 2001-207 denying the KMG’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

What does the “Magna Carta for Health Workers” intent to achieve?

HELD:

The law aims to promote and improve the economic and social well-being as well as living and working conditions of health workers in the public sector; to develop their skills and capabilities to make them more responsive and better equipped to deliver health projects and programs; ant to attract the best and the brightest health to join and remain in the government service. Accordingly, in addition to the basic salary of public health workers, the law provides for hazard pay, subsistence, longevity pay, laundry and remote assignment allowance of them.

OMBUDSMAN vs. MOJICA, GR No. 146486, March 4, 2005

FACTS:

Twenty two officials and employees of the office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its directors filed a formal complaint with the office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, ArutroMojica, committed sexual harassment, mulcting money from confidential employees and oppression against all employees in not releasing benefits of OMB Visayas employees on the date due for release. They threatened to go on a mass leave of absence. A recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. Following the established stand that the deputy ombudsman and special prosecutor cannot be impeached.

ISSUE:

Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987Constitution?

RULING:

No. to determine whether or not the Ombudsman as mentioned and enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution refers to a person or an office. Reference was made by the appellate court to the records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of the leading commentators of constitutional law. Thus, it appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies, the courts notes that the leading legal luminaries agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution exclusive. The list may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment.