macarulay

1)

Ombudsman vs Armilla

GR no. 160675, June 16, 2006

Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria Constancia-Lim filed with the olffice of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein EdmondoArregadas, NicomedesArmilla,DeliaBatasin-in,James Fuentes, Oscar Gador,SantosGuigayoma, Jr, ClaritoMinoza,NelsonObeso,SenenSerino,ErnestoNaraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. Banilad, Mandaue City.

It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of Land owned by the Corominas family without seeking from the latter or their representative and despite the big “NO TRESPASSING” sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.

Issue: Viewed against Section 13(3), Article XI of the constitution, is the ombudsman is limited only with the power  to recommend, but not to impos, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public office or employee found to be at fault?

Ruling: The court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the constitution which directs the Officeof the Ombudsman to “recommend” to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term “recommended,” according to the court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provision in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

The Court further explained that the mandatory character of the ombudsman’s order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal actor omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.

In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the orpenalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.

2)

Lambino v Comelec

Lambinowas able to gather the signature of 6,327,952 individual for an initiative petition to amend  the 1987 constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters.

This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs1-7 of Art VI and Sec  1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”.These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-president system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government . The COMELEC, on 31 aug 2006, denied the petitions to amend the Constitution- this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

ISSUE: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signature in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal  to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents ,or their supporters , often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving  that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the log rolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since at hand can be decided upon other facts. He rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

3)

Civil Service Commission

Petitioner

Vs

Pedro Dacoycoy

Respondent

GR No.135805

April 29, 1999

EN BANC

FACTS:

The case at bar involving respondent Pedro Dacoycoy was charge with nepotism.

Civil Service Commission found respondent Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts result of appointment of his two sons, Rito andPed, as driver and utility worker, respectively,and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him thethe  penalty of dismissal  from the service.

Issue:

Whether  the respondent is guilty of nepotism

Rulling:

We affirmed with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro Dcaoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly imposed the penalty of dismisal from servce.Nepotism was reclassified as a grave offense punishable by DISMISSAL.Hence, at the time of the appointments of the Dacoycoy brothers the penalty for nepotism was already dismissal.

Under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 292, s 1987, that constitute nepotism, that is, "one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

a) appointing authority;

b) recommending authority;

c) chief of bureau or office, and

d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee"

Wherefore, the Court hereby DENIES the respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.This denial is final.The Justices maintained their votes as in the original decision.

The Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

4)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner
vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent

G.R. No. 161098 September 13, 2007

Facts:

On July 27, 2000, the City of Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay 183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B. Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical malversation, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against Mr. Santiago herein respondent.
Mr. Santiago(respondent)  filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint denying all the charges and contending that the complaint was filed to harass him.
On May 22 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissed him from service.

Mr. Santiago(respondent)  filed a motion for reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order dated July 24, 2001.

Mr. Santiago(respondent) filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order  and the Court of Appeals partially granted the said petition.

Issue:

Whether  the Ombudsman has the power and authority to dismiss government employees and official  at fault.

Rulling:

The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following  power, functions and duties:

Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Considering that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, it follows that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

The power of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.

5)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 169004

Rolando Plaza herein respondent, a member of the Sangguniang  Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00)

Mr.Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss on  April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan,  and the latter granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

Issue:

Whether  the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the members of Sangguniang  Panglungsod  with the  salary grade of 27 charged with the violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Rulling:

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan . In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.

The Petition on September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan  hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.

6)

RENATO M. LAPINID, PETITIONER,

VS

 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO JUNSAY, RESPONDENTS

G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991

Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the  Civil Service Commission  and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA.

After the record of the said case has been reviewed. The CSC find the petition meritorious.

Issue:

Is the  Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

Rulling:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil case Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.

While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body, we must stress, as a necessary reminder, that every department and office in the Republic must know its place in the scheme of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts are subject to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even if the Commission may not agree with them.

The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.

The petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil Service Commission  are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order is made PERMANENT. No costs.

7)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,

VS.

PASTOR B. TINAYA, RESPONDENT

 G.R. NO. 154898, February 16, 2005

 

Facts:

Respondent Pastor B. Tinaya, , was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.

On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards. On the same day his appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of his office.

On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.

The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approved respondent’s appointment as permanent.

On the basis of the above report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999^[7] recalling respondent’s appointment.

Issue:

Whether the respondent Mr. Tinaya is guilty of nepotism.

Rulling:

In Lazo vs.  Civil Service Commissionwe held that “under the Constitution, the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the Civil Service.”

While the appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications.

The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the appointee is qualified, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.

Significantly, respondent does not dispute such lack of proof of his work related experience when he was extended his original appointment as municipal assessor. In fact, he did not raise any objection to the approval of said original appointment as temporary.
Thus, petitioner merely complied with the Constitutional and statutory mandate to determine whether respondent was qualified. And due to his failure to submit the required service record as proof of his qualification, petitioner did not err in approving his original appointment as temporary.

Records show that before respondent married Caridad Justimbaste, daughter of then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, on December 16, 1993, the latter appointed him municipal assessor. The appointment was permanent.S

As stated earlier, petitioner approved it as temporaryActing Mayor Luban extended to respondent (already the son-in-law of Mayor Justimbaste) a permanent appointment after his original temporary appointment expired. This new appointment was initially disapproved by petitioner.

Petitioner has the power to recall an appointment in violation of civil service law, rules and regulations.

The instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals  and its Resolution are REVERSED. The Resolution No. 002470 and Resolution No. 010126 of petitioner CSC are AFFIRMED.

8)

Tecson

vs.

COMELEC ,

GR 16134 , March 3, 2004

 

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

Rulling:

No. "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled “Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,” for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

9)

BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011
Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.

Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.

Rulling:

No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.

International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements.
Likewise, any derogation from the surrender option of the Philippines under Section 17 of RA 9851 must be embodied in an applicable extradition law or treaty and not in a mere executive agreement because such derogation violates RA 9851, which is superior to, and prevails over, a prior executive agreement allowing such derogation. Under no circumstance can a mere executive agreement prevail over a prior or subsequent law inconsistent with such executive agreement. Thus, the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement to be valid and effective must be ratified by the Philippine Senate, and unless so ratified, the Agreement is without force and effect.
The petition is GRANTED and to DECLARE the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ineffective and unenforceable unless and until ratified by the Senate of the Philippines.

10)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,
vs.
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO, respondents.

Facts:

Gertrudes Madriaga (respondent), school principal of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila, and her co-respondent Ana Marie Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom teacher who was designated as Canteen Manager of the same school.

Through its president Teresa Nuque (Teresa), charged respondents with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

After respondents had given their side of the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Acuña, by Decision of May 28, 2001, found respondents guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713.To the best interest of the service, and accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration  is denied by Order of July 26, 2001, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. Finding the issues that called for resolution in the petition to be

The appellate court, by Decision of May 28, 2004, declared that the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is merely "recommendatory" to the Department of Education, it (Office of the Ombudsman) having "only the power to investigate possible misconduct of a government official or employee in the performance of his functions, and thereafter recommend to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out; and that it is the disciplining authority that has the power or prerogative to impose such penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not the suspension imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman to the respondents is recommendatory the concerned agency.

Rulling:

We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
The Court of Appeals Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.