Karen Joy C. Cezar

                                                                  

karenjoychiocezar@yahoo.com

http://www.lawphil.net/ -Source (cases are randomly selected)

G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: On October9,1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17.  The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.  It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 80007 January 25, 1988

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO R. BUAN, JR., and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition.   The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

G.R. No. 124680-81           February 28, 2000

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, 
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1^st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division.  At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her.  At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario.  It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law.  But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

G.R. No. L-59068 January 27, 1983

JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA and ROMEO B. IGOT, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.”  COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the afore quoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

G.R. No. 158466 June 15, 2004

PABLO V. OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARIO B. CRESPO a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

FACTS: On 23 May 2001, Crespo was declared as the elected Congressman of the 6^th District of Manila. Ocampo was the rival candidate who filed an electoral protest in the HRET alleging that Crespo’s win was due to election fraud and vote buying. On 06 March 2003, Crespo was declared by the HRET as ineligible for office due to lack of residence in the said district of Manila. Due to such declaration, Ocampo then requested the HRET to declare him as the winner of the election done in 2001 pursuant to RA 6646 which provides that “Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted…” Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then be considered as stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the second highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768 votes), he should be declared as the winner of the said election contest. The HRET denied Ocampo’s petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.

HELD: Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is disqualified.   The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered “stray.” Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the Election Day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS: On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD: The Constitution provides that each “house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides : “SEC. 13.  Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.”

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, presiding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.  Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds.  Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case.  All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

.

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS: Bengson and Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2^nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a Quo Warranto proceeding in the HRET alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipinoand he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of RA 2630 which provides that “Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines…”. Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

HELD: Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable.  As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term “natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens “are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. In respondent Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.  However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.  On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

G.R. No. 178678 April 16, 2009

DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES, petitioner,

vs

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES A. ROBLES, respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of Buhay, a party-list group duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. All the required Manifestations of Desire to Participate in the said electoral exercises, including the Certificates of Nomination of representatives, carried the signature of Robles as president of BUHAY. On January 26, 2007, in connection with the May 2007 elections, BUHAY again filed a Manifestation of its Desire to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation. As in the past two elections, the manifestation to participate bore the signature of Robles as BUHAY president.

Señeres, on the other hand, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates. In it, petitioner Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed that position since August 17, 2004 when Robles vacated the position. Pushing the point, Señeres would claim that the nominations made by Robles were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the expiration of the latter’s term as party president. Furthermore, Señeres asserted that Robles was, under the Constitution, disqualified from being an officer of any political party, the latter being the Acting Administrator of the Light Railway Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Roble, so Señeres would charge, was into a partisan political activity which civil service members, like the former, were enjoined from engaging in.

On July 9 and July 18, 2007, respectively, the COMELEC issued two resolutions proclaiming BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 2007 elections entitled to three (3) House seats and it also declared Robles as the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawexcept the instant petition.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

HELD:  A special civil action for certiorari may be availed of when the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling the proceeding.  It is the “proper remedy to question any final order, ruling and decision of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” For certiorari to prosper, however, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In the present case, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to Señeres. The 1987 Constitution cannot be more explicit in this regard. It is undisputed that the COMELEC, sitting as National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 14, 2007 elections, entitled to three (3) seats in the House of Representatives. The proclamation came in the form of two Resolutions dated July 9, 2007 and July 18, 2007, respectively. Said resolutions are official proclamations of COMELEC considering it is BUHAY that ran for election as party-list organization and not the BUHAY nominees.

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS: Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]  Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the membersof Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.