courts of general jurisdiction

Courts of limited jurisdiction are called by many different names, including city court, county court, justice of the peace, magistrate, municipal court, and probate court.

Limited jurisdiction is a type of jurisdiction conferred on courts with legal authority restricted to specific subjects, cases or persons. Examples of limited jurisdiction courts include family courts, traffic courts, probate courts and military courts.

A trial court of general jurisdiction may hear any civil or criminal case that is not already exclusively within the jurisdiction of another court. Examples include the United States district courts on the federal level and state-level trial courts such as the New York Supreme Courts and the California Superior Courts.

General Jurisdiction refers to a court that holds the authority to hear all types of cases except those prohibited by the laws in that state. Case types include civil, criminal, family, probate, and others.

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.46 It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such registration.47 Accordingly, and considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction,48 petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction.

The legal attribution of Regional Trial Court as courts of general Jurisdiction sterns from Section 19 (6) Chapter II or Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980:"

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. ~ Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

x x x x

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions: ....

As enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to particularize the fact that the phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts. This interpretation is supported by San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council, wherein the Court held that:

THIRD DIVISION

February 17, 2016

G.R. No. 203678

CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM, INC., by itself and comprising the Unit Owners of Concorde Condominium Building, Petitioner,
vs.
AUGUSTO H. BACULIO; NEW PPI CORPORATION; ASIAN SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY and its security guards; ENGR. NELSON B. MORALES, in his capacity as Building Official of the Makati City Engineering Department; SUPT. RICARDO C. PERDIGON, in his capacity as City Fire Marshal of the Makati City Fire Station; F/C SUPT. SANTIAGO E. LAGUNA, in his capacity as Regionaf Director of the Bureau of Fire Protection-NCR, and any and all persons acting with or under them, Respondents.

The COMELEC en banc is only empowered to resolve motions for reconsideration of cases decided by a Division for Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120140 August 21, 1996

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PATEROS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

ROMERO, J.:p

Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr. questions the authority of respondent Commission on Elections en banc to hear and decide at the first instance a petition seeking to declare a failure of election without the benefit of prior notice and hearing.

During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T. Capco vied for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros which was won by Capco by a margin of 6,330 votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed and has since been serving as Mayor of Pateros.

Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence terrorism and analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC a petition to declare a failure of election and nullify the canvass and proclamation made by the Pateros Board of Canvassers.

Concluding that the grounds relied upon by Borja were warranted only in an election contest, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition in its resolution dated May 25, 1995. It declared that "force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud and other analogous causes . . . are merely the causes which may give rise to the grounds to declare failure of elections." These grounds, which include (a) no election held on the designated election date; (b) suspension of election before the hour fixed by law for the closing of voting; and (c) election in any polling place resulted in a failure to elect, were not present in Borja's petition.

Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court, arguing the same matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He avers that the COMELEC en banc does not have the power to hear and decide the merits of the petition he filed below because under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, "shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."

After a careful scrutiny of petitioner's arguments, this Court finds the same to be untenable. The petition must inevitably be dismissed.

In order to resolve the threshold issue formulated at the outset, there must first be a determination as to whether a petition to declare a failure of election qualifies as an election case or a pre-proclamation controversy. If it does, the Constitution mandates that it be heard and adjudged by the COMELEC through any of its Divisions. The COMELEC en banc is only empowered to resolve motions for reconsideration of cases decided by a Division for Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

In the case at bar, no one, much less the COMELEC, is disputing the mandate of the aforequoted Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution. As Borja himself maintained, the soundness of this provision has already been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, albeit with some dissent.1 In Ong, the Court declared that if a case raises "pre-proclamation issues, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has no original jurisdiction" over the same. Accordingly, said case should be remanded to the COMELEC which, in turn, will refer the same to any of its Divisions for proper disposition.

A petition to declare a failure of election is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as classified under Section 5(h), Rule 1 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case.

It must be remembered that Capco was duly elected and proclaimed as Mayor of Pateros. "Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity."2 To destroy the presumption, Borja must convincingly show that his opponent's victory was procured through extra-legal means. This he tried to do by alleging matters in his petition which he thought constituted failure of election, such as lack of notice of the date and time of canvass; fraud, violence, terrorism and analogous causes; disenfranchisement of voters; presence of flying voters; and unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors. These grounds, however, as correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, are proper only in an election contest but not in a petition to declare a failure of election and to nullify a proclamation. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code lays down the instances when a failure of election may be declared. It states thus;

Sec. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The same provisions are reiterated under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Revised COMELEC Rules. In other words, the COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is "nobody was elected." None of these circumstances is present in the case at bar. At best, the "grounds" cited by Borja are simply events which give rise to the three consequences just mentioned.

In reality, Borja's petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 251 states:

Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. — A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's decision pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borja's petition, not only for being deficient in form but also for having been filed before the wrong tribunal. This reason need not even be stated in the body of the decision as the same is patent on the face of the pleading itself. Nor can Borja claim that he was denied due process because when the COMELEC en banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case. The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations therein certainly did not deprive him of his day in court. If anybody here was aggrieved by the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco whose arguments were never ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was because the COMELEC's actuation was favorable to him.

Certainly, the COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of discretion, let alone grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borja's petition. For having applied the clear provisions of the law, it deserves, not condemnation, but commendation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated May 25, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Ong, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 221 SCRA 475 (1993); Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 309 (1992).

2 Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 218 SCRA 782 (1993).

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

EN BANC

G.R. No. 163776             April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 165736             April 24, 2007

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR., Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

FELISEO K. BAYACSAN, Intervenor.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For our resolution are two petitions for certiorari filed by Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat (Cayat). G.R. No. 163776 is a petition for certiorari¹ of the Resolution dated 12 April 2004² and of the Order dated 9 May 2004³ of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC First Division) in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 12 April 2004 Resolution cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Cayat as mayoralty candidate of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. The 9 May 2004 Order denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee.

G.R. No. 165736 is a petition for certiorari⁴ of the Order dated 25 October 2004⁵ of the COMELEC First Division also in SPA Case No. 04-152. The 25 October 2004 Order granted the motion for execution of judgment filed by Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. (Palileng) and annulled Cayat’s proclamation. The 25 October 2004 Order also directed (1) the COMELEC Law Department to implement the dispositive portion of the 12 April 2004 Resolution; (2) the Regional Election Director of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC); (3) the new MBOC to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet by deleting Cayat’s name and to proclaim Palileng as the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Feliseo K. Bayacsan (Bayacsan), duly elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed a petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736.

The Facts

Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004. On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC Regional Election Office in Baguio City. Docketed as SPA (PES) No. C04-001, Palileng’s petition alleged that:

3. On January 05, 2004, [Cayat] filed his Certificate [of] Candidacy for Mayor for the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet, Philippines alleging among others as follows:

"I AM ELIGIBLE for the office [I] seek to [be] elected, x x x. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge."

x x x (Underscoring supplied).

Copy of his Certificate of Candidacy is hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "A";

4. The truth of the matter being that [Cayat] is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final judgment for a criminal offense by the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Philippines, Branch 2, for the Crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness docketed as Criminal Case Number 110490. Copies of the Information and the Order of conviction dated October 03, 2003 is [sic] hereto attached and marked as ANNEX "B" and "C";

5. In fact, [Cayat] is still under probation at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on January 05, 2004 after the Honorable Court granted his application for probation on November 06, 2003. Copies of the Application for probation date[d] October 07, 2003 and the Order granting the probation is [sic] hereto attached and marked as ANNEXES "D" and "E";

6. Despite assumption of obligation imposed by this oath that the facts stated in his Certificate of Candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge, [Cayat] made misrepresentations and committed acts of perjury when he declared that he is eligible for the said office while in truth and in fact, Respondent was convicted in the above-mentioned Criminal Complaint;

7. At the time of filing his Certificate of Candidacy, [Cayat] is disqualified to [sic] said office as Mayor as he is still serving his sentence and/or disqualification was not yet removed or cured[.]⁶ (Emphasis in the original)

Atty. Julius D. Torres (Atty. Torres), COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor for Baguio-Benguet, served summons on Cayat by telegram through the Telecommunications Office on 26 January 2004. However, Cayat did not personally receive the telegram. The Telecommunications Office of Abatan, Buguias delivered the telegram to Ferdinand Guinid (Guinid). Atty. Torres also instructed Mr. Francis Likigan, Election Officer of Buguias, Benguet, to personally inform Cayat to file his answer within three days from receipt of notice. Cayat did not file an answer.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

Despite Cayat’s non-participation, Atty. Torres proceeded with SPA (PES) No. C04-001. Palileng filed his position paper on 16 February 2004. Atty. Torres then resolved the issues based on available records. Atty. Torres also submitted the entire record of the case together with his findings and recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC on 24 February 2004. Pertinent portions of Atty. Torres’ report read:

It is important to note that based on the petition, [Palileng] seeks to disqualify [Cayat] for material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. This can be deduced from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the respondent declared that he is eligible for the office he is seeking to be elected where in fact, [Cayat] is not eligible due to his conviction of a criminal offense. This being [the case,] the petition should have been a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy which should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. Obviously, a petition to deny due course could no longer be filed at the time the petition was received.

However, it is important that the petition alleged the disqualification of the respondent by reason of his conviction of a criminal offense, which is the main reason why the petitioner filed this case. On this note, the applicable provision of law is now Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Said provision of law reads:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running fro [sic] any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within [two] (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) xxx xxx xxx

With this, the issue of disqualification rests on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code and not on the material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy.

The issue now to be resolved is whether or not the crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, to which [Cayat] was convicted by final judgment, is a crime involving moral turpitude so as to bring the issue within the coverage of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

The conviction of [Cayat] was never questioned. In fact [Cayat] accepted his conviction by applying for probation which was granted on November 6, 2003. It is already well settled that a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation. This brings us to the issue of moral turpitude.

Based on the Information filed, [Cayat] was convicted of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness when he, with lewd desire and/or with intention to obtain sexual gratification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold the complainant’s [AAA] arm which he placed on his crotch, grab[bed] and embraced her, as well as kiss[ed] her on the lips and mashed her breasts and performed similar acts of indecency, with force and intimidation and against the will of complainant.

Moral turpitude had been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. (IRRI vs[.] NLRC, May 12, 1993)

Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It is not merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but those initially lies in their being positively prohibited (Dela Torre vs[.] COMELEC and Marcial Villanueva, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996).

From the definition of moral turpitude, it can be determined that the acts of [Cayat] involved moral turpitude. His acts fell short of his inherent duty of respecting his fellowmen and the society. This was aggravated by the fact that [Cayat] is a priest. The crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral turpitude.

Therefore, the respondent is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Applying Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is recommended that [Cayat] be disqualified from running as Mayor of the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet.⁷

In its Resolution of 12 April 2004 of the case docketed as SPA Case No. 04-152, the COMELEC First Division found no compelling reason to disturb Atty. Torres’ findings and consequently cancelled Cayat’s certificate of candidacy. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent REV. FATHER NARDO B. CAYAT.

The Law Department is directed to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT as mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections.

SO ORDERED.⁸

On 13 April 2004, Cayat received a telegram from the Telecommunications Office through an unnamed person. Apparently, the Telecommunications Office asked the unnamed person to deliver the telegram to Cayat. In his affidavit, Cayat stated that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."⁹

The officer in charge of the Telecommunications Office in Buguias, Benguet, Mr. Rufino G. Cabato, certified that he delivered the telegram to Guinid. He further stated that Guinid, Cayat’s cousin, voluntarily accepted to deliver the telegram to Cayat.

Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc on 16 April 2004. Cayat argued that the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 is void because the COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. Cayat also argued that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 (Resolution No. 6452) allowing service of summons by telegram is void.

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat’s name remained on the COMELEC’s list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164 votes.¹⁰ Palileng, on the other hand, received 5,292 votes.¹¹ Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.

Meanwhile, on 13 May 2004, Cayat received a photocopy of the 9 May 2004 order of the COMELEC First Division denying his motion for reconsideration for his failure to pay the filing fee. On 26 May 2004, Cayat filed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 163776 before this Court.

On 29 July 2004, pending the resolution of G.R. No. 163776, Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation with a prayer for the issuance of an injunctive relief, docketed as SPC No. 04-043, against the MBOC of Buguias and Cayat before the COMELEC Second Division. On 28 August 2004, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Palileng’s petition pursuant to COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 7257 (Resolution No. 7257). Resolution No. 7257 enumerated the cases which survived from among those filed before the Clerk of the COMELEC in the 10 May 2004 elections and which required proceedings beyond 30 June 2004.¹²

On 29 July 2004, pending resolution by the COMELEC of SPC No. 04-043, Palileng also filed a motion for execution of judgment in SPA Case No. 04-152. On 10 August 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an order setting on 18 August 2004 the hearing on the motion for execution. Only Palileng’s counsel appeared during the hearing. The parties were instructed to file their respective memoranda within five days. In an order dated 25 October 2004, the COMELEC First Division granted the motion for execution and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) hereby GRANTS the instant Motion for Execution of Judgment and ANNULS the proclamation of Respondent Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat. Accordingly, it directs as follows:

1. For the Law Department to implement the disposition of this Commission (First Division) in its Resolution promulgated last April 12, 2004 and affirmed when it denied Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Order of May 9, 2004, for it to "CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of Rev. Father Nardo B. Cayat as mayoralty candidate in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections["];

2. For the Regional Election Director of Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers;

3. After due notice to the parties, for the Board to convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for mayor of Buguias, Benguet deleting therefrom the name of disqualified candidate Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat and immediately proclaim petitioner Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. as the duly elected mayor of Buguias, Benguet.¹³

Cayat filed an omnibus motion before the COMELEC First Division on 3 November 2004.1ªvvphi1.nét Cayat prayed for the recall of the 25 October 2004 order and for the suspension of further proceedings while the resolution of G.R. No. 163776 remains pending before this Court. The hearing on the motion was set for 12 November 2004.¹⁴

However, on 4 November 2004, Atty. Armando Velasco, Regional Director for the CAR, sent a notice that the new MBOC would convene on 12 November 2004 for the implementation of the COMELEC First Division’s 25 October 2004 order. On 10 November 2004, Cayat filed a petition for certiorari before this Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 165736. Cayat prayed that (1) a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin COMELEC and its agents from enforcing the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; (2) an order be issued reversing and setting aside the 25 October 2004 order and the 4 November 2004 notice; and (3) an order be issued directing the COMELEC to suspend proceedings in SPA Case No. 04-152 until G.R. No. 163776 is resolved by this Court with finality.

On 12 November 2004, the new MBOC executed the COMELEC First Division’s order of 25 October 2004 and proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Palileng took his oath of office on the same day.

Bayacsan, elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed his petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736 on 17 November 2004 before this Court. For his part, Bayacsan prayed that the 25 October 2004 order and the 12 November 2004 proclamation be nullified and that he be declared as the rightful Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Issues

The present petition seeks to determine the legality of the orders cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy, nullifying Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

On the Late Filing of Cayat’s Motion for Reconsideration

Cayat learned about the promulgation of the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 and its contents through two separate telegrams. He narrates the circumstances of his receipt of these telegrams as follows:

10. On April 13, 2004, I took a jeepney ride to Loo, Buguias, to attend a farmers’ congress. When the jeep I was riding in made a stop in front of the Lino’s Grocery in Abatan, somebody (who was not an employee of the Telecom Office) came rushing to give me a telegram which I received. Said telegram, which I read later, informed me that the Comelec will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila;

11. I could not make a trip to my lawyer in Baguio City until April 15, 2004, because he was appearing with Attorneys Samson Alcantara and Rene Gorospe before the Supreme Court which was holding oral arguments in Baguio City;

12. On April 15, 2004, at about 3:00 o’clock, I received a text message in the office of my lawyer that a telegram was served to Mr. Simon Guinid. The message was forwarded. It gave information that my Certificate of Candidacy (COC) had been canceled by the First Division of the Comelec;

x x x x¹⁵

On 16 April 2004, Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2004 before the COMELEC en banc. Cayat alleged that although the Resolution was promulgated on 12 April 2004, he was notified by telegram only on 13 April 2004. Hence, Cayat posits, he had until 16 April 2004 to move for reconsideration.

Cayat claims that he was not served the advance notice of promulgation required in Section 7 of Resolution No. 6452,¹⁶ stating:

Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram or fax.

The three-day period¹⁷ from promulgation of the resolution in Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452, within which to file a motion for reconsideration, presupposes that the advance notice in Section 7 was served on Cayat.

The COMELEC sent the advance notice to Cayat by telegram to "Bayoyo, Buguias, Benguet," the address Cayat wrote on the blank space provided beside "RESIDENCE" in the Certificate of Candidacy he filed with the COMELEC.¹⁸ The COMELEC sent the telegram to Cayat before the date of promulgation. Cayat, who was traveling throughout Buguias at the time, admitted in his affidavit that on 13 April 2004, someone gave "me a telegram which I received. Said telegram which I read later, informed me that the COMELEC will promulgate its decision on April 12, 2004, at the Comelec Session Hall in Intramuros, Manila."¹⁹

Clearly, by the wordings of the telegram, the COMELEC sent the telegram to the residence address of Cayat before 12 April 2004, the date of promulgation. It is immaterial if Cayat personally received the telegram after 12 April 2004 as long as the telegram was sent and delivered before 12 April 2004 to the residence address Cayat indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy.

However, there is no point belaboring this issue, which need not even be resolved. Whether the telegram reached the residence address of Cayat before or after the date of promulgation will not affect the outcome of this case. Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee when he filed his motion for reconsideration on 16 April 2004. There is no dispute that the failure to pay the filing fee made the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, as if Cayat did not file any motion for reconsideration at all.

Thus, the disqualification of Cayat became final three days after 13 April 2004, based on Cayat’s own allegation that he received the telegram only on 13 April 2004 and that he had until 16 April 2004 to file a motion for reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s Certificate of Candidacy due to disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, or 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections.

On Cayat’s Failure to Pay the Filing Fee
for His Motion for Reconsideration

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division denied Cayat’s motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. Cayat made a fatal error: he failed to pay the required filing fee for his motion for reconsideration.

Although there is nothing in Resolution No. 6452 which mentions the need to pay a fee for filing a motion for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes a fee of ₱300 for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or resolution. The succeeding section further provides that the COMELEC may refuse to take action until it is paid.

Cayat’s motion for reconsideration is merely pro forma because Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee within the prescribed period.²⁰ This brings us to the conclusion that it is as if no motion for reconsideration had been filed, resulting in the 12 April 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division attaining finality. The COMELEC First Division’s 12 April 2004 Resolution declaring Cayat’s disqualification became final on 17 April 2004, long before the 10 May 2004 local elections.

On Palileng’s Proclamation

There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation for two basic reasons.

First, the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004²¹ when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty–three days before election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,²² which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases²³ because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases²⁴ had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.

Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law. In Labo, the Court applied the second sentence of Section 6, and even italicized the second sentence for emphasis, thus:

x x x In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:

"Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case, Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.²⁵ (Italicization in the original)

Cayat’s proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes "shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and "shall not be counted."

To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law. It creates confusion in the results of the elections and invites needless new litigations from a candidate whose disqualification had long become final before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant to apply to a situation where a candidate’s disqualification had become final before the elections.

In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, became final on 17 April 2004. This constrains us to rule against Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat’s petitions and Feliseo K. Bayacsan’s petition-in-intervention. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the First Division of the Commission on Elections dated 12 April 2004 and the Orders dated 9 May 2004 and 25 October 2004.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice	CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Asscociate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice	MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Asscociate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Asscociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice	ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Asscociate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice	MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Asscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice	PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

² Rollo (G.R. No. 163776), pp. 57-64. Penned by Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano, with Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Resurreccion Z. Borra, concurring.

³ Id. at 56. Signed by Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcillano.

⁴ Under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

⁵ Rollo (G.R. No. 165736), pp. 26-34. Signed by Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Resurreccion Z. Borra, and Virgilio O. Garcillano.

⁶ Rollo (G.R. No. 163776), pp. 93-95.

⁷ Id. at 59-61. Complainant’s name is omitted per our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419. See also Section 44 of the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9292 and Section 40 of the Rule on Violence Against Women and Children, Administrative Matter No. 04-10-11-SC.

⁸ Id. at 64.
⁹ Id. at 80.
¹⁰ Id. at 107.
¹¹ Id. at 165.

¹² The COMELEC shall dismiss without need of hearing all other cases which are not found in the enumeration and which were disposed of according to the guidelines set forth under paragraphs one to five of the dispositive portion of Resolution No. 7257.

The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 7257 reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of its powers under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act Nos. 6646 and 7166, and other election laws, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. All cases which were filed by private parties without timely payment of the proper filing fee are hereby dismissed;

2. All cases which were filed beyond the reglementary period or not in the form prescribed under appropriate provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act Nos. 6646 and 7166 are hereby likewise dismissed;

3. All other pre-proclamation cases which do not fall within the class of cases specified under paragraphs (1) and (2) immediately preceding shall be deemed terminated pursuant to Section 16, R.A. 7166 except those mentioned in paragraph (4). Hence, all the rulings of boards of canvassers concerned are deemed affirmed. Such boards of canvassers are directed to reconvene forthwith, continue their respective canvass and proclaim the winning candidates accordingly, if the proceedings were suspended by virtue of pending pre-proclamation cases;

4. All remaining pre-proclamation cases, which on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, appear meritorious and/or are subject of orders by the Supreme Court or this Commission in petitions for certiorari brought respectively to them shall likewise remain active cases, thereby requiring the proceedings therein to continue beyond 30 June 2004, until they are finally resolved; and

5. All petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases, not being pre-proclamation controversies and, therefore, not governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 6, Republic Act No. 7166, shall remain active cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 2004, until the issues therein are finally resolved by the Commission.

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered that the proceedings in the cases appearing on the list annexed and made an integral part hereof, be continued to be heard and disposed of by the Commission.

This resolution shall take effect immediately.¹³ Rollo (G.R. No. 163776), pp. 161-162.
¹⁴ Rollo (G.R. No. 165736), pp. 42-51.
¹⁵ Rollo (G.R. No. 163776), p. 80.

¹⁶ Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing and Reception of Evidence of Disqualification Cases Filed on connection with the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections; Motu Propio Actions and Dispositions of Disqualification Cases.

¹⁷ Section 8 of Resolution No. 6452 provides:

SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. — A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall, within two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.

The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.

¹⁸ Rollo (G.R. No. 163776), pp. 97, 106.
¹⁹ Id. at 80.
²⁰ See Loyola v. COMELEC, 337 Phil. 134 (1997).
²¹ See note 17.

²² G.R. No. 105111 and G.R. No. 105384, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 297.

²³ To name a few: Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 158466, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 144; Kare v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157526, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 264; Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002); Loreto v. Brion, 370 Phil. 727 (1999); Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310 (1998); Nolasco v. COMELEC, 341 Phil 761(1997); Reyes v. COMELEC, 324 Phil. 813 (1996); Abella v. COMELEC, G.R. 100710, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 253; Geronimo v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-60504, 14 May 1985, 136 SCRA 435.

²⁴ Id.
²⁵ Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 22, at 305.

guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.⁵⁹ Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

x x x x

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

x x x x

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.

x x x x

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,⁶⁰ abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."⁶¹ The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule⁶² that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203766               April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x