juvy ageas

 Laurel vs. CSC (1991)

[ G.R. NO. 71562, OCTOBER 28, 1991 ]

FACTS:

 Petitioner, the duly elected governor of Batangas appointed his brother Benjamin Laurel as Senior Executive Assistant, non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. He was later appointed as acting provincial administrator effective January 2, 1981. On April 2888888, 1981, Benjamin Laurel was issued a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer.

Private respondent Sangalang questions Benjamin Laurel’s appointment as Provincial Administrator. He alleges that the appointment to a career position and violates Civil Service Rule; and the Governor violates the anti-graft and corruption practices act.

ISSUE:

Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation?

HELD:

Yes.  Although what was extended to Benjamin was merely a designation and not an appointment, the Civil Service Commission ruled that the prohibition on nepotism would include designation because what cannot be done directly cannot be done directly. It further held that Section 24(F) of RA 2260 provides that no person appointed to a position in the non-competitive service (non-career) shall perform the duties properly belonging to any position in the competitive service (career). The petitioner therefore could not legally and validly designate Benjamin who successively occupied the non career position of Senior Executive Assistant and Civil Security Officer, to the position of a Provincial Administrator, a career position under Section 4 of RA No. 5185.

DEBULGADO V. CSC (1994) NEPOTISM

 [ G.R. NO. 111471, SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 ]

FACTS:

Rogelio R. Delgado, a mayor of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, appointed his wife Victoria T. Debulgado as Head of the General Service Office of the City Government of San Carlos. The Civil Service Commission disapproved the promotions it violated the prohibition against nepotic appointments and not to promotional appointments.

ISSUE:

Does nepotism apply to promotion?

HELD:

Yes. The prohibitory norm against nepotism covers all appointments without any distinction between different kinds or types of appointments. Section 59 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) covers all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal government as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned and controlled corporations. The promotional appointment of Victoria by her husband, the mayor falls within the prohibited class of appointments.

The court ruled that the Civil Service Commission had the authority the promotional appointment extended to the petitioner.

TECSON V. COMELEC (2004)

 [ G.R. NO. 161434, MARCH 03, 2004 ]

FACTS:

Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE:

As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualification over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

HELD:

No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12. 13 and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal”, promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario .

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

NAC V. COA (2004)

 [ G. R. NO. 156982, SEPTEMBER 08, 2004 ]

FACTS:

National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of a chairperson, 3 commissioners and 3 ex-officio members. After personally attending the initial NAC Meetings, the 3 ex-officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, NAC resident auditor disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria amounting to P225, 270 pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

NAC filed a petition contending that COA committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the Memorandum  to the NAC ex-officio members’ representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below that of an Assistant Secretary; and disallowing the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex-officio members.

ISSUE:

Are Assistant Secretaries covered by the constitutional prohibition imposed under Section 13, Art. VII?

HELD:

Yes. Section 13, Art. VII specifically prohibits the President, Vice-President , Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

The court held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex-officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. Hence, since the ex-officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.

The petition is dismissed.

OMBUDSMAN V. MADRIAGA (2006)

[G.R. No. 164316 September 27, 2006 ]

FACTS:

A letter complaint dated September 8, 2000 was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging the respondents with the violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.  After respondents gave their side of the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer found respondents guilty of violation of the aforementioned provision.

A Memorandum Order dated June 28, 2001 was from the Graft Investigation Officer, Julita Calderon set aside Acuña's decision and stating further that respondents were also guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for not promptly responding to the letter request of the complainant for copies of the school canteen's financial statements for the period from February to August 2000 and against respondents Gertrudes Madriaga and Ana Marie Bernardo and accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension.

Respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation having been denied by Order of July 26, 2001, they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials?

What is the nature of the functions of the Ombudsman as envisioned by the Fundamental Law?

HELD:

Yes. The petitioner's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law as provided for by the provisions of RA 6770. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Therefore the challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004 is reversed and set aside. The record of the case is remanded to the office of origin, Office of the Ombudsman, for appropriate action consistent with the ruling of this case.

VELOSO V. COA

[ G.R. NO. 193677, SEPTEMBER 06, 2011 ]

FACTS:

On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to Elective Local Officials of Manila who have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The ordinance was deemed approved on August 23, 2002. Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of the former councilors a total sum of P9,923,257.00. On August 8, 2005, Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation citing that the initial payment of monetary reward is without legal basis; the amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to double compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR of RA 7160;  and that the appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III of the NGAS for local government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 .On November 30, 2010, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing before the implementation of the assailed COA decisions.

ISSUE:

Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds? Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of  P9,923,257.00 covering the EPSA of former three-term councilors of the City of Manila authorized by Ordinance No. 8040.

HELD:

The COA's assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.  However, the refund of the disallowed amount is not required because all the parties acted in good faith. The questioned disbursement was made pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as December 7, 2000 although deemed approved only on August 22, 2002. The city officials disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such reward.

The petition is dismissed. Judgment affirmed the decisions dated September 26, 2008 and August 23, 2010 of the Commission on Audit but with modifications. The recipients need not refund the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration that they already received and the Commission on Audit is ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the Notice of Finality of Decision dated October 5, 2010. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on November 30, 2010 is recalled.

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANGBAYAN  

[ GR No. 159486-88, Nov. 25, 2003 ]

FACTS:

            Atty. Allan Paguia, speaking for Joseph Estrada asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. This prohibits justices from participating in any partisan political activity which prescription was violated by Chief Justice Hilario Davide when he attended the EDSA 2 rally and authorized the assumption of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners contends justices have thereby prejudged a case that assails the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo.

ISSUE:

            Was the act of Chief Justice in swearing into office President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in EDSA a partisan political activity?

HELD:

            No. The act of the Chief Justice was not a partisan political activity. The taking of an oath of office by and incoming President of the Republic is a traditional official function of the honest magistrate. The assailed presence of the other justices of the court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in other official function.

ESTRADA V. MACAPAGAL ARROYO

[ GR No. 146738, March 2, 2001 ]

FACTS:

            Joseph E. Estrada alleged that he is President on leave and respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.

            This stems from the event which took place on January 20, 2001 wherein then President Estrada transmitted a declaration to the Senate and House of Representative where he declared his inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office. The President then left Malacanang after a huge public outcry for him to step down. Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo then took her oath of office as President of the Republic.

            Petitioner prays for judgment confirming him to be the lawful President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge his duties of his office and declare Gloria Macapagal Arroyo President only in an acting capacity.

ISSUE:

            Was Estrada’c claim of temporay disability, correct and tenable?

HELD:

            NO. The court ruled that Joseph Estrada is not a President on leave and his claim of temporary disability untenable. Although it is maintained that he did not write a formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang, his acts and omissions prove his intent to relingquish the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines.

FRANCISCO V. DE VENECIA

[ GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003 ]

FACTS:

            A second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. in time wherein a new set of Rules of Impeachment was adopted by Congress. Petitioners assail that Rule 5, Section 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedural Impeachment is a political question and is beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

                        What is judicial power in relation to the power of judicial review? What is the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts? Is the exercise of judicial review over the impeachment proceedings of the Chief Justice appropriate?

HELD:

            Judiciary power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights. This includes the duty of the court to determine if there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch of the government. In judicial review, the judiciary effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power and to declare executive and legislative acts violative of the Constitution.

            The ‘expanded certiorari jurisdiction’ is included in the constitution to ensure the potency of the power of judiciary review to grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of the government. The Courts cannot evade the duty to settle matters of this nature by claiming that such matters pose a political question.

            The exercise of judicial review of the impeachment complaint is therefore appropriate as explained by the foregoing statements. It is the duty of the court under Constitutional mandate.

OMBUDSMAN V. GALICIA

[ GR No. 167711, October 10, 2008 ]

FACTS:

Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former  public school teacher at M.B. Asistio Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that the submitted forming part of his 201 file, Galicia graduated with degree in civil engineering from the Far Eastern University but failed to pass the board exam. He also presented himself to have earned 12 units in education from Caloocan City Polytechnic College and passed the Teachers Professional Exam.

            The school principal of MBASHS proceeded to verify the authenticity of Galacia’s Transcript of Records from Caloocan City Polytechnic College and was informed the had no record of such. He lodged an affidavit for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

            As between the Ombudsman and the DepEd

Schools Superintendent who has the jurisdiction to investigate non-feasance and mal-feasance by public school teachers?

HELD:

             The court held that it is the school superintendent and not the Ombudsman that has the jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers. However in the case at bar, Galicia stopped from belated assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. His right to due process was fully satisfied when he participated fully in the investigation proceedings. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman is therefore valid.