People of the Philippines
vs.
Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo
(G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992)
FACTS:
Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio
Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine Constabulary together with Sgt.
Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated National Police were on
routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the afternoon,
the officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel
Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran
to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon
approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon
Evaristo and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of Rosillo. The police
patrol members were told that he had already escaped through a window of the
house. Vallarta noticed a bulge around the waist of Carillo and upon being
frisked he admitted the same to be a revolver.
As the patrol was still in
pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo’s permission to scour through
the house which was granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms and
paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms.
Evaristo and Carillo were ound guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence
obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is admissible.
RULING:
According to Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 2: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3
(1)…
(2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is to be noted that what the
above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches and
seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule,
be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the
rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is
not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view.
The records in this case show
that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter
his house. The officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had
sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was
not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery
of the subject as inadvertent and even accidental.
With respect to the firearms
seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the
firearm’s seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on
authorized warrantless arrests.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, INC.,
vs.
Office of the Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003)
FACTS:
Petitioner
IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially
to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct
seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers.
On October 26, 2001, respondent
Office of the Executive Secretary issued Executive Order (EO) 46, creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee
its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to
issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the
subject EO violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State abd that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate
policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme
is a function only religious organization, entity or scholars can lawfully and
validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Order (EO)
violated the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion.
RULING:
Yes,
without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function
because the standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By
giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
In
the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a product as
halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos’
right to health are already provided for in the existing laws and ministered to
by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the
market are fit for human consumption, probably labeled and safe.
Ricardo C. Silverio
vs.
The Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991)
FACTS:
Ricardo Silverio was charged
with violation of Section 2(4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case
No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail
for his provisional liberty. The respondent filed to cancel the passport of
Silverio and to issue a hold departure order.
The RTC ordered the DFA to
cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not
been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the
country without the knowledge and the permission of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can
impair the right to travel if not on the grounds of national security, public
safety or public health.
RULING:
The bail bond posted by the
petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued that he
failed to appear at his arraignments. There is valid restriction on the right
to travel; it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever
the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return. Also, an accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the
necessity of warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without
prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Article III, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national
security, public safety, or public health” and “as may be provided by law,” a phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 Constitution. Apparently, the phraseology in
the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed
under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which
issued certificates to travel upon application of an interested party.
Holding an accused in a criminal
case within reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered a valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is their best interest
that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality,
without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and Processes.
United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU)
vs
Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma
(G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998)
FACTS:
The petitioner is a union of
supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a
petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter
and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that
the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join
any labor organization; right of supervisory employees-Managerial employees are
not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence
of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 245, insofar
as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor
unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.
RULING:
Art. 245 do not violate Article
III, Section 8 of the Constitution. The real intent of Article III, section 8
is evident in Lerum’s proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to
organize of government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be
constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional
rights to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to
top-level and middle managers. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in
Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution infringed by a ban against managerial
employees forming a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the purposes “not
contrary to law.” In the case of Art
245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organization. For the reason
that these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with the
presence of managerial employees in Union membership.
Blo Umpar Adiong
vs.
Commision on Elections
(G.R. No. 1013956, March 31, 1992)
FACTS:
Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in
the May 11, 1992 elections assails that the Comelec’s Resolution which
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and
other moving vehicles is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner
believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer
grave and irreparable injury with his prohibition. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform
the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in May 11,1992 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the Comelec may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”
places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
RULING:
The portion of Section 15(a) of
Resolution No. 2347 of the Comelec providing that “decals and stickers may be
posted only in any authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof” is declared NULL AND VOID. The Comelec’s probation on
posting decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except
in designated areas provided for by the Comelec itself is also NULL AND VOID on
constitutional grounds.
The prohibition unduly infringes
on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the constitution
(Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution). Significantly, freedom of
expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of
candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an
individual to express his preference and, by displaying it in his car, to
convince others to agree with him.
The constitutional objective to
give rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26,
and Article XIII, Section 1 in relation to Article IX © Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other
private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, and other moving vehicles needs consent of
the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial
in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the
candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on
posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether private or public
except in authorized areas designated by the Comelec becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
