dagpin

1.                                 [G.R. No. 154898.  February 16, 2005]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PASTOR B. TINAYA, respondent.

FACTS: The Respondent Pastor B. Tinaya, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.

The CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment on December 1, 1993 but only as temporary effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. Respondent’s temporary appointment was made due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3) years work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor as required in the CSC qualified standards.

Respondent’s appointment was approved on the same day and took his oath and assumed the duties of his office. On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste. On November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994 the incumbent Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence. Then Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban acted as Mayor of the Municipality. n June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record.  The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor Bienvenido Balderian.  This prompted respondent to report the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII with a request to conduct an “on-the-spot physical audit” of the municipal employees’ 201 files.  In response, the CSC scheduled an audit on August 3, 1999. As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the recall order but the same was denied. On appeal, CSC Central Office rendered its resolution affirming the CSC Regional Office No. VIII Order dated November 9, 1999. This prompted the Respondent to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. On March 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside the Resolutions of CSC Regional Office and CSC Central Office respectively.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in their decision on March 21, 2002 for Setting Aside the assailed resolutions of Civil Service Commission.

RULING: Petitioner CSC contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent’s original appointment as municipal assessor on November 16, 1993 is permanent granting him security of tenure; and in declaring that his subsequent appointment on December 1, 1994 does not violate the rule on nepotism. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner CSC and held that under Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.” With respect to petitioner’s recall of respondent’s new permanent appointment dated December 1, 1994 by reason of nepotism, the Court finds the new appointment is in violation of Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law. The Petition for review on certiorari of the CSC through the Solicitor General is GRANTED. The challenged decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED. The Resolutions of CSC are AFFIRMED.

2.                                             G.R. No. 81467, October 27, 1989NARCISO Y. SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONER, VS.  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LEONARDA A. JOSE, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: The vacant position of Customs Collector III prompted then the Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada to extend a permanent promotional appointment to herein petitioner Santiago. The said appointment was approved by the CSC prior to his promotional appointment Santiago held the position of Customs Collector I, herein respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II filed a protest before the Merit Systems Promotion Boardagainst Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III. The Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada for appropriate action. Commissioner Tanada upheld Santiago's promotional appointment. Respondent Jose then appealed to the Board, which, decided to revoke the petitioner Santiago's appointment and directed that respondent Jose be appointed in his stead. Hence Petitioner Santiago filed a petition for review on certiorari before the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santiago's promotional appointment should be upheld

RULING:  The Court finds the petition to have merit. That petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be upheld. Foregoing decisions states that there is “no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment.” The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide-latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

3.         RAMON L. LABO, Jr. Petitioner v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA, Respondents.

Facts: Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched hiscandidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega,on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office.Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec,on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Comelec decided in favor of Ortega.

ISSUES: Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified to run for Mayor; 2) Whether Ortega having the next highest number of votes is entitled to be proclaimed Mayor upon Labo’s disqualification.

RULING: One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari file by petitioner Labo is DISMISSED for the following reasons. (1) Labo was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. (2) The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor. While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

4.         IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner v.

 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY 

 MONTEJO, Respondents.

FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification “alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. Mrs. Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood", however, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed her that the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. COMELEC sustained Montejo.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections

RULING: Residence means domicile in election laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile. The Resolution of the COMELEC in this petition is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE.

5.         MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
  G.R. No. 95398,August 16, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of Phase I of the home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000. Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign as a Witness to the contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 968.

While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated November 8, 1983 addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.

The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the construction which the petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things, increased cost of construction materials and labor.
The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid for the construction of a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract is null and void for want of one signature.

RULING: The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to personally pay for the building already constructed. In the case before the court, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his signature to the contract was somehow made up by his own certification which is the basic and more important validating document. The Court agreed with the petitioner's view that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract.

6.    HELMA P. GAMINDE, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, Respondent.

FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.

On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.”Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit Enbanc.

On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President.

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion.

ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.

RULING:  The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff. ACCORDINGLY, The Court REVERSED the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.

7.         JOSE C. LAUREL V, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BATANGAS, Petitioner, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND LORENZO SANGALANG, Respondent.

 

 

FACTS: Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868.

 

ISSUE: Does nepotism apply to designation?

 

RULING: Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service.
Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. The before the Court petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the challenged Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED.

 

8.         LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its Chairman EDGARDO J. ANGARA vs.THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO

FACTS:  The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within COMELEC jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not. The assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.

9.         RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision whether the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people.

RULING: This petition does not comply with the provision of the Constitution particularly on with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people. Sec. 2, Art. XVII is the governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before – not after – signing.

10.       LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

 

FACTS: The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions. The petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. They also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the "Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive Order violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.

The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No. 1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create a public office because the President's executive power and power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed. More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional.

ISSUES: Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office?

 

RULING: No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office. In the said E.O., there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations existing funds already appropriated. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. According to the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission," and thus, will be subject to auditing rules and regulations. However, the Court stressed that, "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing its goals is simply irreconcilable with the constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions were GRANTED.