morandarte

LAMBINO V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006

(CARPIO, J.)

FACTS:

Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. The Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. Meanwhile, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution which the Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

Issues:

1.        WON the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2.       Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision;

Ruling:

1.       The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. The Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.

 

2.       The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."

Amendment v. Revision

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

OMBUDSMAN V. MADRIAGA (2006)

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

The respondents were charged with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of  Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. After respondents had given their side of the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Acuña, by Decision of May 28, 2001, found respondents guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713 which was later on set aside by the By Memorandum Order of Graft Investigation Officer Julita Calderon finding that respondents were guilty also (aside from the former offense charged) of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service under Section 22(t) of Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292, and accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension. Respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation having been denied, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari which the appellate court declared that the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is merely "recommendatory" to the Department of Education, it (Office of the Ombudsman) having "only the power to investigate possible misconduct of a government official or employee in the performance of his functions, and thereafter recommend to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out; and that it is the disciplining authority that has the power or prerogative to impose such penalty. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE

WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials

RULING

Petitioner's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. GIL A. VALERA AND COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. He took his oath and immediately assumed office. On August 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint dated July 28, 2003 charging Respondent Valera with criminal offenses involving violation of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), Executive Order No. 38, Executive Order No. 298 and R.A. No. 6713 as well as administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was respondent Valera’s brother-in-law for violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. But prior to this sworn complaint, criminal and administrative charges were also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondent Valera. Similar allegations as those in the other complaint in that respondent Valera, without being duly authorized by the Commissioner of Customs, entered into a compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 to the prejudice of the government. Meanwhile on November 12, 2003, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum inhibiting himself from the foregoing criminal cases as well as the related administrative case and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his (the Ombudsman’s) stead and place. On March 17, 2004, pursuant to the above memorandum, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the administrative case OMB-C-A-0379-J, issued the Order placing respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six months without pay. In the said order, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that respondent Valera entered into the compromise agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 without being duly authorized to do so by the Commissioner of Customs and without the approval of the Secretary of Finance in violation of Section 2316 of the TCCP. Said order was deemed immediately effective and executory. Respondent Valera sought reconsideration of the said Order claiming denial of due process. He averred that he had already submitted his counter-affidavit refuting the charges leveled against him way back on November 6, 2003. He pointed out that sworn complaint was filed on August 20, 2003 and it was only two months later or on October 22, 2003 that the Ombudsman found enough bases to proceed with the administrative investigation of the case by requiring respondent Valera to file his counter-affidavit. He did so on November 6, 2003. During the said period of two months, the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication Bureau-A (PIAB-A) of the Office of the Ombudsman did not find enough bases to preventively suspend him. According to respondent Valera, he was at a loss as to why it was only then (March 17, 2004) that he was being placed under preventive suspension. Acting on respondent Valera’s motion for reconsideration, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio issued the Order dated April 5, 2004 explaining that the delay in the issuance of the preventive suspension order was due to the inhibition of the Ombudsman from the case and for which reason, he (petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio), by virtue of the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003, had to act in his place and stead. Even before his motion for reconsideration was acted upon, however, respondent Valera already filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition as he sought to nullify the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. The appellate court rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the March 17, 2004 Order of preventive suspension and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to desist from taking any further action in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. Relying on the two provisions of law (Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 in relation to, Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution), the CA declared that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has no authority to issue a preventive suspension order since he is neither the Ombudsman nor one of the Deputy Ombudsmen. Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioners Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio and the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

WON  petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has the authority to place respondent Valera under preventive suspension in connection with the administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD:

The Court holds that the Special Prosecutor has no such authority. It is noted that petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio anchors his authority to conduct the administrative investigation in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J on the Memorandum dated November 12, 2003 issued by Ombudsman  inhibiting himself therefrom and directing petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead. Significantly, Ombudsman did not state in the said memorandum the reason for his inhibition. However,  similar to judges, Ombudsman has no unfettered discretion to inhibit himself. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. No such cause was proffered by Ombudsman for his inhibition in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. Based on the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, the powers of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following: investigatory power; prosecutory power; public assistance functions; authority to inquire and obtain information; and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures. The Court has consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. However, if the Ombudsman delegates his authority to conduct administrative investigation to the Special Prosecutor and the latter finds that the preventive suspension of the public official or employee subject thereof is warranted, the Special Prosecutor may recommend to the Ombudsman to place the said public officer or employee under preventive suspension. With respect to the conduct of administrative investigation, the Special Prosecutor’s authority, insofar as preventive suspension is concerned, is akin to that of the PIAB-A, i.e., recommendatory in nature. It bears stressing that the power to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension pending an investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen.

NARCISO Y. SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LEONARDO A. JOSE, RESPONDENTS.

[ G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989 ]

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS

The Customs Commissioner, Wigberto E. Tanada extend ed a permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to petitioner SANTIAGO, Jr. That appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), National Capital Region Office. Prior thereto, SANTIAGO held the position of Customs Collector I. However, respondent JOSE, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board (the Board, for short) against SANTIAGO's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. Pursuant to Section 19(6) of Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), the Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada for appropriate action. In reply, said official upheld SANTIAGO's promotional appointment, among others.  Respondent JOSE appealed to the Board (MSB Case No. 1410), which, decided to revoke petitioner SANTIAGO's appointment and directed that respondent JOSE be appointed in his stead. On 15 July 1987, the Board resolved to deny SANTIAGO's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The same year, respondent Commission affirmed the Board Resolutions in its own Resolution No. 87-554. The Commission ruled that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. It added that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, subject to specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (h), Section 9 of the Civil Service Law.  Hence, a Petition for Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner.

ISSUE

WON the promotional appointment of the Petitioner be upheld.

RULING

The promotional appointment of Petitioner (Santiago) should be upheld. We grant reconsideration of our Order of dismissal and reinstate the Petition. Retracting the ruling in Taduran v. CSC, stating that there is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement (in the Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment." One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JAIME N. FERRER, LINO PATAJO and CESAR MIRAFLOR as Commissioners of the Commission on Elections; COMELEC BIDDING COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN EMILIO AGUILA and MEMBERS PACIENCIO BALLON, ALEJANDRO MACARANAS, TOMAS MALLONGA and ERNESTO LOMBOS; HON. JUDGE JOSE LEUTERIO of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 11 and ACME STEEL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, respondents.

CUEVAS, J.:

Facts:

In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent commissioners of the commission on elections issued an invitation to bid call no. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths with some specifications and descriptions. Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said invitation were the herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and machine shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing company, (Acme for short). However, the respondent Comelec bidding committee chairman and members submitted their memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to the said invitation to bid which stated that acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy. The committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all members of the commission of all the samples before the final award be made." ⁵ after an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the Comelec commissioners, and after the commissioners noted that acme submitted the lowest bid, the Comelec issued a resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to acme, subject to the condition, among others, that "(acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. Two days after, the Comelec issued purchase order no. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the 11,000 units of voting booths in favor of acme. Acme accepted the terms of the purchase. Filipinas then filed an injunction suit with the then court of first instance of manila, docketed as civil case no. 77972, against herein public respondents Comelec commissioners, chairman and members of the Comelec bidding committee, and private respondent acme. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent judge in an order, denied the writ prayed for. ⁷ thereafter, the public respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action which the respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing civil case no. 77972. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the Comelec dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the Comelec and acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.

Held:

The court resolve the first issue in the affirmative pondering on to section 2, article x, 1935 Philippine constitution, section 5 of the revised election code and section 17(5) of the judiciary act of 1948 (republic act no. 296). Nevertheless, it has been consistently held ⁹ that it is the Supreme Court, not the court of first instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the Comelec relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. The Comelec resolution awarding the contract in favor of acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the supreme court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the Comelec from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

With regards to the second issue, Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin the Comelec from pursuing its contract with acme, the winning bidder. While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the Comelec's award of contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its complaint.

Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities, ¹⁰ and that the reservation to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, ¹¹ petitioner has miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the part of the public respondents in the challenged award. In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in acme's favor, the commissioners of the Comelec had taken into account that acme's bid was the lowest; that acme was a responsible manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples submitted by the bidders, acme's sample was favorable chosen subject to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award.

Finding the instant petition to be without merit aside from being moot and academic, the same is hereby dismissed.

GUDANI V. SENGA (2006)

FACTS:

The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.

On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 

Petitioners attended such hearing and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that the day before, there was an order from Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced "per instruction" from President Arroyo) prohibiting them from testifying without the prior approval of the President. Petitioners do not precisely admit before this Court that they had learned of such order prior to their testimony, although the OSG asserts that at the very least, Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified.

ISSUES

1.      WON A PRESIDENT CAN PREVENT A MEMBER OF ARMED FORCES FROM TESTIFYING BEFORE A LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY

2.      WON THE PREVENTION FROM THE PRESIDENT IS AN ABSOLUT RULE

RULINGS

1.      YES. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. It is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics.

2.      Suffice it to say that the President can prevent a member of an Armed Forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry  in lieu of the President’s Executive power as Commander-in-chief, meanwhile, THIS IS NOT ABSOLUTE. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature's functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President's power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The remedy lies with the courts.

The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor.

 

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. This is the fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the other. The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing.

Note:  Petition was DENIED. Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General. The issues raised by petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the Senate without having to countermand their Commander-in-chief and superior officer under the setup that the court has prescribed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

May 15, 1980

G.R. No. L-52446-48
ENRIQUE B. INTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE TANODBAYAN, THE CITY FISCAL OF DAVAO, HONORABLE JUDGE MILAGROS C. NARTATEZ and ANGELINA S. SALCEDO, respondents.

ANTONIO, J:

FACTS

On December 9, 1977, petitioner endorsed to the City Fiscal of Davao complaints for perjury against respondent Angelina S. Salcedo on the ground that in the latter’s sworn Personal Data Sheets (Civil Service Forms) of January 18, 1967, June 11, 1968, January 6, 1970 and January 5, 1976, she knowingly and falsely indicated that she completed the one-year Secretarial Science course at University of San Carlos in Cebu City from 1961 to 1962, although she was never enrolled in, and neither did she complete the Secretarial Science course from, the University of San Carlos. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the City Fiscal of Davao, through Special Counsel Rodrigo R. Duterte, found a prima facie case for perjury and resolved to file three (3) separate counts of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent Angelina S. Salcedo. Pursuant to said resoution, three (3) corresponding Informations were filed against respondent Angelina S. Salcedo in the City Court of Davao, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3193-D, 3194-D and 3195-D, all for perjury. These three (3) Informations were later amended in order to show that the Personal Data Sheets of said respondent were subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Barbara Pioquinto, Clerk of Court, City of Davao, a person authorized by law to administer oath.  Private respondent, through her counsel, interposed an appeal to the Ministry of Justice which, forwarded the records of the appealed case to the Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section 10 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 1630, which vests on the latter the power to file and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office. However, the Tanodbayan reversed the Decision of the City Fiscal and directed City Fiscal to move for dismissal of 3 perjury cases against Salcedo.

ISSUE

WON the Tanodbayan has the jurisdiction to review and nullify the resolutions of the City Fiscal of Davao and in ordering the latter to secure the dismissal of Criminal Cases.

Ruling

Yes. The Tanodbayan’s authority to file and prosecute is not limited to civil and administrative cases and in offenses made in relation to the office. Presidential Decree No. 1630 provides that “he may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and pt practices and such other offenses committed by public offices and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office.” As correctly observed by the Tanodbayan, the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet, being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment and private respondent was already in the government service when the other Personal Data Sheets, subject matter of the Informations for perjury filed against her, were accomplished by her. The Tanodbayan is an administrative body whose main purpose is to give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service. Section 6 of Article XIII of the Constitution specifically provides that the National Assembly shag create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which “shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case before the proper court or body.” This provision and the laws creating and conferring upon the Tanodbayan investigative authority over certain offenses are sufficiently broad enough as to include the power now in question.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-50508-11 October 11, 1985

VICENTE S. ORAP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN represented by HON. JUSTICES MANUEL R. PAMARAN BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ, and ROMEO M. ESCAREAL, et al., respondents.

Benigno M. Gubatan for petitioner.

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS 

Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022. Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of Court. The fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied.

Hence, the instant recourse.

Issue

WON the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to file the corresponding information before the Sandiganbayan and prosecute the same.

HELD

The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such authority. We affirm.

The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor, however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607.

Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term, confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity and efficiency in the government service."

The informations in question have complied with the substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the investigating prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the Chief Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of
PD 1606.

As petitioner is charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said court validly acquired jurisdiction over the informations in question.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

REYES V. COA (1999)

FACTS:

By Resolution No. 89-003, the TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided additional benefits to its members, in accordance with the policies and guidelines approved by the Board of Trustees. The Fund's sources of capital were from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary and TLRC's or the government's counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the member's gross monthly salary, earnings of funds and others. However, it was suspended by  Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores the transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991, amounting to P11,065,715.84, per Notice of Suspension No. 93-006 and held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758, fringe benefits were allowed provided that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case, there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers and employees. Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537, to which TLRC may not qualify. The TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees on a Resolution, discontinued the collection of contributions for the Fund from both the TLRC and the members. It also ordered the members' personal contributions collected from March 1, 1993 until September 15, 1993, refunded to them immediately. On September 21, 1993, the Board issued another Resolution dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the distribution of the personal and corporate shares to the members thereof, on or before October 31, 1993. Meanwhile, Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the amount of P11,065,715.84, representing the government's share paid to the TLRC Provident Fund refunded to members, covering the period 1990 to 1991, including all amounts that may have been transferred to the Fund after 1991 which was appealed by Petitioner to the Commission On Audit  that eventually denied by the COA ruling that the government's share in the Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. It held that since the primary purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its discontinuance and dissolution, then the employees were not entitled to the government's share in the Fund. Petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a reversal of COA Decision which in turn, denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit was filed.

ISSUE

WON the Commission on Audit  committed a grave abuse of discretion disallowing the distribution of the government  share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members

HELD

The court ruled that Commission on Audit did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members reiterating the decision made by the COA.

OMBUDSMAN V. SANTIAGO (2007)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS:

The City of Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay 183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received by the respondent as the Barangay Chairman. On October 3, 2000, an administrative complaint was filed for technical malversation, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against respondent, before the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint denying all the charges and contending that the complaint was filed to harass him.

In a Decision, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissed him from the service and requested the direct implementation of said decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order." Apparently, the Court of Appeals considered this action a petition for review and PARTIALLY granted the petition. The Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE

            WON the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring government officials or employees.

HELD                   

In interpreting a statute, care should be given that every part thereof be given effect.⁸ Hence, the use of the word "recommend" must be read in conjunction with the words "ensure compliance therewith" in order not to run counter to the intention of the framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and complete disciplinary authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. In fact, Section 13(3), Article XI is complemented by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770. Considering that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, it follows that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. At any rate, the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been jurisprudentially settled (reiterating it’s ruling In Estarija v. Ranada). THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE REVERSED. THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS AFFIRMED.