ocamia

SANTIAGO JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE

FACTS:

CSC revoked the promotional appointment of petitioner fromCollector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III and directing instead theappointment of private respondent to the same position.When petitioner was promoted, respondent filed a protest with the MSPB.MSPB upheld petitioner’s promotional appointment on the grounds, amongothers, that: (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) theprotestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact was notquestioned by the protestant; and (3) existing law and jurisprudence givewide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is noclear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud.Respondent appealed to the Board then overturned its earlier decision. The Commission ruled that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualifiedfor the position of Customs Collector III, JOSE has far better qualifications interms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminarsand training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanentappointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the revocation of petitioner’s appointment was valid.

HELD:

No. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (CivilService Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference inappointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to beconsidered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled bypromotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment." One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotionto the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no oneelse can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holdernor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote suchperson to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has awide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To applythe next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on theappointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualifiedand eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment

ABILA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed after Admin Officer retired. Privaterespondentfiled a protest with the MSPB. The same was dismissed. Uponappeal, MSPB reversed. It found that both petitioner Abila and privaterespondent Eleria met the minimum eligibility and education requirements forAdministrative Officer IV, but ruled that respondent Eleria had the edge interms of rank and experience as an Administrative Officer. The Board alsoheld that respondent Eleria was holding a position next in rank to that of thevacancy, which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4 of theCivil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343, gave her "promotionalpriority" over petitioner.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the respondent Commission has authority to substitute itsown judgment for that of the official authorized by law to make anappointment to the government service, in the matter of weighing an appointee's qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shownthat the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed for theposition.

HELD:

No. CSC has no such authority, the power of appointment, which isessentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the officeconcerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot. He occupies theideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual whocan best fill the post and discharge its functions in the government agency heheads. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess therequired qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling forconsiderations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of servicewhich can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the personmost familiar with the organizational structure and environmentalcircumstances within which the appointee must function. The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled bypromotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement and re-employmentor appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-in-rank rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filledby promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer toanother position higher either in rank or salary. A promotion involves asituation quite different from the situation in the case at bar where theappointment of petitioner Abila was effected through lateral transfer from aposition in one department of the city government to a position of greaterresponsibility in another department of the same government. The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had been filled bypromotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next in rank" doesnot import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next inrank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807,the Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, theperson holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for  promotion."

MEDENILLA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION                    

FACTS:

Petitioner was a contractual employee of the DPWH occupying theposition of Public Relations Officer II. A reorganization ensued within theDPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing patterntogether with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel wasissued. This included the contested position of Supervising Human ResourceDevelopment Officer to which position petitioner was appointed. Respondentslodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting theappointment of the petitioner to the position. CSC revoked appointment.

ISSUE/S:

Whether there is merit in the protest.

HELD:

No. While the appointing authority is given the wide latitude of discretion, to sustain the appointment of Medenilla may give the appointingpower unnecessary opportunities to act capriciously and thus thwart thenatural and reasonable expectation of the officer next-in-rank to any vacantposition, to be promoted to it.We have already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee isqualified, the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to theappointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on theground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power,another person has better qualifications for the job.Once the function is discharged, the participation of the Civil ServiceCommission in the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of attestation is to determine whether the appointee possesses the requisitecivil service eligibility, no more than that is left for the Civil ServiceCommission to do. The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of appointment is essentially discretionary. The discretion to be granted to theappointing authority, if not plenary must at least be sufficient

CABAGNOT v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincialgovernment of Aklan was approved by the Joint Commission on LocalGovernment Personnel Administration. The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364) regular plantillapositions from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with the Office of the Governor allocated one hundred forty four (144) from the previous sixty(60) positions.Petitioner herein, issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officials andemployees to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffingpattern for the evaluation and assessment of the Provincial PlacementCommittee. 21 supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to petitioner pursuantto Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the CivilService Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656(1988) entitled An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Officers andEmployees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. Theyprayed that they be appointed to the positions they applied for to which theyare eligible, having the required educational background, training andexperience. They likewise sent petitioner individual letters reiterating theirqualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments topositions lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization.Petitioner denied their plea.Upon appeal, CSC found that irregularities attended the election of the twomembers representing the first and second level personnel to the PlacementCommittee based on the affidavit executed by one Nida E. Melgarejo and theletter appeal of some thirty-seven (37) employees of the provincialgovernment of Aklan. Furthermore, it found petitioner to have violated Sec. 7of the Rules on Reorgnization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. of 1988providing preference for appointment of employees holding permanentpositions considering that private respondents who were all holdingpermanent appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization wereproposed to positions much lower than their former items despite the factthat their old items were carried over in the new staffing pattern. TheCommission found no reason for displacing the services of privaterespondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84) additional positionsfor the Office of the Governor alone. The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private respondentswere demoted because of the wide disparity between the former positionsheld by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner.

ISSUE/S:

Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstatingthe dismissed employees.

HELD:

 Yes. With respect to the sixteen private respondents, respondentCommission committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be"immediately appointed and restored to their positions or positions of comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights with backsalaries reckoned from dates they should properly have been appointedthereto effective the date of the reorganization of said province."It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as thecentral personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard theconstitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the presentcase, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasonsclearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of itsconstitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service.

However, with respect to private respondent Oczon, we hold that respondentCommission did commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering hisreinstatement with back salary, considering that he was not terminated as a result of the reorganization

BORROMEO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 FACTS:

Petitioner wrote a letter to COA Chairman, coursed through the CSCChairman, requesting an opinion on whether or not the money value of theterminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should includethe allowances received at the time of retirement. The petitioner, in his letter,further stated that while retired members of other ConstitutionalCommissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basis of highestmonthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal leave wascomputed solely on the basis of highest monthly salary.Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differentialrepresenting the unpaid COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSCChairman informed the petitioner that the release of the correspondingadvice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his terminalleave differential had already been requested from the DBM.In a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied the petitioner'srequest for payment of terminal leave differential for the following reasons,among others:1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on"basic pay" or "basic salary" pursuant to the provisions of the RevisedAdministrative Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1081.2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic payor salary received by an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtimepay and allowance.3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot bevalidly invoked as precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action sincesaid claims were processed without prior involvement of the DBM.Faced with the DBM refusal to release the corresponding allotment, the CSCyielded to DBM instead of asserting its initial determination. It issuedResolution No. 90-514 dated May 30, 1990 wherein the Commission deemedit proper not to rule on the issue on "ethical considerations" and"compulsions of delicadeza" and advised the petitioner to file an action fordeclaratory relief (sic) on the issue with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not RATA and COLA should be added to the highestmonthly salary in computing the petitioner's terminal leave pay.

HELD:

 The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary andConstitutional Commissions who retired or shall retire on or after the

 February, 1986 political upheaval shall be based on highest monthly salaryplus COLA and RATA.It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based onhighest monthly salary plus transportation, living and representationallowance."Commutation of salary" as used in Section 286 is, however, not the same as"commutation of leave credits." The former is applied for by an employee

during employment 

when he goes on

ordinary leave

.

CENA, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONPONENTE:

FACTS:

Petitioner entered the government service as Legal Officer II of theLaw Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years untilhis transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, oruntil February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.He was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, MetroManila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would haverendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days.Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice,through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority(LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-yearservice requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-agepension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the CSC whether ornot to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered byCivil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990.CSC denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service.

ISSUE/S:

 May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirementage of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of anold-age pension?

HELD:

 Yes. Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of theAdministrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted toauthorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year theextension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, whensaid limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the lawsupposed to be carried into effect.Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishingretirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of thepersons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims toachieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creatingpension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement.

RABOR  v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

Petitioner is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City.He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at theage of 55 years.Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he hadalready reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, withthirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Raborresponded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issuedby the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May1988. Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote tothe Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "asto what action [should] be taken on this matter."Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Governmentuntil he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] inthe Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirementlaws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was askingfor was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health andvery able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as UtilityWorker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception toMemorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President."

 ISSUE/S:

Whether Rabor may be allowed to extend?

HELD:

No. Our conclusion is that the doctrine of 

Cena

should be and ishereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is herebydeclared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. Wereiterate, however, the holding in

Cena

that the head of the governmentagency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallowextension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five(65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of governmentservice; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with theprovisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

ORTIZ v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the COMELEC by thenPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992."On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting ChairmanFelipe to convey the information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpaloand Layosa that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations,

effective immediately."

After the presidential acceptance of said"resignations," the new COMELEC was composed of Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. asChairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Leopoldo L. Africa,Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr.,as members. It was to this body that Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz andMarquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for

retirement 

. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986. To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits, all seven former COMELEC Commissioners invokedRepublic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and re-enactedby Republic Act No. 6118COMELEC denied the applications for retirement of CommissionersMarquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that they were "notentitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended"without specifying the reason therefor.Petitioner filed an MR, contending that he was entitled to the benefits underRepublic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein that he did not resignbut simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had infact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his]office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to retirementbenefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Codewhich states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall bedeemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." Heinvoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation No. 3 and cited the casesof former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice HermogenesConcepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receiveretirement benefits. COMELEC denied.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesyresignation" was accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement benefitsunder Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.

HELD:

 Yes. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of thereorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not beconsidered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation isdefined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declineshis office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a completeand operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clearintention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in someform, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce andrelinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.