Liong Case Digest 1-5

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008] 

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. HENRY A. SOJOR, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Henry A Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete city on August 1, 1991. He was subsequently reappointed by the Board of Trustees when the law mandated that a BOT be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. On June 25, 2004, CVPC converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), the Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body. Meanwhile the respondent was charged with 3 administrative cases filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism. Respondent argued that CSC has no jurisdiction over him as presidential appointee. He further argued that only the BOT has the power to remove university officials citing provisions of R.A. No. 8292. CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondents appeal and authorizing the regional office to proceed with the investigation and preventively suspending the respondent. When the CSC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration with finality, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC. The CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation. Hence this petition was filed by CSC.

ISSUES

Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction in the discipline and removal of state university officials.

RULING

The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. The CSC has also been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. As provided in Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Sec. 5; “Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.” Argument of the respondent that BOR has the sole authority to discipline and remove his office cannot prosper. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university. Academic freedom cannot be invoked by Sojor as this is not applicable to the present case. It cannot be justified that he is within the bounds of academic freedom since administrative complaints filed against him involve violations of civil service rules. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

[G.R. No. 101526, July 03, 1992]

RODELA D. TORREGOZA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

FACTS

The petitioner has been working as Staff Aide position in the Legal Office, Office of the President, Malacanang, Manila, since January 18, 1978, to the present. His original appointment was for only six months. On June 5, 1978, less than five months after the first appointment, petitioner was given another appointment to the same position effective "as of June 18, 1978" and with a notation that "This appointment is declared confidential." Then on March 5, 1990, respondent Commission issued the "Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6850, enabling the petitioner to file her application for the appropriate eligibility to the position she has been occupying for the last thirteen (13) years and having accordingly rendered efficient service. The petitioner’s request returned unacted for the reason that the position held was declared confidential. After the Salary Standardization Law (Republic Act No. 6758) was passed, the same position was reclassified as Clerk II in July 1989.

Subsequently, Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento sent a letter to the respondent dated November 7, 1990, requesting that based on the present certified function and actual duties of the petitioner, the position be restored to the career service and that said petitioner be granted the civil service eligibility under R.A. No. 6850. Respondent commission denied the request stating the position was declared “confidential in nature” by the Office of the President. The respondent however restored the position of Clerk II to career service but still denied the petition for reconsideration of the petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not the writ of mandamus may be issued by the Court to compel the respondent Commission to grant the petitioner the privilege of securing an appropriate civil service eligibility under Republic Act No. 6850.

RULING

The court cannot compel the commission to grant the privilege of civil service eligibility under RA 6850. The simple reason being that under the law granting the privilege to government employees, there is a wide latitude of discretion given to the Commission which determines in Section 1 thereof, "who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this Act." With such discretion, Section 2 of the same law requires the Civil Service Commission to promulgate the rules and regulations to implement this Act using certain standards. Besides what the law granted is a privilege and not a right, therefore the discretion lies with the commission itself. As provided by Sec 1 of RA 6850 ; "The Civil Service Commission shall formulate performance evaluation standards in order to determine those temporary employees who are qualified to avail themselves of the privilege granted under this Act.

"The civil service eligibility herein granted may apply to such other positions as the Civil Service Commission may deem appropriate.

Petition was hereby dismissed due to lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

FACTS

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

“There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.”

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty Monsod has past work experiences which are exposed in the legal aspects of society. This includes position as former Secretary General and National Chairman of NAMFREL. He also served as Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development and has also used his legal knowledge in being a member of Davide Commission. He also worked as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. 

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Atty. Christian Monsod possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

RULING

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Hence instant petition is hereby dismissed.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993

DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms. CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.

FACTS

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992, directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III; Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).

The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).

ISSUE/S

1) Whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

2) Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary conference.

RULING

The Ombudsman power to preventively suspend petitioners is clearly provided in the Sec 24 of RA No 6770 which provides that the Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay is due to fault, negligence or petition of the respondent. The Solicitor General cannot invoke Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution for the suspension indicated herein are those punitive in character. The Ombudsman merely ordered for a preventive suspension which may be necessary due to several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.

The second issue is equally unmeritorious. Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was "nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard . . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra). Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.

Wherefore the petition was DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the Resolution was LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

             G.R. No. 138093             

February 19, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IGNACIO SALMINGO, petitioners,
vs.
EDWIN D. VELEZ (City Mayor), ELI G. ALMINAZA (City Accountant), ARTURO J. SIASON (Acting City Treasurer), ELADIO S. MONDRAGON, JR. (City Engineer), All of Silay City, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Ignacio Salmingo, a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Silay City, filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (for Visayas) charging respondents with:

1. Installing and operating a rock crusher without the required Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) from the DENR;

2. Incurring an overdraft against appropriation in the amount of P3.991M, in violation of Section 158 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual;

3. Entering into a transaction that is grossly or manifestly disadvantageous to Silay City, in violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019;

4. Malversation of P2.528M in violation of Art. 217 of the RPC; and

5. Technical Malversation of at least P11.648M in violation of Sec. 305 (a) of the Local Government Code and Art. 220 of the RPC

Salmingo alleged in the complaint that respondent City Mayor Edwin D. Velez requested and obtained an approval from the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Silay City, through a resolution, an authority to enter into a loan agreement with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for purchasing a rock crusher and related heavy equipments for a total of P10M.  Total payment to supplier YY&Company amounted to P 11,648,000.00. The city received P8.719M from LBP but had only used P 6.191M in payment and thus had been unable to account for the P2.528M. The foregoing disbursements allegedly caused the Silay City local government to incur an overdraft of P3.991M under the item of Capital Outlay – Office of the City Mayor. As a result of said overdraft and embezzled or unaccounted amount, Silay City allegedly experienced extreme fund shortage and had been deficit spending operation after May 8, 1995 elections. Respondent Mayor Velez caused the installation of the rock crusher without the Environmental Clearance Certificate from the DENR and did not conduct Environmental Impact Assessment. The rock crusher plant allegedly failed to operate during the inauguration because it was not only used and second hand but also actually a junk. While it has yet to operate, Silay City has been burdened with interest payment for the LBP loan amounting to at least P 250,000.00.

After preliminary investigation, the Graft Investigator prepared a Resolution recommending the filing of Information against respondents excluding the City Budget Officer for violation of Sec 3 of RA 3019. The Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman and the corresponding Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB). The SB found probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest of respondents and issued the same against them, where respondents posted bail. On the same day, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Office of Ombudsman  denied the motion with the ratiocination that the filing of an Information before the SB precluded the said Office from taking cognizance of the said motion.

Undaunted, respondents filed with the SB a “Joint Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation”. The SB granted the respondent’s motion and ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to re-evaluate the evidence adduced by the parties and to take appropriate action in connection therewith.  The Special Prosecutor office agreed with the findings that there was a prima facie case against respondents but recommended modifications to the Ombudsman, namely, that the Information in Criminal Case No. 24307 be withdrawn and another Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 be filed only against City Engineer Eladio S. Mondragon Jr. The reason of which is that no overpricing was found but instead the City Engineer who has the technical knowledge should have inspected the said equipments before and after the same were delivered and accepted. This is a negligence on his part who failed to exercise the degree of diligence he was expected to perform. The SB granted the Motion to Withdraw Information of the prosecution, the criminal case was dismissed and bail bonds were cancelled. Salmingo filed for motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied by SB.

ISSUES

1.) Whether Salmingo is the proper party to file the present petition

2.) Whether SB violated Section 27 of RA 6770 when it treated the "Joint Motion for Reconsideration / Reinvestigation" of respondents as a motion for reconsideration under Sec 27 of RA 6770 and when it granted the "Motion to Withdraw Information" filed by the Office of the Ombudsman and dismissed Criminal Case No. 24307.

RULING

The Court agrees with the contention of the respondent Office of the Ombudsman that Salmingo is not the proper party as petitioner in this case. The governing rule is Sec 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The Court has previously held that the "party" referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main case. Hence only the aggrieved original party in the main case is the only proper party as petitioner. The Court notes that Salmingo was not a party in the main case. While it is true that he initiated the criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for various offenses, however, under the Information filed with the SB, the parties are the People of the Philippines as plaintiff and the respondents as the accused. The private complainant is the Cty of Silay while Salmingo is merely a witness for the plaintiff.

Contrary to the contention of Salmingo, the SB did not violate Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it treated the Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation of respondents as a motion for reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. Records show that when the Office of the Ombudsman approved the resolution prepared by the Graft Investigator, the Information was filed prematurely against the respondents. The Office of theOmbudsman must have realized this when respondents filed with the SB their Joint Motion for Reconsideration / Reinvestigation and thus agreed to treat the Motion as a motion for reconsideration under Sec 27 of RA 6770. By its agreement, the Office of the Ombudsman merely corrected itself when it denied the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation filed by the respondents with the Office of the Ombudsman on the sole ground that the Information had already been filed with the SB. 

The Office of the Ombudsman is vested under the 1987 Constitution with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Said office, through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of the case. When it filed the Motion to Withdraw Information on its finding that there was no probable cause against respondents, except the City Engineer, the Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Case law holds that this Court is loathe to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of its powers:

x x x At this point we reiterate that ‘x x x [t]his is an exercise of the Ombudsman’s powers based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts will be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.’²²

In light of all the foregoing, the petition was DENIED and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan were affirmed.