G.R. No. 89604
April
20, 1990
ROQUE
FLORES, petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents
CRUZ,
J.
FACTS:
In an election held in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, on
March 28, 1989, the Petitioner Roque Flores was deemed to have the highest
number of votes for a kagawad position, which was proclaimed by the board of
canvassers. During the 1982 elections, he was voted as punong barangay in
accordance with Section 4 of Rep. Act 6679. However, private respondent
Nobelito Rapisora protested the election before The Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in question which only indicated
“Flores” should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to the
other candidate who has the same surname. He further stated that in accordance
with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be counted in his
favor by virtue of the equity of incumbent rule, which states, in the event
that there would be 2 or more candidates having the same full name, if the
ballot only states such full name, the vote would be entitled to the incumbent.
For that reason, the lower court sustained the private respondent’s contention
and afterwards declaring him as the punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he was entitled to
the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule
RULING:
The court maintained that the position
of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad. A kagawad assumes a
position that is legislative in nature, whereas a Punong Barangay is mainly an
executive officer. Therefore, the petitioner can not insist that he was running
for punong barangay when in truth, what was stated in his certificate of
candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As a result, the 4 votes
in question can not be counted in his favor on the erroneous grounds that he
was still the incumbent punong barangay at the time of the election. It then
follows that the petitioner losses the title of being the incumbent punong
barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits of equity-of-the-incumbent
rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes were considered stray,
declaring the private respondent as the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum,
Abra for garnering the highest number of votes for a kagawad position. Petition
is dismissed.
G.R. No.
124680-81
February 28, 2000
IMELDA R.
MARCOS, petitioner
Vs
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
Vs
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
PARDO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda R.
Marcos together with Jose Dans were both charged of Graft and Corruption while
they were still officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit,
allegedly done in 1984.The case was forwarded to the 1st Division of
the Sandiganbayan, headed by Justice Garchitorena along with J. Balajadia and J.
Atienza as both associate justices. Atienza’s disagreement in favor of Marcos’
innocence resulted to the division’s having no decision. Furthermore, Justice
Garchitorena summoned a special division of the Sadiganbayan and included
Cipriano and JJ Amores, who asked to be given 15 days to sendhis manifestation. Justice
Garchitorena, received manifestation from Balajadia stating that he agreed with
Rosario who also agreed with Atienza. As a result, Garchitorena issued a special order to dissolve the issue since it
would already be futile to wait for Amores’ manifestation when the majority has
already decided on Marcos’ favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due process has been observed.
RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed that SB lacks merit since there was no strong
evidence showing Marcos’ guilt and that she was deprived of due process of the
law for the reason that Justice Garchitorena failed to wait for Amores’s
manifestation. It is furthermore stated that SB’s procedural flaw was deemed to
be fatal in making its decision whether or not to convict the petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the
First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard
by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of
Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases
against her.
As a result, the Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition. However, the Court
directs SB to forthwith proceed with further proceedings and final disposition
of Criminal Case Nos. 20345-20346, in accordance with
the mandates of Republic Act No. 8493, with all deliberate dispatch. SC ordered
SB to inform them of the proceedings within ten (10) days of the action.
August 6, 1991
MANILA PUBLIC
SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG AND
OTHER
TEACHER-MEMBERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners
Vs
Vs
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS,
ISIDRO
CARIÑO, respondent
FACTS:
On an eventful day of September 17, 1990, supposedly the first day of a
weekday which is a Monday and also a regular school day, proximately 800
teachers of the Manila Public School Teachers Association led by F. Anonuevo
and M. Galang barricaded the street and
organized mass action. Hence, the teachers in question did not hold their
ordinary classes. As stated in G.R. No. 95590, the teachers assembled at the
Liwasang Bonifacio who subsequently proceeded to the National Office of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly and
airing their grievances.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not teachers have the right to strike
2. If true, whether or not conducting strikes on
classes hour is appropriate
RULING:
The association of Manila Public School Teachers has no right to
conduct strike during classes’ hours.
G.R. No. 16134
March 3, 2004
TECSON, petitioner
Vs
COMELEC, respondent
FACTS:
Tecson, the petitioner, claimed that COMELEC has no authority in
settling and deciding issues with regards to Presidential candidates mainly
Fernando Poe Jr. for the reason that, according to his assertions, only the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to settle those issues or
complaints and in effect, COMELEC has violated provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to settle complaints involving
Presidential candidates
RULING:
Only qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines
and not Presidential Vice-Presidential Candidates can the electoral tribunal
get jurisdiction, as stated in “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,”
promulgated by SC on April 1992. Hence, in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, articulated by Section 4 Paragraph 7, questions or complaints
with regards to the qualifications of Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidate before the election is held will not be included in their
jurisdiction.
September 27, 2006
OFFICE OF THE UMBODSMAN,
petitioner
Vs
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO, respondents
CARPIO
MORALES, J.
FACTS:
Gertrudes
Madriaga, the school principal of San Juan Elementary School; Ana Marie
Bernanardo, a school teacher of the same school, both respondents, were charged
of violation of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713 which is also known as
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Officers found them guilty of conduct that is prejudicial to pursuance of their
service which is punishable of suspension for 6 months. For this reason,
respondents passed a motion for reconsideration which was later on denied,
subsequently they escalated the case to CA for certiorari, wherein the
Appellate Court stated that penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is only
recommendatory.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the penalty of suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is only
recommendatory
RULING:
Section
15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 grants the order “to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee similar to the incident of
G.R. No.164316. We have to understand that Ombudsman’s recommendation is not
just only a suggestion in its nature but it can also be interpreted as having
legal grounds.
It
should be understood that the Ombudsman’s recommendation for a certain course
of action of the parties in question should not be taken as over-usage of their
power but it rather means that the recommendation be complete through the
appropriate officers.
April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III,
petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act NO. 9176 which originated from
House Bill No. 4264, created an additional legislative district of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said act restructured the first and second districts to create an
additional legislative district for the said province. Moreover, the
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district. Petitioners contended that the restructuring
as articulated in R.A. No. 9176 violates the constitutional standards which
states that in order for a legislative district to be recognized legit it has
to meet the standards of a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) as per population. As a result, the proposed district will fall short
by 176, 383.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 250,000 population is an
absolute requirement for the creation of a legislative district
RULING:
NO. As stated in Section 5, Art,. VI of the
Constitution, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” It should
be understood that the section speaks only of the population of a city which
should be composed of 250,000. There is a clear distinction between a city and
a province, and the population requirement of a province is not stated in the
section. Ergo, the minimum population requirement of 250, 000 only refers to a
city but not for a province.
November
23, 2010
ATTY.
ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner
Vs
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal,
petitioner, questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) stating that it violates
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner chafes the
creation of the “separate tribunal” which was complemented by a budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to affect a
constitutional mandate.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has locus
standi to file the instant petition.
RULING:
The petitioner does not possess
the locus standi in filing the petition as he was unmistakably stopped in
assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had appeared and
had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004. Judicial inquiry requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity to
challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution. The 1987
Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme Court’s independence as
cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but it remained
absolute.
April 24, 2012
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS,
petitioner
Vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
DAN ERASMO, SR., respondents
FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos, petitioner, was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973.
At 8 years old, he migrated to Australia in 1981 and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines. Four
days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he
renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the
same in compliance with Republic Act. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for
the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC. The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that,
while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the
requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a
gubernatorial candidate.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not COMELEC presented sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s
domicile.
RULING:
The petitioner effectively changed
his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On the other
hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother
in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
his domicile for good. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his
being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live
in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that
Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss
of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by
operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must
have a domicile or residence somewhere.
January
16, 2002
DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, respondent
On 1986, Development Bank of the Philippines, the petitioner, signed a
contract with a private firm. May 13, 1987, Commission on Audit, the
respondent, found out about the said contract. And in effect, the COA chairman wrote the DBP chairman that COA
auditors imposed instructions to prohibit any payment to private firm whose
operations and services were deemed illegal and unconstitutional.
July 1, 1987, DBP chairman sent a copy of DBP’s signed contract with
Joaquin Cuanan & CO., to the COA chairman which was signed four months
earlier of March 5, 1987. The note sought for the concurrence of COA. However,
upon the pendency of the request of the concurrence, DBP paid the private firm
of the sum amount of P487,321.14, which is contrary to the instructions imposed
by the COA. On October 30, 1987, COA
Chairman issued a memorandum to prohibit payments to the private firm and
making the persons personally liable for such payment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not public corporation is under the jurisdiction of COA
2. Whether or not DBP could be held liable for not following COA’s
instruction
Ruling:
The petition is granted. On May 20, 1989, the letter-decision which was
promulgated by the Commission on Audit is set aside; subsequently a temporary
restraining order issued by the court imposing the said decision was declared
permanent.
G.R.
No. 159940
February
16, 2005
OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petition
Vs
.CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent
Facts:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court seeking to set aside and nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) dated August 28, 2003. On June 6, 2003, Carandang and
Clemente were granted with CSE Eligibility in pursuance with CSC Resolution No.
03-0665. August 8, 2003, the petitioner reclassified several positions in
pursuance with Resolution No. 02-03, which made Graft Investigation Officer III
reclassify into Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. As an effect, the Ombudsman requested for the
approval of the proposed qualification
standards. It was later found out that reclassified position, in deference to
the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position and
the Prosecution Officer III position, according to the qualification standards
were the same. Consequently, CSC
disputed the Resolution passed on August 28, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not there are independent offices authorized by the
Consitition to appoint and reclassify public officials
Ruling:
The petition
is granted. Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission on August 28, 2003 is set aside.
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