Saturday, September 29, 2012

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G.R. No. 89604
April 20, 1990

ROQUE FLORES, petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents
CRUZ, J.


FACTS:
In an election held in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, on March 28, 1989, the Petitioner Roque Flores was deemed to have the highest number of votes for a kagawad position, which was proclaimed by the board of canvassers. During the 1982 elections, he was voted as punong barangay in accordance with Section 4 of Rep. Act 6679. However, private respondent Nobelito Rapisora protested the election before The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, contending that the ballot in question which only indicated “Flores” should be declared stray votes and should not be divided equally to the other candidate who has the same surname. He further stated that in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should be counted in his favor by virtue of the equity of incumbent rule, which states, in the event that there would be 2 or more candidates having the same full name, if the ballot only states such full name, the vote would be entitled to the incumbent. For that reason, the lower court sustained the private respondent’s contention and afterwards declaring him as the punong barangay. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule

 RULING:
The court maintained that the position of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad. A kagawad assumes a position that is legislative in nature, whereas a Punong Barangay is mainly an executive officer. Therefore, the petitioner can not insist that he was running for punong barangay when in truth, what was stated in his certificate of candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As a result, the 4 votes in question can not be counted in his favor on the erroneous grounds that he was still the incumbent punong barangay at the time of the election. It then follows that the petitioner losses the title of being the incumbent punong barangay on the election day making him not entitled to the benefits of equity-of-the-incumbent rule. The result was that the 4 contested votes were considered stray, declaring the private respondent as the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum, Abra for garnering the highest number of votes for a kagawad position. Petition is dismissed.
 

G.R. No. 124680-81
February 28, 2000

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner
Vs
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE 
PHILIPPINES, respondents
PARDO, J.
http://uber2002.wordpress.com/wp-includes/js/tinymce/plugins/wordpress/img/trans.gif


FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda R. Marcos together with Jose Dans were both charged of Graft and Corruption while they were still officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit, allegedly done in 1984.The case was forwarded to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, headed by Justice Garchitorena along with J. Balajadia and J. Atienza as both associate justices. Atienza’s disagreement in favor of Marcos’ innocence resulted to the division’s having no decision. Furthermore, Justice Garchitorena summoned a special division of the Sadiganbayan and included Cipriano and JJ Amores, who asked to be given 15 days to sendhis manifestation. Justice Garchitorena, received manifestation from Balajadia stating that he agreed with Rosario who also agreed with Atienza. As a result, Garchitorena issued a special order to dissolve the issue since it would already be futile to wait for Amores’ manifestation when the majority has already decided on Marcos’ favor.


ISSUE:

Whether or not due process has been observed.


RULING:

Supreme Court affirmed that SB lacks merit since there was no strong evidence showing Marcos’ guilt and that she was deprived of due process of the law for the reason that Justice Garchitorena failed to wait for Amores’s manifestation. It is furthermore stated that SB’s procedural flaw was deemed to be fatal in making its decision whether or not to convict the petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division.  At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. 
As a result, the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. However, the Court directs SB to forthwith proceed with further proceedings and final disposition of Criminal Case Nos. 20345-20346, in accordance with the mandates of Republic Act No. 8493, with all deliberate dispatch. SC ordered SB to inform them of the proceedings within ten (10) days of the action.
G.R. No. 95445
August 6, 1991

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, FIDEL FABABIER MERLIN ANONUEVO, MINDA GALANG AND OTHER
 TEACHER-MEMBERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners
Vs
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS,
 ISIDRO CARIÑO, respondent



FACTS:                             
On an eventful day of September 17, 1990, supposedly the first day of a weekday which is a Monday and also a regular school day, proximately 800 teachers of the Manila Public School Teachers Association led by F. Anonuevo and M. Galang  barricaded the street and organized mass action. Hence, the teachers in question did not hold their ordinary classes. As stated in G.R. No. 95590, the teachers assembled at the Liwasang Bonifacio who subsequently proceeded to the National Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly and airing their grievances. 

ISSUES:     
1. Whether or not teachers have the right to strike
2. If true, whether or not conducting strikes on classes hour is appropriate  

RULING:    

The association of Manila Public School Teachers has no right to conduct strike during classes’ hours.







 




G.R. No. 16134
March 3, 2004

TECSON, petitioner
Vs
COMELEC, respondent





FACTS:

Tecson, the petitioner, claimed that COMELEC has no authority in settling and deciding issues with regards to Presidential candidates mainly Fernando Poe Jr. for the reason that, according to his assertions, only the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to settle those issues or complaints and in effect, COMELEC has violated provisions of the 1987 Constitution.




ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to settle complaints involving Presidential candidates




RULING:

Only qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines and not Presidential Vice-Presidential Candidates can the electoral tribunal get jurisdiction, as stated in “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,” promulgated by SC on April 1992. Hence, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, articulated by Section 4 Paragraph 7, questions or complaints with regards to the qualifications of Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate before the election is held will not be included in their jurisdiction.




G.R. No.164316
September 27, 2006

OFFICE OF THE UMBODSMAN, petitioner
Vs
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA  and ANA MARIE BERNARDO, respondents
CARPIO MORALES, J.




FACTS:
Gertrudes Madriaga, the school principal of San Juan Elementary School; Ana Marie Bernanardo, a school teacher of the same school, both respondents, were charged of violation of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713 which is also known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Officers found them guilty of conduct that is prejudicial to pursuance of their service which is punishable of suspension for 6 months. For this reason, respondents passed a motion for reconsideration which was later on denied, subsequently they escalated the case to CA for certiorari, wherein the Appellate Court stated that penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is only recommendatory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is only recommendatory

RULING:
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 grants the order “to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee similar to the incident of G.R. No.164316. We have to understand that Ombudsman’s recommendation is not just only a suggestion in its nature but it can also be interpreted as having legal grounds.
It should be understood that the Ombudsman’s recommendation for a certain course of action of the parties in question should not be taken as over-usage of their power but it rather means that the recommendation be complete through the appropriate officers.






G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III, petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
Perez, J.


FACTS:

Republic Act NO. 9176 which originated from House Bill No. 4264, created an additional legislative district of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said act restructured the first and second districts to create an additional legislative district for the said province. Moreover, the municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners contended that the restructuring as articulated in R.A. No. 9176 violates the constitutional standards which states that in order for a legislative district to be recognized legit it has to meet the standards of a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) as per population. As a result, the proposed district will fall short by 176, 383.


ISSUE:

Whether or not the 250,000 population is an absolute requirement for the creation of a legislative district


RULING:

NO. As stated in Section 5, Art,. VI of the Constitution, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” It should be understood that the section speaks only of the population of a city which should be composed of 250,000. There is a clear distinction between a city and a province, and the population requirement of a province is not stated in the section. Ergo, the minimum population requirement of 250, 000 only refers to a city but not for a province.



G.R. No. 191618
November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner
Vs
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent
Nachura, J.




FACTS:

Atty. Romulo Macalintal, petitioner, questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) stating that it violates  Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The petitioner chafes the creation of the “separate tribunal” which was complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to affect a constitutional mandate.



ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.



RULING:

The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing the petition as he was unmistakably stopped in assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had appeared and had acknowledge its jurisdiction in 2004. Judicial inquiry requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution. The 1987 Constitution introduces an innovation about the Supreme Court’s independence as cited in Section 4, Article VII. The judicial power expanded, but it remained absolute.



G.R. No. 191970
April 24, 2012

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, petitioner
Vs
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., respondents


FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos, petitioner,  was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. At 8 years old, he migrated to Australia in 1981  and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC. The Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC presented sufficient evidence to substantiate petitioner’s domicile.

RULING:
The petitioner effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
G.R. No. 88435
January 16, 2002

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent




Facts:                  
On 1986, Development Bank of the Philippines, the petitioner, signed a contract with a private firm. May 13, 1987, Commission on Audit, the respondent, found out about the said contract. And in effect, the  COA chairman wrote the DBP chairman that COA auditors imposed instructions to prohibit any payment to private firm whose operations and services were deemed illegal and unconstitutional.
July 1, 1987, DBP chairman sent a copy of DBP’s signed contract with Joaquin Cuanan & CO., to the COA chairman which was signed four months earlier of March 5, 1987. The note sought for the concurrence of COA. However, upon the pendency of the request of the concurrence, DBP paid the private firm of the sum amount of P487,321.14, which is contrary to the instructions imposed by the COA.  On October 30, 1987, COA Chairman issued a memorandum to prohibit payments to the private firm and making the persons personally liable for such payment.

Issues:
1. Whether or not public corporation is under the jurisdiction of COA
2. Whether or not DBP could be held liable for not following COA’s instruction

Ruling:
The petition is granted. On May 20, 1989, the letter-decision which was promulgated by the Commission on Audit is set aside; subsequently a temporary restraining order issued by the court imposing the said decision was declared permanent.


 

G.R. No. 159940
February 16, 2005

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petition
Vs
.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent




Facts:        

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside and nullify Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated August 28, 2003. On June 6, 2003, Carandang and Clemente were granted with CSE Eligibility in pursuance with CSC Resolution No. 03-0665. August 8, 2003, the petitioner reclassified several positions in pursuance with Resolution No. 02-03, which made Graft Investigation Officer III reclassify into Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III.  As an effect, the Ombudsman requested for the approval of the proposed  qualification standards. It was later found out that reclassified position, in deference to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III position and the Prosecution Officer III position, according to the qualification standards were the same.  Consequently, CSC disputed the Resolution passed on August 28, 2003.




Issue:         

Whether or not there are independent offices authorized by the Consitition to appoint and reclassify public officials




Ruling:      

 The petition is granted. Resolution No. 030919 of the Civil Service Commission on  August 28, 2003 is set aside.


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IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20 AND 21, 2007. D E C I S I O N

  Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC             August 8, 2008 IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS ...