DIGESTED CASES IN POLITICAL LAW IVEN B. PACATANG

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Perez, J.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010

Abad, J.

FACTS:

In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group.

Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr. ,ErlindaCadapan, Antonia Flores, and JoselitoUstarez are members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warrantoagainst Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and nderreprsented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.

Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications. Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

FACTS:

YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse of Representatives are of two kinds: “members who shall be elected from legislative districts” and “those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are “elected” into office, not their parties or organizations. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.

As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

III

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010

FACTS:

On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council: (1) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (2) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (3) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and(4) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion that a plain reading of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.

ISSUE:

 Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight appointments stated under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

YES: We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.

Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purpose of any quarter.

 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010

Nachura, J.

FACTS:

Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) on the grounds that it violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner chafes the creation of the “separate tribunal” which was complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.

HELD:

NO. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the instant petition as he was unmistakably estopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004 therefore making the petitioner’s standing still imperiled by thee white elephant in the petition. Judicial inquiry requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme Court’s independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but it remained absolute.

 LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAGAO V. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010

Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

At the dawn of administration, the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). Barely a month after  the issuance of Executive order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers bu usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.

HELD:

No. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent them. The president’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws-in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency- is inherent in the president’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power”. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.

VI

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009

FACTS:

As the head of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, Victoria Amante as a member of the SangguniangPanglusod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu, was able to get an amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher for the seminar expenses for the said Committee.Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao in his demand letter requested Amante to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours for the cash advance she obtained for almost two years had elapsed.

The Commission on Audit, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be furtherinvestigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree(P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known asThe AuditingCode of the Philippines.Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information forMalversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indictrespondent Amante.The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amantefiled with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not a member of theSangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who wascharged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:

 Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19,1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides thatto determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, asamended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable inthe present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at thetime of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in thispresent case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shallgovern.The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, asamended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for theSandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, amongothers, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwiseclassified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However,the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall withinthe jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the samelaw.By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being amember of theSangguniangPanlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relationto her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

VII

OMBUDSMAN V. ARMILLA

G.R. No.160675, June 16, 2006

FACTS:

Joan and Thomas Corominas, and Maria ConstanciaCorominas-Lim filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) a criminal complaint for violation of Article 281 (Other Forms of Trespass) of the Revised Penal Code against herein EdmondoArregadas, NicomedesArmilla, Delia Batasin-in, James Fuentes, Oscar Gador, Santos Guigayoma, Jr., ClaritoMiñoza, Nelson Obeso, SenenSeriño, Ernesto Naraja, and Martin Yase, all employees of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Regional Office No. VII, Banilad, MandaueCity.It was alleged that the above-named DENR employees conspired to enter the parcel of land owned by the Corominas family without seeking permission from the latter or their representative and despite the big "NO TRESPASSING" sign attached to the perimeter fences enclosing the said property.

ISSUE:

Viewed against Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, is the Ombudsman limited only with the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault?

HELD:

The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

The Court further explained that the mandatory character of the Ombudsman’s order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.

In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.

TECSON V. COMELEC

G.R. 16134 March 3, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioners herein contended that the Comelec  has no jurisdiction in deciding the complaints against the Presidential candidates particularly the Fernando Poe Jr. as a Presidential contender. They claimed that the Comelec has violated the provision of the 1987  Constitution that the Supreme Court only has the original and exclusive power to settle those queries.

ISSUE:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

HELD:

No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

 LAMBINO V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

Lambino proposed an amendment to modify the Constitutional provisions particularly the Sections 1-7 of Article VII and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions” by gathering signatures of 6,327, 952 individuals for an initiative petition which said signatures comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters.These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.  The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.  The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.  The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.    The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

X

OMBUDSMAN V. MOJICA

G.R. No. 146486, March 04, 2005

FACTS:

On 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.

ISSUE:

Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. 
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.