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SANTIAGO V. COA (2007)

EN BANC

[ G. R. NO. 146824, November 21, 2007 ]

ENCARNACION E. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. V, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner informed the Court that upon the directive of the Bureau of Local Government Finance Executive Director Ma. Presentacion R. Montesa, she is back to her regular station and formally assumed office as the Municipal Treasurer of Goa, Camarines Sur, on February 26, 2007.

In a letter dated August 13, 2007, petitioner requested respondents and the Municipal Mayor of Goa, Camarines Sur, to pay her representation allowance, additional compensation allowance, productivity bonus, year-end bonus, clothing allowance and other benefits, excluding her salary, from October 1998 up to the present based on the dispositive portion of the Decision.

In a letter dated August 22, 2007, respondent Commission on Audit (COA), through the Regional Cluster Director, replied that the items requested cannot be paid to petitioner because this Court has already clarified the issue when it stated in the body of the Decision that “. . . COA can direct the proper officer to withhold petitioner’s salary and other emoluments. . . .” According to COA, “emoluments” necessarily include all allowances and any money due petitioner.

Petitioner prays that the dispositive portion of the Decision be clarified as to whether the emoluments due her as Municipal Treasurer are excluded from the item that respondents can withhold, so that in the event that the said emoluments are excluded, the same can be paid to her.

In petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari, she prayed that judgment be issued setting aside the Director’s First Indorsement dated January 25, 2000, the Commission’s Letters dated December 8, 2000 and January 22, 2001, the Second Indorsement dated December 8, 2000; and that the respondents, including the Municipal Mayor of Goa, Camarines Sur, be ordered to immediately pay her salary in the accumulated amount of P124,606.21, and the salary accruing after the month of July 1999 to which she may be entitled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the salary and other emoluments of petitioner may be withheld by respondents and applied to her cash shortage determined merely in an audit examination.

RULING:

The Court holds that COA can direct the proper officer to withhold petitioner’s salary and other emoluments under Section 21, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, which is substantially the same as Section 37 of PD No. 1445, the legal basis of COA. . . .

The amount of petitioner’s salary remitted to the local government treasurer as payment of petitioner’s cash shortage should be considered merely withheld until final resolution on her indebtedness. In the event that petitioner is found not liable for the cash shortage, the withheld salary and other emoluments will be released to her; otherwise, it will be applied in payment of her indebtedness.

LAPINID V. CSC (1991)

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991 ]

RENATO M. LAPINID, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO JUNSAY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA. In n a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious.

Upon the reviewing the merits of the evaluation, CSC directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.

Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and on the basis of the finding orders his replacement by the latter.

RULING:

The court ruled by citing the case of Luego Vs. CSC that the Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.

CSC V. DACOYCOY (1999)

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999 ]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

n November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.^[1]

After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal charge against him.^[2] Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.^[3]

On February 25, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration;^[4] however, on May 20, 1997, the Civil Service Commission denied the motion.^[5]

On July 18, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction^[6] to set aside the Civil Service Commission's resolutions.

On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act."^[7]

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dacoycoy is covered on the ban on nepotism.

RULING:

The court agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.

The law defines nepotism^[9] as follows:

"Sec. 59. Nepotism. - (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

"As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission."

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:

a) appointing authority;

b) recommending authority;

c) chief of the bureau or office, and

d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

DEBULGADO V. CSC (1994) NEPOTISM

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 111471, September 26, 1994 ]

CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO AND VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. On October 1, 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife, Victoria T. Debulgado, as General services Officer, that is, as head of the Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. Victoria was one of three (3) employees of the City Government who were considered for the positionof General Services Officer. Before her promotion in 1992, she had been in the service of the City Government for about thirty-two (32)years. She joined the City Government on January 3, 1961 as Assistant License Clerk. Through the years, she rose from the ranks from being Asst. Chief of the Licenses & Fees Division until being a Cashier IV. On October 1, 1992, petitioner Victoria assumed the new post, and commenced discharging the functions, of General Services Officer of San Carlos City and receiving the regular salary attached to that position. On December 16, 1992, the Civil Service Commission received a letter from Congressman Tranquilino B.Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. During the investigation, the CSC found that the appointee was the lawful wife of the Mayor. Acting on the investigation report, the CSC disapproved the promotion of Victoria to the position of General Services Officer of San Carlos City upon the ground that promotion violated the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments. The Debulgados moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer. They also asserted that the Commission had deprived Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment.

ISSUES:

1.     Whether the prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original appointments and not to promotional appointments.

2.     Whether the CSC exercised due process in recalling/disapproving the appoint of Victoria

RULING:

1.     The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. A textual examination of Section 59 at once reveals that the prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Firstly, it explicitly covers "all appointments", without seeking to make any distinction between differing kinds or types of appointments. Secondly, Section 59 covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government, as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned or controlled corporations. Thirdly, there is a list of exceptions set out in Section 59 itself, but it is a short list which includes (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (b) teachers; (c) physicians; and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The list has not been added to or subtracted from for the past thirty (30) years. The list does not contain words like "and other similar positions." Thus, the list appears to us to be a closed one, at least closed until lengthened or shortened by Congress. Under Sec. 1, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of the Admin Code, both an original appointment and a promotion are particular species of personnel action. The original appointment of a civil service employee and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must comply with the Implementing Rules including, of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule XVIII. To the extent that all personnel actions occurring after an original appointment, require the issuance of a new appointment to another position (or to the original position in case of reinstatement), we believe that such appointment must comply with all applicable rules and prohibitions, including the statutory and regulatory prohibition against nepotism. To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into the government service, and to insulate from that prohibition appointments subsequently issued when personnel actions are thereafter taken in respect of the same employee, would be basically to render that prohibition meaningless and toothless. The purpose of the rule is to ensure that all appointments and other personnel actions in the civil service should be based on merit and fitness and should never depend on how close or intimate an appointee is to the appointing power.

2.     No. The action was not the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure upon petitioner Victoria, nor upon petitioner Mayor. There were no administrative charges in respect of which petitioner Victoria would have been entitled to notice and hearing.The Commission, in approving or disapproving an appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicableprovisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualifications. In any case,Victoria was afforded an opportunity to be heard when she filed a motion for reconsideration with the Commission and there challengedthe disapproval by the Commission.

ARATUC V. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

FACTS:

Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent Board in Cotabato City. A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of  the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass but issued guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting. The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for decision. In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly :a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affected

On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring he final result of the canvass.

ISSUE:

WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC.

RULING:

Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-à-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.