RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT
The appeal is meritorious. The Court
acquits accused-appellant Manabat for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant Manabat was
charged with the crimes of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II RA
9165.
In order to convict a person charged
with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object,
which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses
the drug.
In cases involving dangerous drugs,
the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but also proving
the corpus delicti or the body of the
crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the
law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and
proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict compliance
with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In this connection, Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to
maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and
(2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and
(d) a representative from the Department
of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy therefor.
This must be
so because with the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for
entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with
which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or
hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds
all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further
requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the
aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase “immediately
after seizure and confiscation” means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension.
It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done
as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also
means that the three required witness should already be physically present at
the time of apprehension – a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather
and bring with it the said witness.
As held fairly recent of People v. Tomawis, the Court explained
that the presence of the three witnesses
must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the
time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the
presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the
time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source,
identity, and integrity of the seized drug, viz.:
The presence of the
witness from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to
protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the
seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, “planting” or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely
affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The presence of the
three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory bbut more
importantly at the time of the
warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three
witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and
confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and
integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted,
the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual
defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able testify the buy-bust
operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
The practice of police
operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses,
when they could easily do so – and “calling them in” to the place of inventory
to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust
operation has already been finished – does not achieve the purpose of the law
in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence
of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs
must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such
that they required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and
confiscated drugs “immediately after seizure and confiscation”. (Emphasis in
the original)
Based from the foregoing, the Court
holds that the buy-bust operation was not
conducted in accordance with the law.
First, it is not disputed whatsoever
that the
witnesses were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime only after
the accused-appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. On
cross-examination, PO2 Barral readily admitted that during the apprehension of
accused-appellant Manabat, the witness were not present:
Q You
mean to say that during the arrest, the witnesses did not arrive yet?
A Not
yet, sir.
Further, as testified by SP02
Vertudes, the buy-bust team did not contact the witnesses at all before the
team arrived at the place of the buy-bust operation. The witnesses were
conducted only after accused-appellant Manabat was already arrested and
handcuffed:
Q Before
you proceeded to ABC Printing Press you did not yet contact the
witnesses from the DOJ, the media
and from the elected officials of the
barangay right?
A Not yet, sir.
Q Only after Mario was
arrested and handcuffed that you did not contact those witnesses, correct?
A Yes, sir.
In fact, the Court notes that the
prosecution offered conflicting testimonies as regards the time of arrival of
the witnesses.
According to PO2 Barral, the
witnesses arrived: [m]ore or less ten minutes” after they were called. To the
contrary, when SPO2 Vertudes was asked to when the witness arrived, he first
answered “three to five minutes sir.” But when pressed as to the veracity of
his answer, considering that the buy-bust was conducted on a Sunday, SPO2
Vertudes eventually admitted that the arrival of the wtitnesses was completed
“[f]ifteen to thirty minutes.”
Further creating doubt as to the
presence of the witnesses during the buy-bust operation is the admission of PO2
Barral on cross-examination that the photographs of the inventory do not show
the presence of the witnesses, except for Councilor Epifanio Woo:
Q The witnesses are not shown in
these pictures during the search, right?
A No, sir.
Q All these pictures are taken close
up?
A Yes, sir.
Q No witnesses are shown in this
picture, right?
A None, sir.
x
xxx
Q In the pictures
marked as Exhibits “X-9” and “X-16”, there is a person with fatigue short
pants?
A Yes, sir.
Q You know who is this person?
A Yes, sir. Councilor Epifanio Woo.
He is also shown here.
If the witnesses were indeed present during the entire photographing
and inventory of the evidence, obviously, it would have been easy and
effortless on the part of the buy-bust team to take photographs of the other
witnesses. Yet, this was not done, creating some doubt in the mind of the Court
as to the presence of the required witnesses during the buy-bust operation.
The apprehending team cannot justify its failure to ensure the
availability of the witnesses during the apprehension of accused-appellant
Manabat, considering that the buy-bust operation was conducted seven days after the day it
received information about accused-appellant and was instructed to conduct the
buy-bust operation. Simply stated, the apprehending team had more than enough
time to ensure that all the mandatory procedures for the conduct of the
buy-bust operation would be sufficiently met.
Second, the Certificate of Inventory that was produce by the prosecution
was irregularly executed.
To reiterate, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires that the copies of the
inventory should be signed by all
the following persons: (a) accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an
elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Certificate of
Inventory itself reveals that the document was not signed by accused-appellant Manabat or by his counsel or
representative. Upon perusal of the records of the
instant case, the prosecution did not acknowledge such defect. Nor did the
prosecution provide any explanation whatsoever as to why accused-appellant
Manabat was not able to sign the Certificate of Inventory.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that
“noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items.” For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapse on the part of the
police officers and (2) be able to justify the same. In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to
justify, the police officers’ deviation from the procedure contained in Section
21, RA 9165.
Third, the Court notes that the marking of the plastic sachets
allegedly recovered was irregularly done.
Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual,
the conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:
Anti-Drug Operational Procedures
Chapter V. Specific Rules
x xxx
B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as
practicable, all operations must be officer led)
1.
Buy-bust Operation – [I]n the
conduct of buy-bust operation, the following are the procedures to be observed:
a.
Record time of jump-off in
unit’s logbook;
b.
Alertness and security shall at
all times to be observed:
c.
Actual and timely coordination
with the nearest Philippine National Police territorial units must be made;
d.
Area security and dragnet or
pursuit operation must be provided [;]
e.
Use of necessary and reasonable
force only in case of suspect’s resistance [;]
f.
If buy-bust money is dusted
with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect ge[t] hold of the same and his
palm/s contaminated with the powder before giving the pre-arranged signal and
arresting the suspects;
g.
In pre-positioning of the team
members, the designated arresting elements must clearly and actually observe
the negotiation/transaction between suspect and the poseur-buyer;
h.
Arrest suspect in a defensive
manner anticipating possible resistance with the use of deadly weapons which
maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or in a place within arms’ reach;
i.
After lawful arrest, search the
body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other concealed evidence oededly
weapon;
j.
Appraise suspect of his constitutional
rights loudly and clearly after having been secured with handcuffs;
k.
Take actual inventory of the
seized evidence by means of weighing and/or physical counting, as the case may
be;
l.
Prepare a detailed receipt of
the confiscated evidence for issuance to the possessor (suspect) thereof;
m.
The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence
custodian must mark the evidence with their initials and also indicate the date,
time and place the evidence was confiscated/seized;
n.
Take photographs of the
evidence while in the process of taking the inventory, especially during the
weighing, and if possible under existing conditions, the registered weight of
the evidence on the scale must be focused by the camera; and
o.
Only the evidence custodian
shall secure and preserve the evidence in an evidence bag or in appropriate
container and thereafter deliver the same to the Philippine National Police CLG
for laboratory examination.
In the instant case, as incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs
of the plastic sachets
Allegedly
retrieved from accused-appellant Manabat, only the date and initials of the
seizing officers were inscribed on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were not indicated in the
markings, in clear contravention of the PNP’s own set of procedures for the
conduct of buy-bust operations.
At this juncture, it is well to
point-out that while the RTC and CA were correct in stating that denial is an
inherently weak defense, it grievously erred in using the same principle to
convict accused-appellant Manabat. Both the RTC and CA overlooked the
long-standing legal tenet that the starting point of every criminal prosecution
is that the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. And
this presumption of innocence is overturned only when the prosecution has
discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases and has proven the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, by proving each and every element of the
crime charged in the information, to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime
or for any other crime necessarily included therein. Differently stated, there
must exist no reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and every element of
the crime to sustain a conviction.
It is worth emphasizing that this
burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need not present a single
piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The
accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent.
In this connection, the prosecution
therefore, in cases involving dangerous drugs, always has the burden of proving
compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21. As the Court stressed in People v. Andaya.
x xx We Should remind ourselves that we cannot presume
that the accused committed the crimes they have been charged with. The State
must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen
is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful
vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful
incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the past many cases of
false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve
to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
Nor should we
shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just
because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their
performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but a purely
evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming task of
establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of
the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer
presumption of innocence in favour of every person whose life, property and
liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a false
accusation of committing some crime. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed
innocent. It is thus immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving
dangerous drugs, that the accused put forth a weak defense.
To reiterate, breaches of the
procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
would have been compromised. As the Court explained in People v. Reyes:
Under the last paragraph of Section 21 (a), Article II
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism has been provided to ensure
that not every case of non-compliance with the procedures for the preservation
of the chain accused. To warrant the
application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize
the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or
explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the
Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification
or explaination for them. The failure to
justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the iintegrity of
the evidence of the corpus delicti.
With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused deserves
acquittal.
Lastly, it was an error for the RTC to convict accused-appellant
Manabat by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties supposedly extended in favour of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat
the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. As the Court, in People v. Catalan, reminded the lower
courts:
Both lower courts favoured the members of the buy-bust
team with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty,
mainly because the accused did not show that they had ill motive behind his
entrapment.
We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in
relying on the presumption of regularity.
Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team
regularly performed their duty was patently bereft of any factual and legal
basis. We remind the lower courts that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over
the stronger presumption of innocence favouring the accused. Otherwise, the
constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held
subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence.
Where, like here, the proof adduces against the accused has not even overcome
the presumption of innocence, the presumption regularity in the performance of
duty could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the
regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in
favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their
serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance
by a police officer must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not
plucked out from thin air. To say it differently,
it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular
performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police
officers in arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier
noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand-because of
the buy-bust team’s disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of
RA 9165 and the PNP’s own Drug Enforcement Manual.
In sum, the prosecution failed
to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team’s deviation from the
rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti have thus been
compromised. In light of this, accused-appellant Manabat must perforce be
acquitted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 2,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01781-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant MARIO MANABAT y DUMAGAY is ACQUITTED
of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
detention unless he is being lawfully held for another case. Let an entry of
final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Superintendent of the Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga
City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.
