arevalo

CIVL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DE LA CRUZ
 
FACTS:
Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air TransportationOffice, he was a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division.His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yrmanagerial & supervisory qualification for the position.CSC-NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of the appointment of Dela Cruz.Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC reversed itself and approved theappointment. (decision of the CSC kept changing)CA approved the appointment. He has the required qualifications “planning,organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of airsafety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checkingof all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools.
 
HELD:
 The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position AND/ORsupervisory position.“or” – either the 1^st clause or 2^nd clause may be applied.Dela Cruz had excellent credentials and a “proven excellent performance.”Every particular job has:3.formal – age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminarsattended, etc. and4.informal qualifications – resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interestof the service.Even if the law stated “&”,the Court held that he has “substantially complied”3 yrs & 8mos
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA
 
FACTS:
Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in theOffice of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotionalappointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved thetemporary appointment.New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment, ground: Not CareerExecutive Service Eligible.CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was also noteligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid backwages until theexpiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment.CA reinstated Darangina.
 
ISSUE/S:
Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
 
HELD:
CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,only salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of histerm upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term to beserved.Administrative Code of 1987Book VTitle ISubtitle AChapter 5Section 27. Employment Status. – Appointment in the career service shall bepermanent or temporary.(1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a personwho meets all the requirements for the position to which he is beingappointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance withthe provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuancethereof.(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and itbecomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a tempappointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirementsfor the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civilservice eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall notexceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualifiedcivil service eligible becomes available.
 
 
 
LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE
 
FACTS:
Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to theposition of Terminal Supervisor. This appointment was protested by Junsay,who contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to anyother comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.Complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to theCivil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the samegrounds he had earlier raised before the PPA.In a resolution, the Commission held that Junsay had a preferential right tothe position and ordered that he beappointed thereto.
 
ISSUE/S:
WON the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove apermanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualifiedthan the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement bythe latter.
 
HELD:
NO, the CSC was not authorized to do so. The Civil ServiceCommission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel.Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by otheroffices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the requiredqualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimumstatutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointingauthority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow anappointment because it believes another person is better qualified and muchless can it direct the appointment of its own choice.Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel.While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee taking into account thetotality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define hispersonality is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority.It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power toreview under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
2. temporary - In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomesnecessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointmentshould be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for theposition to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civilservice eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall notexceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if aqualified civil service eligible becomes available.
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service
as:(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualificationin an appropriate examination is required;(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical innature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state collegesand universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific orresearch institutions which shall establish and maintain their own meritsystems;(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of DepartmentService and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified bythe Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by thePresident.(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign ServiceOfficers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces whichshall maintain a separate merit system;(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do notfall under the non-career service; and(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of meritand fitness utilized for the career service; and(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which iscoterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to hispleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project forwhich purpose employment was made.Included in the non-career service are:1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
 
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold theirpositions at the pleasure of the President and their personalconfidential staff(s);3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed termsof office and their personal or confidential staff;4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in thegovernment is in accordance with a special contract to undertake aspecific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available inthe employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishesthe specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimumof direction and supervision from the hiring agency.5. emergency and seasonal personnel. There is another type of non-career employee: Casual  where and when employment is not permanent butoccasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v.Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.945) The employment status of personnel hired under foreign-assisted projects isconsidered co-terminus, for the duration of the project.CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizesthe status of a co-terminous employee —(3) Co-terminous status
shall be issued to a person whose entrance in theservice is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or thatwhich is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure. The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into thefollowing:a)
co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent withthe duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was madeor subject to the availability of funds for the same; b)co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority. c)co-terminous with the incumbent 
— when appointment is co-existent withthe appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of theservices of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automaticallyabolished; andd)
co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3years" — the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof,the position is deemed abolished. Felwa V. Salas, equal protection clause applies to persons or thingsidentically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subjectof legislation, and a classification is reasonable where:(1.)it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;(2.)these are germane to the purpose of thelaw(3.)the classification applies not only to present conditions but also tofuture conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;(4.)the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.Applying the criteria, the Early Retirement Law would be violative of theEqual Protection Clause if the SC sustains the denial to a class of governmentemployees similarly situated to those covered.Expressio unius est exclusion alterius or casus omissus pro omisso habendusest – a person omitted from an enumeration must be held to have beenomitted intentionally - should not be the applicable maxim in this case; butthe doctrine of necessary implication – what is implied in a statute is as mucha part thereof as that which is expressed; & Ex necessitate legis – everystatutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidentalpower, right or primilege;& in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus – the greater includes the lesser.Note that pending in Congress is a House Bill to extend the Early RetirementLaw, and also the coverage includes contractual employees already whichwas admittedly overlooked before.A
co-terminus employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.A co-terminus or project employee should be included in the coverage of theEarly Retirement Law, as long as:1.)they file their application prior to the expiration of their term;2.)comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose –Memorandum Circular No. 14 Series of 1990 implementing RA 6850 requiresas a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of 7yrs of government service which need not be continuous, in the career ornon-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,seasonal, contractual or co-terminus, including military and polic service, asevaluated and confirmed by the CSC.A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in RA 6683 of co-terminus personnel who survive the test of time
 
 
AQUINO V. CSC
 
FACTS:
Victor A. Aquino was holding the position of Clerk II, Division City of Schools of San Pablo City. On Feb. 16, 1984, he was designated as PropertyInspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing duties andresponsibilities of Supply Office I. Upon retirement of the Supply Officer I,DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo designated Aquino as OIC of theDivision Supply Office.On Septermber 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent Milagros Tagle issueda promotional appointment to Leonarda D. De La Paz as Supply Officer I inthe DECS Dvision of San Pablo City. Civil Service approved her appointmentas permanent “provided that there is no pending administrative case againstthe appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decisionby competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of theappointment.”Aquino questioned the appointment of de la Paz.DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest and revokedthe appointment of de la Paz,appointing Aquino instead. The Merit SystemsProtection Board (MSPB) also upheld the appointment of Aquino as SupplyOfficer I. The CSC reversed the DECS Sec & MSPB, restoring de la Paz to her positionas Supply Officer I. Ground: Security of Tenure had already attached to de laPaz. (CONSTI ART IX-B, SEC 2. PAR 3)
 
 
 
ISSUE/S:
Whether the appointing authority can revoke appointment on theground that another is more qualified.
 
HELD:
 The appointing authority cannot revoke the appointment to de la Pazon mere ground that the protestant is more qualified.PD 807: Civil Service Law, Section 19. provides the “for cause” grounds, Par.6.(1.)That the appointee is not qualified(2.)That the appointee is not the next in rank (3.)In case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by originalappointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the writtenspecial reason/s given by the appointing authorityIn addition the appointment of Aquino was tainted with irregularity, withundue haste, and is not valid because an appointment to an office which isnot vacant is null and void.CSC Resolution No. 83-343 prohibits the issuance of an appointment to theprotestant, if the protest case is not yet finally resolved.
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SALAS
 
FACTS:
On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCORChairman as Internal Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casinoat the Manila Pavilion Hotel.ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and issubject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who onlyimplements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 grounds: loss of confidence.Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting – in affidavits of 2 customers,claiming to have been used as gunners.CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannot bedismissed on that ground, applying the“proximily rule” enunciated in Case 63: Grino V. CSC & Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare 10. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed by Section 2 (1),Article IX-B of the Consti.
 
ISSUE/S:
 1.Whether Salas is a confidential employee?
2. Whether the Pinero doctrine is still applicable?
 
 
HELD:
Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in theoccupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office,but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. “since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technical.Senator Tanada: “in the 1st
instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position.In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential ornot.”-Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, whichis part of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions areprimarily confidential.
1. No.Salas’ position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description isordinary, routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 permonth.He does not enjoy that “primarily close intimacy” which characterizes aconfidential employee.Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority,the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, “the fact that sometimes, private respondentmay handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhatconfidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarilyconfidential.”
2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive incases of conflict.1986 Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing forthe declaration of a position asa.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technicalis to exempt these categories from competitive examinations as a means fordetermining merit and fitness.It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense thatappointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations forpurposes of determining merit and fitness.CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential,merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement.In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because thesame is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), ArticleIX-B of the 1987 COnsti. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logicalinterpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the CivilService Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.
 
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which provides that “All employees of the casinos and related servicesshall be classified as “Confidential” appointees.” While such executivedeclaration emanated merely from the provisions of  Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Rule XXSection 2 The power to declare a position as:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technical,as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987Book V. Civil Service CommissionSection 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers and functions: (9). Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarilyconfidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorizationmade under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were
2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarilyconfidential:
1:when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of CivilService, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;2:in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy” between the appointing powerwhich ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedomfrom misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959)
Section 5.
“The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive orunclassified service or those which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential or highly technical in nature.”
General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service RulesSection 1. “appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to bedetermined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.”
 
SEPARATE OPINIONS
VITUG, J ., concurring:
- Highlighted the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrativecharges against (Salas) if warranted," found in the dispositive portion of thedecision of the appellate court. It would seem to me that the adverse findingsarrived at by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR which the Board of Directors relied upon to terminate the services of Salas on ground of loss of confidence could well be constitutive of the administrative infractions thatthe appellate court must have had in mind. The case should be remanded to the CSC to specifically meet head-onPAGCOR's foregoing findings and to thereby fully ventilate, as well as passupon, the appeal to it (CSC) on the basis with an opportunity for a hearingadequately accorded to Salas
 
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether the term “compensation” in P. D. No. 198, §13, asamended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479 does not include the allowancesand per diems which had been disallowed in this case, considering §2(i) of P.D. No. 1146 as amended by RA 8291, which provides that “compensation”means “the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to hisemployment/appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay,allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic paywhich are not integrated into the basic pay under existing laws.”2) Whether the prohibition in PD 198, §13 against the grant of additionalcompensation to board members must be deemed repealed by virtue of §22of R. A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, whichtook effect on July 1, 1989.* If yes to 1 and 2, then the members of the board of directors of waterdistricts are entitled to receive benefits in addition to those authorized to bepaid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA after theeffectivity of R. A. No. 67583) Whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportationallowance of various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, riceallowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors of BWD, would impair vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine the management prerogative of water districts; and
 
HELD:
1) NO. The definitions of the term “compensation” in the statutesrelied on by petitioners are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemedto comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in theprovisions thereof.
 
Words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, andcommonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in whichthe words and phrases are used. The provision petitioners cite as basis refers to the basis for the computationof employer and employee contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits towhich such employees are entitled. In the same manner, under §32 of theNIRC, “compensation” includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, andsimilar items for purposes of recognizing taxable income. The definitions of the term “compensation” in these statutes are for limitedpurposes only and cannot be deemed to comprehend such other purposesnot specifically included in the provisions thereof.Under P. D. No. 198, §13, per diem is precisely intended to be thecompensation of members of board of directors of water districts.By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and bylimiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the sameparagraph, providing “No director shall receive other compensation” than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directorsof water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized bylaw and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.2) NO. The Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners becausedirectors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and areprohibited from the management of the districts, as provided by §18 thereof.R. A. No. 6758, §4 specifically provides that the Salary Standardization Lawapplies to “positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, nowexisting or hereafter created in the government, including GOCCs and GFIs.” The Salary Standardization Law adopts a Position Classification Systemclassifying positions into four main categories, namely: professionalsupervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, andsub-professional non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for itsimplementation.A review of the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law will reveal thatthe Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners becausedirectors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and areprohibited from the management of the districts. The fact that §12 and §17 of the Salary Standardization Law speak of allowances as “benefits” paid in addition to the salaries incumbents arepresently receiving makes it clear that the law does not refer to thecompensation of board of directors of water districts as these directors do notreceive salaries but per diems for their compensation.3) NO. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by publicofficers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correctionof such errors – practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannotgive rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.Management prerogative refers to the right of an employer to regulate allaspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments,working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal andrecall of work. Clearly, the existence of such right presupposes the existenceof an employer-employee relationship.
 As to the BWD board of directors:
 The BWD board of directors are notemployees of BWD. As already noted, their function, as defined by P. D. No.198, is limited to policy-making.Moreover, as also noted before, the right of directors of water districts to thepayment of compensation is expressly provided for in PD 198, thus pre-empting the exercise of any discretion by the water districts.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            PANIS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as Administrative Officer of the Hospital,while private respondent was Administrative Officer of the City HealthDepartment detailed at the said hospital. The Mayor appointed private respondent to the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration of CCMC. Petitioner, a candidate for the saidposition, promptly protested the appointment before the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC Regional Office, however,indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Mayor, which in turn referred itto the Office of the City Attorney. The City Attorney dismissed petitioner's protest and upheld the appointmentof private respondent. This dismissal was affirmed by the CSC Regional Officeand later on appeal, by respondent CSC. Hence, the present petition.Petitioner contends that the appointment of private respondent was made inviolation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudencebecause (1) the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration wasnot legally created; (2) assuming that it was, there was no qualificationstandard nor valid screening procedure; and (3) the seniority and next-in-rank rules were disregarded.
 
ISSUE/S:
WON the appointment was valid.
 YES. The position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration isthe very same position of
 
HELD:
Hospital Administrator created by Ordinance No.1216. The Office of Hospital Administrator was not extinguished, but thedesignation thereof merely corrected to reflect the proper classification of theposition under existing rules. The Office of Assistant Chief of Hospital forAdministration therefore was created and existed in accordance with law. The determination who among the qualified candidates should be preferredbelongs to the appointing authority. The Mayor of Cebu City, in the instantcase, chose to appoint private respondent.In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferentialconsideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarilyfollow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vestedright granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on theappointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position.An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created position, isessentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Once acandidate possesses the minimum qualities required by law, sufficientdiscretion, if not plenary, is granted to the appointing authority. It ismarkworthy that private respondent was detailed at the CCMC primarily tohelp in upgrading the level of performance of the said hospital