saracho

G.R. No. 134792 August 12, 1999
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT MANILA), respondents.
FACTS:
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping's proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto¹ before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold office as member of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.²
On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution³ dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. After recieving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit⁴ on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration⁵ they filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.⁶
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:

·         Whether or not this Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari.

·         Whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even after the payment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit

RULING:
 The Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar us from entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of discretion.
That this Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the required cash deposit; but after their petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for such non-payment, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal.
Petitioners herein, Perla Garcia, Pat Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed their petition for quo warranto on May 29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a serious charge which, if true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or to be more precise, their lawyers are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation.
Therefore, this court finds that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper
                        Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial           functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion                    to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and       adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying       the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.¹³
                                In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of         procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a       court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its           discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by                     appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari.¹⁴
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Liberal Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 191771

May 6, 2010

En Banc

Petitioner: Liberal Party, Represented by its President Manuel A. Roxas II and Secretary General Joseph Emilio A. Abaya

Respondent: COMELEC, Nacionalista Party, Represented by its President Manuel B. Villar and Nationalist People’s Coalition, Allegedly Represented by its Chairman Faustino S. Dy, Jr.

Poenente: Brion, J:.

FACTS:

The Liberal Party filed before COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party on February 12, 2010. Meanwhile, the respondent, NP-NPC coalition also filed a petition for registration and consequently asked to be recognized and accredited as dominant minority party. On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its opposition to the NP-NPC citing among others that NP-NPC failed to comply with the procedural matters and also it was filed beyond the set dateline.

On February 16, 2010 the COMELEC issued a notice of hearing for accreditation for the purpose of determining party alignments as to majority and minority. Included in the agenda is the hearing LP and the NP-NPC petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party. Both parties presented evidences and memoranda. Thereafter, the COMELEC sitting En Banc granted the NP-NPC coalition but deferred the same as dominant minority party.

ISSUES:

WON the COMELEC En Banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition;

WON the COMELEC En Banc erred in allowing the registration of NP-NPC coalition.

 JURISPRUDENCE/RULING:

The court finds the petition meritorious. In the case at bar, the court gave paramount consideration on public interest and not brushed aside the rigid technicalities but also showed liberality. The resulting harm or prejudice is considered but counterbalancing factors are given significant weight.

The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Under the circumstances of the present case where the registration was handled at the En Banc and so therefore, a motion for reconsideration of En Banc is a prohibited pleading under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules. Therefore, the NP-NPC’s petition for registration is time barred.

On the second issue, an examination of Resolution No. 8646 shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the COMELEC has set. In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. it was denied registration because of late filing. This among other organization would cry foul and rightly so because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when NP-NPC has been made the exception without rhyme or reason. The court solely rules for now that the En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition.

Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedure, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. There is no ifs and buts about these constitutional mandate.

Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The COMELEC is BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition.

Ombudsman v. Madriaga

G. R. No. 164316

September 27, 2006

Third Division

Petitioner: Office of the Ombudsman

Respondent: Gertrudes Madriaga and Ana Marie Bernardo

Poenente: Carpio Morales, J:.

FACTS:

On September 8, 2000, respondents were charged before the Ombudsman with violation of R.A. No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Gertrudes Madriaga and Ana Marie Bernardo, principal and teacher of San Juan Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila were meted with six-month suspension by the Ombudsman. The CA on May 28, 2004 however, merely recommended the case to the Department of Education.

ISSUE:

WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials.

JURISPRUDENCE/RULING:

The contention that the Ombudsman’s action is only recommendatory is void of merit. The Constitution gives the Ombudsman full and complete disciplinary authority, with powers not merely persuasive in character. Section 3(3), Article XI is complemented by Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770.

The Court decided that at any rate, the powers of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official have been jurisprudentially settled. (Estarija v. Ranada).

 The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. The court held that under R.A. No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring official.

The challenged decision of the CA is SET ASIDE.

Lambino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

En Banc

Consolidated with

G.R. No. 174299

Poenente: Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Raul L. Lambino together with Erico Aumentado were able to gather the signatures of 6, 327, 952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

Local COMELEC registrars verified that said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

JURISPRUDENCE/RULING: 

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials.  The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.  The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.  The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.    The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.