G.R. NO. 135805, APRIL 29, 1999
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, RESPONDENT.
[PARDO]
Facts:
On
November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission(CSC), Quezon City Tacloban City
On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CSC’s resolution was reversed ruling that
the respondent did not appoint his two sons, hence, respondent was not guilty
of nepotism.
Issue/s:
Whether the
appointment of the two sons of respondent is within the scope of the ban on
nepotism.
Ruling:
The
law defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office,
or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him. The word
"relative" and members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
The
court ruled that it is true that the respondent did not appoint or recommend
his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the
Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended to DECS Region VIII the
appointment of Rito Dacoycoy as driver and appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual
utility worker. However, it was the respondent who recommended Mr. Daclag’s
authority to appoint first level positions. It was also the respondent who
certified that “funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito.”
Further, Ped, listed him in his job description as his “next higher
supervisor.” Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro
O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both
positions are career positions. Clearly he is guilty of nepotism.
Nepotism
is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its
personnel. The court stressed in the Debulgado case that the basic purpose or
objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the
prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. If not within the
exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated
whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. What is needed is not only to
punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to
plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict
compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for
graft or circumvention of the law.
The Court REVIVES
and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28,
1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.
G.R. NO. 111471, SEPTEMBER 26,
1994
CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO
AND VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO, PETITIONERS, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT.
[FELECIANO]
Facts:
Petitioner
Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos San Carlos City
On
16 December 1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) received a
letter from Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros
Occidental, calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by
petitioner Mayor in favor of his wife. The CSC directed its Regional Office No.
6-Iloilo City to submit a report on the appointment of petitioner Victoria. The
CSC then resolved to recall the approval of the promotion by Director Escobia
of the Bacolod City CSC-Field office after a report was made by Director Caberoy
of the Iloilo City CSRO No. 6 affirming the fact the relation of the petitioners
as husband and wife.
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against
nepotism was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services
Officer. Petitioners also asserted that the CSC had deprived petitioner
Victoria of her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 21 July 1993.
In
this petition for Certiorari, the basic contention of petitioners is that the
prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable only to original
appointments and not to promotional appointments. They believe that because petitioner
Victoria was already in the service of the City Government before she married
petitioner Mayor, the reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her promotional
appointment. Petitioners also affirm that the promotion was not motivated by
personal reasons of petitioner Mayor since petitioner Victoria deserves to be
promoted to General Services Officer, considering her long and faithful service
to the City Government. Petitioner Mayor also claimed that the promotion was of
honest intention having been concurred by the Sanggunian and after an informal
consultation with one Gregorio C. Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in
CSC’s Bacolod Office, affirmed that promotional appointment is not covered by
the prohibition against nepotism.
Issue/s:
- Whether
a promotional appointment is covered by the legal prohibition against
nepotism, or whether that prohibition applies only to original
appointments to the Civil Service; and
- Whether
the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and
disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria
after the Commission, through Director Escobia, had earlier approved that
same appointment, without giving an opportunity to petitioner Victoria to
explain her side on the matter.
Ruling:
Section
59, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 defines nepotism as all
appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in
any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over him. The word "relative" and
members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree
either of consanguinity or of affinity. The definition shall be read in
conjunction with Section 1 Rule V of the Omnibus Implementing rules which says
that all appointments in the career service shall be made only according to the
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations. It further provides that all original appointments and personnel
actions shall be in accordance with these Rules and with other regulations and
standards that may be promulgated by the Commission. The same section defines personnel
action any action denoting movement or progress of personnel in the civil
service which includes promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment,
detail, secondment, reassignment, demotion and separation. The definition of
personnel action is reiterated in Section 1 Rule VII of the same rules.
While
the appointee may in fact be quite loyal and efficient and hardworking, that
circumstance will not prevent the application of the prohibition certainly in
respect of the original appointment. The Court is aware of the difficulties
that the comprehensive prohibition against nepotism would impose upon
petitioner Victoria and others similarly situated. The prohibition is not
intended by the legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The purpose
of the law which shines through the comprehensive and unqualified language in
which it was cast and has remained for decades is precisely to take out of the
discretion of the appointing and recommending authority the matter of
appointing or recommending for appointment a relative.
The
court concluded that Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 means exactly what it
says in plain and ordinary language: it refers to “all appointments” whether
original or promotional in nature. The public policy embodied in Section 59 is
clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court has neither authority nor
inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there. It follows, therefore, that the
appointment of Victoria
On
the second issue, the court ruled that the action taken by the CSC was not of a
disciplinary measure upon petitioners. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an
appointment, only examines the conformity of the appointment with applicable
provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses all the minimum
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The action of the CSC was
only in implementation of Sec. 59 Book V of EO No. 292. Because the promotional
appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it
was null and void as being contra legem. A void appointment cannot give rise to
security of tenure on the part of the holder of such appointment. The CSC is empowered to take appropriate
action on all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such
power includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in
disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations.
Section 20 of Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Rules makes this clear that
notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, it may be recalled if
it is in violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
The
recall or withdrawal by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by
one of its Field Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and
appropriate, the promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void
“from the beginning.” The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it
could not, cure the intrinsic vice of that appointment. Therefore, that there
was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the CSC.
Petition for
Certiorari DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. NO. 125129, MARCH 29, 1999
JOSEPH H. REYES, PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
[PARDO]
Facts:
By
Resolution No. 89-003, the Technology and Livelihood Research Center (TLRC)
Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was
to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. It
also provided additional benefits to its members, in accordance with the
policies and guidelines approved by the Board of Trustees. The Fund's sources
of capital were from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross
monthly salary and TLRC's or the government's counterpart share equivalent to
10% of the member's gross monthly salary, earnings of funds and others.
On
June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores ordered the suspension of
the transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991,
amounting to P11,065,715.84, per Notice of Suspension No. 93-006. Auditor Flores held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10, Rules and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758, fringe benefits
were allowed provided that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits.
In this case, there is no law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC
officers and employees. Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537,
to which TLRC may not qualify.
Accordingly,
on September 14, 1993, the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued a
resolution, discontinuing the collection of contributions for the Fund from
both the TLRC and the members. It also ordered the members' personal
contributions made refunded to them immediately. On September 21, 1993, the Board
issued another resolution dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the
distribution of the personal and corporate shares to the members thereof. The latter
resolution was disallowed by Auditor Flores via Notice of Disallowance dated December
2, 1993.
Petitioner
Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA) but it was denied. COA ruled that
the government's share in the Provident Fund must be reverted to the TLRC and
not be given to the employees since the primary purpose of the Provident Fund
was not realized or attained due to its discontinuance and dissolution. Motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue/s:
- Whether
the erred in ruling for the disallowance of the distribution of the TLRC’s
contribution to the members.
- Whether
the members of the Provident Fund has vested rights on TLRC’s share in the
contribution to the Fund.
Ruling:
The
court ruled that the COA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing
the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to
its members. As correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision, the
government contributions were made on the condition that the same would be used
to augment the retirement and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the
purpose was not attained due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then
the employees are not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its
counterpart contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the
use of public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were
appropriated.
There
is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident Fund
acquired a vested right over the government contributions. "A vested right
is one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which
no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
upon a contingency." As previously stated, the government contributions
were subject to the condition that the funds would be used to augment the
retirement and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees. What is more, the
Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus,
contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
Petition DENIED and
assailed decision of the Commission on Audit AFFIRMED.
G.R. NO. 165132, MARCH 07, 2012
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, RESPONDENT.
[BRION]
Facts:
Dr.
Apolonio (respondent) served as the Executive Officer of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB) from 1996 to August 26, 2002. In December 2000, NBDB’s
Governing Board approved the conduct of a two-day Team Building Seminar Workshop
for its officers and employees. Based on the Department of Budget Management
(DBM) Circular No. 442 dated March 29, 1995 prescribing a P900 limit for each
participant per day in similar activities, NBDB disbursed the amount of P108,000.00
to cover the P1,800 allowance of the 60 employees.
Prior
to the conduct of the workshop, some of the employees/participants approached
respondent to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the
entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash. After the
consultation with the Rogelio Montealto, the Finance and Administrative Chief
of NBDB about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal,
respondent concluded it to be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide
season and approved the request. Thus, after the end of the workshop, SM gift
cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their
approved allowance.
On
August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint
against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the Ombudsman. The complaint
alleged that Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto committed grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the
unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift cheques.
Investigation by Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO) Plaridel Oscar J. Bohol found Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto to be liable only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service and recommended the imposition
of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay. However, this
recommendation was not acted favorably by then Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio, Jr.. Instead, he adopted the recommendation of GIO Julita M. Calderon
which found Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonestly, in addition to the charge of conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Consequently, GIO Calderon recommended that Dr.
Apolonio and Mr. Montealto be dismissed from the service. GIO Calderon
described Dr. Apolonio’s act as a criminal act of technical malversation.
On
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), it ruled that the Ombudsman does not
possess the power to directly impose the penalty of removal against a public
official but only a recommendatory one. It also ruled that respondent was only
liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, the
conclusion reached and recommended by GIO Bohol. The CA imposed the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months, but due to her retirement from the service, the
amount corresponding to her salary for six months was deducted from her
retirement benefits.
Issue/s:
- Whether
the Ombudsman has power to directly impose the penalty of removal from
office against public officials.
- Whether
Dr. Apolonio’s act constitute grave misconduct.
Ruling:
A.
Power
of Ombudsman to directly impose the penalty of removal from office against
public officials.
Republic
Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989 mandated the
Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on complaints but also to
enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers
and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman has the power, function and
duty to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15 of RA 6770, which is substantially the same as the above provision
in the constitution, added that the Ombudsman shall enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who
is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer. The
provision is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not
merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide
the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can
effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and
corrupt government officers and employees.
In
the case of Gemma P. Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII, the court ruled
that the provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent
of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of
administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules
of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place
under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public
officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose
the said penalty. Thus, it is settled
that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions.
B. Grave Misconduct
Contrary
to the Ombudsman’s submissions, however, Dr. Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct, not grave misconduct
or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence (Civil
Service Commission v. Ledesma). Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
In
Monico K. Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance System, the court ruled
that to be categorized as grave misconduct substantial evidence should be
adduced to prove the elements of “corruption,” “clear intent to violate the
law” or “flagrant disregard of established rule.” In this case, Dr. Apolonio’s
use of the funds to purchase the gift cheques cannot be said to be grave
misconduct for the following reasons:
a.
Dr.
Apolonio’s actions were not attended by a willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules. The circumstances prove this conclusion, viz:
Dr. Apolonio merely responded to the employees’ request and even consulted the
Finance and Administrative Chief on the possible legal repercussions of the
proposal.
b.
The
court ruled in Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, et al., that in the absence of a law
or ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed for
another public purpose, an accused did not commit technical malversation as set
out in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Similarly in this case, there is
no law allocating the funds for the workshop since the DBM circular is not a
law. Even if it were a law, it merely prescribed the amounts to be used for the
workshop and did not appropriate the specific amounts to be used.
The
court, however, do not agree with the CA’s ruling that the respondent is merely
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. In Lacson v.
Tuazon, the court considers it as misconduct such as when it affects his
performance of his duties as an officer. From the definition of misconduct as
state previously and in the ruling in Lacson v. Tuason, it is clear in this
case that the act of the respondent is done within his functions. Therefore,
the respondent is only guilty of simple misconduct. Although her actions do not
amount to technical malversation, she did violate Section 89 of PD 1445 when
she approved the cash advance that was not authorized by the NBDB’s Governing
Board.
The
petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED.
The court only found respondent GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT. In the absence of
any showing that this is her second offense, the penalty of SUSPENSION for SIX
MONTHS was imposed, but due to her retirement from the service, the amount corresponding
to her six-month salary was to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
G.R. NO. 116801, APRIL 06, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, FIRST
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF CEBU, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
VISAYAS, AND HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND UNDERSECRETARY
OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, RESPONDENTS.
[MENDOZA]
Facts:
On
February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe,
Cebu, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. The graft investigation officer assigned to the case found, after
investigation, no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended for the
dismissal of the case. However, upon review of the matter, Ombudsman, Hon.
Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor
Illustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was then referred by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar for the filing of appropriate information with the RTC of
Danao City. The same was eventually assigned to herein petition, First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.
On
preliminary investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness
had been committed. With the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an
information for act of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo on July 4, 1994
with the MTC of Santa Fe.
Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica wrote two letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on
any action taken on the referred case. And since no case for attempted rape had
been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and
petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt
for “refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives” of the Office of the
Ombudsman. For this purpose, hearings were duly conducted. As a result,
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were placed
under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months.
Issue/s:
- Whether
the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
- Whether
the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the
mayor because the crime was not committed in relation to a public office
and whether it has authority to place petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension.
Ruling:
The
court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act of omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from the performance of his official duty. It
is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor,
is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In
the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors
for assistance as provided in Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if
the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would
still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is
deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the
Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to
direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.
Section
15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
"punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the
same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no
merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot
be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to
discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct,
insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place
her in the meantime under preventive suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the
same Act provides for this power.
Under
Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is warranted if evidence
against the public official is strong. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether
the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman.
The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in
the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Given the
attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the
criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is
justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be
hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve
grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if
proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified
in ordering their preventive suspension. Under the same provision of the law,
it provides that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay. Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus
according to law.
The petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension is DENIED.
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