UY
V. OMBUDSMAN (2001)
EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 ]
GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR.,
SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.
R E S O L U T I O N
R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: August 9, 1999 the trial court rendered a
decision stating that it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding informations against petitioner in the
regional trial court.That the Ombudsman can only exercise prosecutorial power
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. February 22, 2000 it explained in the
resolution that: (t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the
authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the
Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman
"primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan..." And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of
R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have
the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated
references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the
Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan."
The Ombudsman the respondent
hereof seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling and raises the following
points:(1)The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or
equated with the broader jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman.(2)The
phrase “primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan” is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayancases;and(3)
The authority of the office of the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases before
the sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory and
prosecutorial power of the office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecutor power of
the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan or the
Ombudsman has authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts.
HELD: We held that the Ombudsman is
clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts as well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
"Sec.
15.Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction; it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;Section 11 grants the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman under
the latter's supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
"Sec. 11.Structural
Organization.(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed
of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a)
To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.
Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:
"The
prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct
exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined (therein). The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts."
IN
VIEW WHEREOF,
the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated
February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
OMBUDSMAN
V. SANTIAGO (2007)
FIRST
DIVISION
G.R. No. 161098 September 13, 2007
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent.
vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated June 18,
2003 and Resolution dated December 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66744.
The facts are:
On July 27, 2000, the City of
Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay
183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44, 053.00. This was received
by Barangay Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B.
Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all
barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical malversation,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against respondent,
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828.
The complaint alleges that (a)
respondent failed to utilize the calamity fund for the purpose for which it was
allocated; (b) he leased a portion of the barangay sidewalk to Amity Food
Corporation without the conformity of the barangaykagawad; (c) Amity
Food Corporation issued checks payable to respondent, not in the name of the
Barangay; (d) he did not open any bank account for and in the name of Barangay
183, Zone 16; and (e) he collected fees for the use of the barangay chapel
without remitting any single centavo to the barangay treasurer.
In a Decision dated May 22, 2001,
the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissed him from the service,
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the implementation of
the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an
Order dated July 24, 2001.
Thus, respondent filed with the
Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandatory
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order."
Apparently, the Court of Appeals considered this action a petition for review.In
its Decision dated June 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals partially granted the
petition.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of December 8, 2003.
ISSUE:
Whetherthe Ombudsman has the power
to dismiss erring government officials or employees.
RULINGS:
Section 13(3), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act:
Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer;
In interpreting a statute, care
should be given that every part thereof be given effect. Hence, the use of the
word "recommend" must be read in conjunction with the words
"ensure compliance therewith" in order not to run counter to the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and
complete disciplinary authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in
character. In fact, Section 13(3), Article XI is complemented by Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 6770.
At any rate, the power of the
Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been
jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada, we ruled:
The powers of the Ombudsman are not
merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional
body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official other than a member of Congress and theJudiciary.WHEREFORE, we
GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66744 are REVERSED. The Decision dated May 22, 2001
of the Office of the Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.
OMBUDSMAN
V. ANDUTAN (2011)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011 ]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
PETITIONER, VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,
the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks the reversal of the
decisio of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico
P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman
and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed decision annulled and set aside
the decision of the Ombudsman dated July
30, 2001, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Facts:
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998, On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum,Andutan resigned from the DOF.
On September 1, 1999 Andutan together
with some respondents, was criminally charged by the fact finding and
intelligence Bureau(FFIB) of the Ombudsman with estafa and through
falsification of public Documents,and violations of section 3(a), (e) and
republic act no. 3019, otherwise known as the anti-graft and corrupt practice
act.As government employees, Andutan were likewise administratively charged of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, falsification of official documents and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
On July 28, 2004,the CA annulled and
set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,
ruling that the latter "should not have considered the administrative
complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that
the Ombudsman "may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if
it believes that the complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of
the act or omission complained of"andsecond, the administrative
case was filed after Andutan's forced resignation.
ISSUES:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770
prohibits the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year
after the act was committed?
II.DoesAndutan's resignation render
moot the administrative case filed against him?
III.Assuming that the administrative
case is not moot, are the Ombudsman's findings supported by substantial
evidence?
RULINGS: The provision of section 20(5)
are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an
investigation a year after the supposed act was committed. The period stated in
Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the
offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman
on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense.
The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion.
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
Andutans resignation divest the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint against him.Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman's position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual findings.
Liberal Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191771
May 6, 2010
En Banc
Petitioner: Liberal
Party, Represented by its President Manuel A. Roxas II and Secretary General
Joseph Emilio A. Abaya
Respondent: COMELEC,
Nacionalista Party, Represented by its President Manuel B. Villar and
Nationalist People’s Coalition, Allegedly Represented by its Chairman Faustino
S. Dy, Jr.
Poenente: Brion, J:.
FACTS:
The Liberal Party filed before
COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party on February
12, 2010. Meanwhile, the respondent, NP-NPC coalition also filed a petition for
registration and consequently asked to be recognized and accredited as dominant
minority party. On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its opposition to the NP-NPC
citing among others that NP-NPC failed to comply with the procedural matters
and also it was filed beyond the set dateline.
On February 16, 2010 the COMELEC
issued a notice of hearing for accreditation for the purpose of determining
party alignments as to majority and minority. Included in the agenda is the
hearing LP and the NP-NPC petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority
party. Both parties presented evidences and memoranda. Thereafter, the COMELEC
sitting En Banc granted the NP-NPC coalition but deferred the same as dominant
minority party.
ISSUES:
WON the COMELEC En Banc have
jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition;
WON the COMELEC En Banc erred in
allowing the registration of NP-NPC coalition.
JURISPRUDENCE/RULING:
The court finds the petition meritorious.
In the case at bar, the court gave paramount consideration on public interest
and not brushed aside the rigid technicalities but also showed liberality. The
resulting harm or prejudice is considered but counterbalancing factors are
given significant weight.
The registration of a coalition and
the accreditation of a dominant party are two separate matters that are
substantively distinct from each other. Under the circumstances of the present
case where the registration was handled at the En Banc and so therefore, a
motion for reconsideration of En Banc is a prohibited pleading under Rule 13,
Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules. Therefore, the NP-NPC’s petition for
registration is time barred.
On the second issue, an examination
of Resolution No. 8646 shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a
firm and mandatory deadline that the COMELEC has set. In the case of Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood Inc. it was denied registration because of late filing.
This among other organization would cry foul and rightly so because of the
denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when NP-NPC has been
made the exception without rhyme or reason. The court solely rules for now that
the En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline
in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition.
Political coalitions need to
register in accordance with the established norms and procedure, if they are to
be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered
coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality
from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly
registered parties. There is no ifs and buts about these constitutional
mandate.
Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Resolution of the COMELEC is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The COMELEC is BARRED
from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition.
LSTIMOSA
V. OMBUDSMAN (1995)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 116801, April 06, 1995 ]
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, FIRST ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
OF CEBU, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS,
AND HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa
is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the
Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge
as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting
crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge forindirect contempt was brought against them, both in the
Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed
under preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman
with respect to the two proceedings.
Lastimosa claims that the Office of
the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent
authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former
first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the
exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the
Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary
investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation
and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary
investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
filing of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a
preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of
the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her
office.In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not
committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to
cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
ISSUES:
A. Whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in
the prosecution of the case.
B. Whether petitioner's refusal to
follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or
resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making
her liable for indirect contempt.
C. Neither is there any doubt as to
the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she
is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of
the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension.
RULINGS:
Petitioner's contention has no
merit. The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”[14]
This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from the
performance of his official duty.[15]
It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
A.In the exercise of his power, the
Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance §31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.–The
Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize
any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to
assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.
(Emphasis added)
It does not matter that the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the
preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would
still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is
because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he
comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review,
approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot
legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as
directed by the Ombudsman.
B. The records show that despite
repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating
the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of
lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives
the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than
judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself
says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the
filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.Whether petitioner's
refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience
or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus
making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of theRules of Court
is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is
important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as
a means of enforcing his lawful orders.
C.. The pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
§21. Officials Subject To
Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.§24. Preventive
Suspension. – The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.Indeed
respondent Deputy OmbudsmanMojica had personal knowledge of the facts
justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them
were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the
Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies
of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a
criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the
matters alleged in the administrative complaint to determine whether the
evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was a strong for the
purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.
Given the
attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the
criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is
justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be
hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve
grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if
proven, can lead to adismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive
suspension.Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge
should first be resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case
can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There
is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act
or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other.
Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
LAPINID V. CSC (1991)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991 ]
RENATO M. LAPINID, PETITIONER, VS. CIVILSERVICECOMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO
JUNSAY, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On October 1, 1988Petitioner Renato
M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. Private
respondent JuanitoJunsay protested the appointment on December 15, 1988, who reiterated his earlier representations
with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision
of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of
his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had
not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service
Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had
earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission found out that Junsay and Lapinid were both
qualified; however, the latter has a lower rating as compared to the former,
with regards to the result of the evaluations conducted.
The CSC directed that Appellants JuanitoJunsay and Benjamin Villegas, another employee, be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the CSC is notified within ten (10) days of the implementation thereof.
Petitioner, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.
When the petitioner came to the Supreme Court on December 13, 1990, it resolved to require Comments from the respondents and in the meantime issued a temporary restraining order. The Solicitor General took a stand against the CSC, which, at his suggestion, was allowed to file its own Comment. The petitioner filed a Reply. The private respondent's Comment was dispensed with when it was not filed within the prescribed period.
ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
RULING:
No. It
had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that
the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
The determination of who among
several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested
in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not
in the CSC.
The Commission has
no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications.
LAMBINO
V. COMELEC (2006)
EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. 174153, October 25, 2006 ]
RAUL
L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
Consolidated
with
G.R.
No. 174299
Poenente: Carpio, J.:
FACTS:
Raul L. Lambino together with
EricoAumentado were able to gather the signatures of 6, 327, 952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. The
proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and
Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”.
These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006,
denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the
ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the
aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.
Local COMELEC registrars verified
that said number of votes comprises at least 12 per
centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least
represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the petition for initiative met the
requirements of Sec 2 Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
JURISPRUDENCE/RULING:
The
proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather
the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The
proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments
were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely
handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the
full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere
amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the
would-be parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to
revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as
there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.
CSC
V. TINAYA (2005)
EN BANC
[ G.R. NO. 154898, February 16, 2005 ]
CIVILSERVICECOMMISSION,
PETITIONER, VS. PASTOR B. TINAYA, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
On November 16, 1993, Pastor B. Tinaya, respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.
On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No.VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards.
On the same day his appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of his office.
On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.
Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.
The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approved respondent’s appointment as permanent.
On June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor BienvenidoBalderian. In the meantime, on July 5, 1999, respondent’s service record was released.
As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled.
On the basis of the above report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999 recalling respondent’s appointment
FACTS:
On November 16, 1993, Pastor B. Tinaya, respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.
On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No.VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards.
On the same day his appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of his office.
On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.
Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.
The CSC Regional Office No. VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approved respondent’s appointment as permanent.
On June 4, 1999, respondent requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor BienvenidoBalderian. In the meantime, on July 5, 1999, respondent’s service record was released.
As scheduled, the CSC’s Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled.
On the basis of the above report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999 recalling respondent’s appointment
Respondent then filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above recall Order but the same was denied.
Petitioner likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, prompting him to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63051.
On March 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside petitioner’s questioned Resolutions
Petitioner likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, prompting him to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63051.
On March 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside petitioner’s questioned Resolutions
This ruling is based on the
Appellate Court’s finding that respondent’s original appointment as municipal
assessor on November 16, 1993 was permanent in nature, although approved by the
CSC on December 1, 1993 as temporary.Moreover, respondent cannot be held guilty
of nepotism as he was not yet married to the daughter of former Mayor Priscilla
Justimbaste at the time the latter appointed him municipal assessor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002. This prompted petitioner, through the Solicitor General, to elevate the matter to us via this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether or not the CSC was correct in recalling the appointment of the respondent
Ruling:
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002. This prompted petitioner, through the Solicitor General, to elevate the matter to us via this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether or not the CSC was correct in recalling the appointment of the respondent
Ruling:
Yes. The Civil Service Commission is
the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of
determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed
to the civil service.
To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC, which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the appointee is qualified, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal requirements. Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC, which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If the appointee is qualified, the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
Here, respondent’s original permanent appointment as
municipal assessor was approved as temporary by petitioner CSC pending his
submission of the required service record of his three (3)-year work experience
in real property assessment or in any related field prior to his appointment,
as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards. As found by petitioner,
it was only on December 1, 1994, after his temporary appointment expired on
that day, that he was able to submit the required paper. Thus, upon its
submission, respondent’s new appointment was made permanent.
Petitioner merely complied with the Constitutional and statutory mandate to determine whether respondent was qualified. And due to his failure to submit the required service record as proof of his qualification, petitioner did not err in approving his original appointment as temporary.
With respect to petitioner’s recall of respondent’s new permanent appointment dated December 1, 1994 by reason of nepotism, the Court find the same in order.
Records show that before respondent married CaridadJustimbaste, daughter of then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, on December 16, 1993, the latter appointed him municipal assessor. The appointment was permanent. As stated earlier, petitioner approved it as temporary. On December 1, 1994, Acting Mayor Luban extended to respondent (already the son-in-law of Mayor Justimbaste) a permanent appointment after his original temporary appointment expired. This new appointment was initially disapproved by petitioner. But respondent’s mother-in-law, Mayor Justimbaste, appealed to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII. Being then the incumbent mayor, she was the chief of respondent and deemed to have recommended him to Vice-Mayor Luban to be appointed as municipal assessor. Verily, such appointment is in violation of Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law, on NEPOTISM.
Petitioner merely complied with the Constitutional and statutory mandate to determine whether respondent was qualified. And due to his failure to submit the required service record as proof of his qualification, petitioner did not err in approving his original appointment as temporary.
With respect to petitioner’s recall of respondent’s new permanent appointment dated December 1, 1994 by reason of nepotism, the Court find the same in order.
Records show that before respondent married CaridadJustimbaste, daughter of then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, on December 16, 1993, the latter appointed him municipal assessor. The appointment was permanent. As stated earlier, petitioner approved it as temporary. On December 1, 1994, Acting Mayor Luban extended to respondent (already the son-in-law of Mayor Justimbaste) a permanent appointment after his original temporary appointment expired. This new appointment was initially disapproved by petitioner. But respondent’s mother-in-law, Mayor Justimbaste, appealed to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII. Being then the incumbent mayor, she was the chief of respondent and deemed to have recommended him to Vice-Mayor Luban to be appointed as municipal assessor. Verily, such appointment is in violation of Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law, on NEPOTISM.
BIR
V. OMBUDSMAN (2002)
[G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002]
FACTS:
Christopher S. Soquilon, Graft Investigation Officer
II,Office of the Ombudsman received an “informer-for reward” about an anomalous
tax refund to both Limtuaco& Co. Inc, and La TondeñaDistelliriresInc, and
later recommended for a case to be docketed. Subsequently the said office
issued a subpoena ducestecum to the Legal Department of the BIR. The BIR
refused and asked to be excused from the compliance of the subpoena.
Consequently,
the Ombudsman issued another subpoena ducestecum addressed to BIR Commissioner
LiwaywayVinzons-Chato ordering her to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring
the complete original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La
Tondeña.
The BIR
however moved to vacate the subpoena ducestecum arguing that (a) the
second subpoena ducestecum was issued without first resolving the issues
raised in its Manifestation and Motion dated December 8, 1993; (b) the
documents required to be produced were already submitted to Graft Investigation
Officer II Baldrias; (c) the issue of the tax credit of ad valorem taxes
has already been resolved as proper by the Sandiganbayan; (d) the subpoena ducestecum
partook of the nature of an omnibus subpoena because it did not specifically
described the particular documents to be produced; (e) there was no clear
showing that the tax case dockets sought to be produced contained evidence
material to the inquiry; (f) compliance with the subpoena ducestecum
would violate Sec. 269 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NLRC) on unlawful
divulgence of trade secrets and Sec. 277 on procuring unlawful divulgence of
trade secrets; and (g) Limtuaco and La Tondeña had the right to rely on the
correctness and conclusiveness of the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena DucesTecum.
The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena DucesTecum.
The BIR moved to reconsider the
respondent’s Order dated February 15, 1994 alleging that (a) the matter subject
of the investigation was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
(b) the subpoena ducestecum was not properly issued in accordance with
law; and (c) non-compliance thereto was justifiable. The BIR averred it had the
exclusive authority whether to grant a tax credit and that the jurisdiction to
review the same was lodged with the Court of Tax Appeals and not with the
Ombudsman.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena ducestecum to be properly issued in accordance with law, there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena ducestecum is not an independent proceeding. The BIR added that the subpoena ducestecum suffered from a legal infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena ducestecum to be properly issued in accordance with law, there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena ducestecum is not an independent proceeding. The BIR added that the subpoena ducestecum suffered from a legal infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.
The Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration and reiterated its directive to the BIR to produce the
documents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the actions taken by the Office of the
Ombudsman are valid
2.
Whether or not the Ombudsman violated due process
RULING:
1. Yes.The 1987 Constitution enjoins
that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
There can be no objection to this
procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman where anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the
filing of complaints “in any form and manner,” the framers of the Constitution
took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the
Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the
other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot
afford to hire lawyers.
Plainly, the pendency of an action
is not a prerequisite before the Ombudsman can start its own
investigation.
The power to investigate and to
prosecute which was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses “all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance
that have been committed by any officer or employee xxx during his tenure of
office.
The determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the BIR’s exercise of discretion.
The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña which are public records, and the subpoena ducestecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said records and not about the trade secrets of the companies.The Court finds no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondeña would be unnecessarily disclosed if such official records, subject of the subpoena ducestecum, were to be produced by the petitioner BIR to respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Yes. The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics of due process in conducting its investigation.
The determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the BIR’s exercise of discretion.
The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña which are public records, and the subpoena ducestecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said records and not about the trade secrets of the companies.The Court finds no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondeña would be unnecessarily disclosed if such official records, subject of the subpoena ducestecum, were to be produced by the petitioner BIR to respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Yes. The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics of due process in conducting its investigation.
In this case, Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon forgot
that there are always two (2) sides to an issue and that each party must be
given every opportunity to air his grievance or explain his side as the case
may be. This is the essence of due process.
ANGELES
V OMBUDSMAN (2012)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012 ]
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, OMBUDSMAN; HON.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN;
HON. SYLVIA A. SEVERO, GRAFT INVESTIGATOR AND PROSECUTION OFFICER I; HON.
MARILOU B. ANCHETA-MEJICA, ACTING DIRECTOR, PIAB-D; HON. JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR.,
ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN, PAMO; ALL OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND SSP EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 20 February 2007, petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:(1) Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
(2) Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner;(3) Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.
The Ombudsman
dismissed the charges against respondent Velasco. It found that after
evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by complainant, there was no
cause to conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication
with regard to the charges. For the following reason: (1) the first charge of suppression of
testimonial evidence in connection with the smuggling case, the Ombudsman dismissed the charge on the ground
that petitioner had no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of
the grievance. The Ombudsman explained
that petitioner was neither one of the parties nor the presiding judge in the
said criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest in it. And respondent
Velasco acted based on his discretion as prosecutor and his appreciation of the
evidence in the case, and any lapse in his judgment cannot be a source of
criminal liability. (2) It pointed out that petitioner should have first
elevated her concern to the DOJ, which had primary jurisdiction over
respondent’s actions and conduct as public prosecutor. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was
not engaged in private practice when he filed the two Petitions for the
reopening of the child abuse cases against petitioner, since he was the
investigating prosecutor of the said cases.(3) The Ombudsman said that the issue should have been raised earlier,
when petitioner Judge Angeles filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution
of respondent Velasco. Moreover, petitioner should have substantiated the
allegation of falsification, because the mere presentation of the alleged
falsified document did not in itself establish falsification. The Ombudsman also ruled that with the belated
filing of the charge and the reversal by the DOJ of respondent Velasco’s
Resolution indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged falsified
document is no longer in issue.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the questioned Joint Order, which was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of merit.
Hence the Petitioner filed a Petition
for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 rules of court, dated 01 September
2009 seeks to set aside the Joint Order dated 21 March 2007 of the Ombudsman exonerating respondent Senior State
Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco.
ISSUE:
Whether, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent
Velasco.
RULINGS:
We dismiss the petition. As a general
rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and
compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
The Ombudsman
is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
Said exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court
will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether
there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is
by no means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) specifically Section 2 of Rule II,
states:
Evaluation. — Upon
evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it
may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to
respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency
which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer
or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative
adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted.
In this Petition, we do not find any
grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Court’s exceptional divergence
from the general rule.
Notably, the burden of proof to show
grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has failed to discharge
this burden. She merely states why she does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman, instead of demonstrating and
proving grave abuse of discretion. In her arguments, petitioner would also have
us pass upon the factual findings of the Ombudsman.
That we cannot do, for this Court is not a trier of facts.
Even if we were to extend liberally the exception to the general rule against the review of the findings of the Ombudsman, an examination of the records would show that no grave abuse of discretion was demonstrated to warrant a reversal of the Joint Order dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.
Even if we were to extend liberally the exception to the general rule against the review of the findings of the Ombudsman, an examination of the records would show that no grave abuse of discretion was demonstrated to warrant a reversal of the Joint Order dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.
In sum, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from its long-standing policy of non-interference in the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers which, as we have emphasized, are plenary.
Although the Court diverges from some of the conclusions reached by the Ombudsman,such the1st and 2nd charge pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act. Cause it applies only to administrative complaints. It should not have been used by the Ombudsman as a ground to dismiss the first charge, since the Complaint filed by petitioner before the Ombudsman was criminal in nature. The criminal nature of petitioner’s Complaint is clear from its prayer seeking the indictment of respondent before the Ombudsman and the latter’s pronouncement that the issue of falsification of public document should have been raised by petitioner earlier. Thus, it cannot be said that the issue of falsification of a public document in the criminal Complaint was raised belatedly, because the Complaint was not a continuation of the previous Petition for Review of respondent’s Resolution. The two proceedings were completely independent of each other. butwe find that its dismissal of the charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at after a rational deliberation. Such deliberation was shown by its reasoned disposition of the case in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated discretionary powers. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries of its plenary powers and acted within the permissible limits. We do not find any arbitrariness or abuse that was so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its discretion as would warrant this Court’s reversal.
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, we uphold the findings of the Ombudsman..
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