RAFFY RUIZ BULADO
LLB-I
ANDRES BONIFACIO COLLEGE
raffy_baggins@yahoo.com
[G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991]
FACTS:
On October 1, 1988Petitioner Renato
M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. Private
respondent Juanito Junsay protested the appointment on December 15, 1988, who reiterated his earlier representations
with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision
of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of
his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had
not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service
Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had
earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission found out that Junsay and Lapinid were both qualified;
however, the latter has a lower rating as compared to the former, with regards
to the result of the evaluations conducted.
The CSC directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas, another employee, be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the CSC is notified within ten (10) days of the implementation thereof.
Petitioner, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.
When the petitioner came to the Supreme Court on December 13, 1990, it resolved to require Comments from the respondents and in the meantime issued a temporary restraining order. The Solicitor General took a stand against the CSC, which, at his suggestion, was allowed to file its own Comment. The petitioner filed a Reply. The private respondent's Comment was dispensed with when it was not filed within the prescribed period.
ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
RULING:
No. It had
no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the
private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
The determination of who among several
candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the
sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the
CSC.
The Commission has
no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications.
LASTIMOSA V. OMBUDSMAN (1995)
[G.R. No. 116801, April 06, 1995]
FACTS:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica
Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal
complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts,
abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa
Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an
investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the
dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman,
Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that
Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. Accordingly,
in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E.
Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial
Court of Danao City, . . .” The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner,
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted
a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness
against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe.
In two letters written to the
Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman
Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the
case, more specifically the directive of
the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
As
no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and
petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt
for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
For
this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial
Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer.
An answer was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.
It
appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the
two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian
Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint
for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law)
and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaints were based
on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
Issue:
Whether
or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo
Ruling:
Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from the performance of his official duty. It
is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor,
is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors for assistance as provided in Sec. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
(R.A. No. 6770)
It
does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already
conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was
for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in
court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the
offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of
the Ombudsman. This is because under Sec 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a
prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control"
of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman
to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.
Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the
information as directed by the Ombudsman.
G.R.
No. 161098 September 13, 2007
OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CELSO SANTIAGO,
Facts:
On July 27, 2000, the City of
Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for Barangay
183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received
by respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B.
Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño, Sr., all
barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner, an administrative complaint for technical malversation, violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of a public officer against respondent.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the administrative complaint.
In a Decision dated May 22, 2001,
the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
dismissed him from the service
Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the implementation of
the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an
Order dated July 24, 2001.
Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a
motion for reconsideration, but denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the
power to dismiss erring government officials or employees.
Ruling:
Yes. Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 13. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(3) Direct
the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
SEC. 15. Powers,
Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(3)
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by
law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal
by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; x x x
Considering that the refusal,
without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, it
follows that the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory
but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
The powers of the Ombudsman are not
merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional
body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, the SC held that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional
power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
ANGELES V OMBUDSMAN (2012)
[G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012]
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Angeles
was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of
the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent Velasco
was a senior state prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 20 February 2007,
petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco
with the Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the
Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a
prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a
criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse
cases against petitioner;
3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing
on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.
The Ombudsman dismissed
the charge on the ground that petitioner had no sufficient personal interest in
the subject matter of the grievance, on the charge of suppression of testimonial
evidence in connection with the smuggling case. The Ombudsman explained that
petitioner was neither one of the parties nor the presiding judge in the said
criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest in it.
The Ombudsman
said that it had no authority to investigate the prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion, unless there was sufficient evidence that the exercise was tainted
with malice and bad faith.
The Ombudsman
likewise dismissed the second charge of private practice of profession on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It pointed out that
petitioner should have first elevated her concern to the DOJ, which had primary
jurisdiction over respondent’s actions and conduct as public prosecutor.
Moreover, the Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not
engaged in private practice when he filed the two Petitions for the reopening
of the child abuse cases against petitioner, since he was the investigating
prosecutor of the said cases.
On the falsification of a public document,
which was also dismissed, the Ombudsman said that the issue
should have been raised earlier, when petitioner Judge Angeles filed her
Petition for Review of the Resolution of respondent Velasco. Moreover,
petitioner should have substantiated the allegation of falsification, because
the mere presentation of the alleged falsified document did not in itself
establish falsification. The Ombudsman also ruled that with
the belated filing of the charge and the reversal by the DOJ of respondent
Velasco’s Resolution indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged
falsified document is no longer in issue.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Joint Order, which was denied by the
Ombudsman for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.
Ruling:
No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
As a general rule, the
Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such
reasons are clearly absent in the petition.
The Ombudsman
is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. The Court reiterated that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted.
The Court acknowledges
exceptional cases calling for a review of the Ombudsman’s
action when there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of
discretion.
On the charge of suppression
of evidence arising from the failure of respondent Velasco to present the
testimony of a material witness, the Ombudsman found – and
the Court defers to its findings – that he acted based on his discretion as
prosecutor and on his appreciation of the evidence in the case, and any lapse
in his judgment cannot be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman
also found that there was no sufficient evidence that the failure of respondent
to present the witness was tainted with malice; or that the failure of
respondent to do so gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the former’s official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
The Ombudsman
correctly found that the charge of falsification had not been substantiated,
and that the mere presentation of the alleged manufactured document alone would
not in itself establish falsification. To recall, petitioner Angeles claimed
that Leonila Vistan could not have appeared before respondent Velasco because
she was sick, but offered no supporting evidence. Also, it does not follow that
a clarificatory hearing could not have been conducted, just because respondent
Velasco had prepared a Resolution on 20 June 1999, two days before that
hearing.
Although the Court diverges
from some of the conclusions reached by the Ombudsman, the dismissal
of the charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at after a rational
deliberation. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries
of its plenary powers and acted within the permissible limits. We do not find
any arbitrariness or abuse that was so gross and patent in the manner it
exercised its discretion as would warrant this Court’s reversal.
CSC V. TINAYA (2005)
[G.R. NO. 154898, February 16, 2005]
FACTS:
On November 16, 1993, Pastor
B. Tinaya, respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor
of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.
On December 1, 1993, the CSC
Regional Office No.VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary,
effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994. The
appointment was made temporary due to respondent’s non-submission of his
service record with respect to his three (3)-year work related experience prior
to his employment as municipal assessor, as required by the CSC Revised
Qualification Standards.
On the same day his
appointment was approved, respondent took his oath and assumed the duties of
his office.
On December 16, 1993 or
fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married
Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.
Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla
Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29,
1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the
expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed
him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was
permanent.
The CSC Regional Office No.
VIII initially disapproved respondent’s new appointment. But upon appeal by Mayor Priscilla
Justimbaste, the CSC, in its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, approved
respondent’s appointment as permanent.
On June 4, 1999, respondent
requested Arturo Juanico, Officer-in-Charge of the municipality’s Human
Resources Management Office (HRMO), to furnish him a copy of his service
record. The request was not immediately acted upon since respondent’s 201 file
was still to be retrieved from the Office of Mayor Bienvenido Balderian. In the
meantime, on July 5, 1999, respondent’s service record was released.
As scheduled, the CSC’s
Personnel Inspection and Audit Division conducted an audit and found, among
others, that the matter of the delay in the release of respondent’s service
records has become moot since his request was already acted upon; and that his
appointment as municipal assessor on December 1, 1994 was issued in violation
of the law on nepotism and, therefore, should be recalled.
On the basis of the above
report, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999
recalling respondent’s appointment
Respondent then filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above recall Order but the same was denied.
Petitioner likewise denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, prompting him to file with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63051.
On March 21, 2002, the Court
of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside petitioner’s questioned
Resolutions
This ruling is based on
the Appellate Court’s finding that respondent’s original appointment as
municipal assessor on November 16, 1993 was permanent in nature, although
approved by the CSC on December 1, 1993 as temporary. Moreover,
respondent cannot be held guilty of nepotism as he was not yet married to the
daughter of former Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste at the time the latter appointed
him municipal assessor.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
August 21, 2002. This prompted petitioner, through the Solicitor General, to
elevate the matter to us via this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: whether or
not the CSC was correct in recalling the appointment of the respondent
Ruling:
Yes. The Civil Service
Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the
duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed
to the civil service.
To make it fully effective, an
appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal
requirements. Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the
CSC, which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is
qualified to hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process
of appointment were observed.
The appointing officer and the
CSC acting together, though not concurrently but consecutively, make an
appointment complete. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. If the appointee is qualified, the appointment must be
approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
Here, respondent’s
original permanent appointment as municipal assessor was approved as temporary
by petitioner CSC pending his submission of the required service record of his
three (3)-year work experience in real property assessment or in any related
field prior to his appointment, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification
Standards. As found by petitioner, it was only on December 1, 1994, after his
temporary appointment expired on that day, that he was able to submit the required
paper. Thus, upon its submission, respondent’s new appointment was made permanent.
Petitioner merely complied
with the Constitutional and statutory mandate to determine whether respondent
was qualified. And due to his failure to submit the required service record as
proof of his qualification, petitioner did not err in approving his original
appointment as temporary.
With respect to petitioner’s
recall of respondent’s new permanent appointment dated December 1, 1994 by
reason of nepotism, the Court find the same in order.
Records show that before
respondent married Caridad Justimbaste, daughter of then Mayor Priscilla
Justimbaste, on December 16, 1993, the latter appointed him municipal assessor.
The appointment was permanent. As stated earlier, petitioner approved it as
temporary. On December 1, 1994, Acting Mayor Luban extended to respondent
(already the son-in-law of Mayor Justimbaste) a permanent appointment after his
original temporary appointment expired. This new appointment was initially disapproved
by petitioner. But respondent’s mother-in-law, Mayor Justimbaste, appealed to
the CSC Regional Office No. VIII. Being then the incumbent mayor, she was the
chief of respondent and deemed to have recommended him to Vice-Mayor Luban to
be appointed as municipal assessor. Verily, such appointment is in violation of
Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law, on NEPOTISM.
BIR V. OMBUDSMAN (2002)
[G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002]
FACTS:
Christopher S. Soquilon, Graft
Investigation Officer II,Office of the Ombudsman received an “informer-for
reward” about an anomalous tax refund to both Limtuaco & Co. Inc, and La
Tondeña Distellirires Inc, and later recommended for a case to be docketed.
Subsequently the said office issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Legal
Department of the BIR. The BIR refused and asked to be excused from the
compliance of the subpoena.
Consequently, the Ombudsman issued another subpoena
duces tecum addressed to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato ordering her
to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets
of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña.
The BIR however moved to vacate the subpoena duces
tecum arguing that (a) the second subpoena duces tecum was issued
without first resolving the issues raised in its Manifestation and Motion dated
December 8, 1993; (b) the documents required to be produced were already
submitted to Graft Investigation Officer II Baldrias; (c) the issue of the tax
credit of ad valorem taxes has already been resolved as proper by the
Sandiganbayan; (d) the subpoena duces tecum partook of the nature of an
omnibus subpoena because it did not specifically described the particular
documents to be produced; (e) there was no clear showing that the tax case
dockets sought to be produced contained evidence material to the inquiry; (f)
compliance with the subpoena duces tecum would violate Sec. 269 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NLRC) on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets
and Sec. 277 on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade secrets; and (g)
Limtuaco and La Tondeña had the right to rely on the correctness and
conclusiveness of the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum.
The Ombudsman denied the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum.
The BIR moved to reconsider the respondent’s Order dated February 15,
1994 alleging that (a) the matter subject of the investigation was beyond the
scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; (b) the subpoena duces tecum
was not properly issued in accordance with law; and (c) non-compliance thereto
was justifiable. The BIR averred it had the exclusive authority whether to
grant a tax credit and that the jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with
the Court of Tax Appeals and not with the Ombudsman.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena duces tecum to be properly issued in accordance with law, there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum is not an independent proceeding. The BIR added that the subpoena duces tecum suffered from a legal infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena duces tecum to be properly issued in accordance with law, there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum is not an independent proceeding. The BIR added that the subpoena duces tecum suffered from a legal infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.
The
Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its directive to
the BIR to produce the documents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the actions taken
by the Office of the Ombudsman are valid
2. Whether or not the Ombudsman
violated due process
RULING:
1. Yes. The 1987
Constitution enjoins that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written, unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.
There
can be no objection to this procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman
where anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation because it is
provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that
in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and manner,” the framers of
the Constitution took into account the
well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman
is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to
hire lawyers.
Plainly,
the pendency of an action is not a prerequisite before the Ombudsman
can start its own investigation.
The power to investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to
the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act
makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses “all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have
been committed by any officer or employee xxx during his tenure of office.
The determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the BIR’s exercise of discretion.
The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña which are public records, and the subpoena duces tecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said records and not about the trade secrets of the companies. The Court finds no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondeña would be unnecessarily disclosed if such official records, subject of the subpoena duces tecum, were to be produced by the petitioner BIR to respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Yes. The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics of due process in conducting its investigation.
The determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the BIR’s exercise of discretion.
The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña which are public records, and the subpoena duces tecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said records and not about the trade secrets of the companies. The Court finds no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondeña would be unnecessarily disclosed if such official records, subject of the subpoena duces tecum, were to be produced by the petitioner BIR to respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Yes. The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given the opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics of due process in conducting its investigation.
In this case, Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon forgot that there
are always two (2) sides to an issue and that each party must be given every
opportunity to air his grievance or explain his side as the case may be. This
is the essence of due process.
OMBUDSMAN V. ANDUTAN (2011)
[G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011]
FACTS:
Andutan
was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998,
then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all
non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their
positions effective July 1, 1998. On
July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOFand among others, was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
The Ombudsman deemed the case submitted for resolution for failure of the respondents to appear in the Preliminary Conference.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, [13] Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA.
On July 28, 2004, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter "should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of"; and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan's forced resignation.
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOFand among others, was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their counter-affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on March 13, 2000.
The Ombudsman deemed the case submitted for resolution for failure of the respondents to appear in the Preliminary Conference.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, [13] Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA.
On July 28, 2004, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter "should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of"; and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan's forced resignation.
ISSUES:
- Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?
- Does Andutan's resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
RULING:
I.
No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public
officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the
object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement
of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence
in our government.
The
use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature
and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive
only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section
20(5), therefore, it is discretionary
upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint
even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription.
Section
20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the
time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative
case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the
Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative
investigation.
II. Yes. Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
II. Yes. Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.
The
Ombudsman's general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case
against him by resigning, since he "knew for certain that the
investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach
him" is unfounded. First, Andutan's resignation was
neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF
post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1,
1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court
struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman's sweeping assertions in light of
these facts.
What
is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year
before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally,
even if we were to accept the Ombudsman's position that Andutan foresaw the
filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that
he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
CABALIT V. COA (2012)
[G.R. No. 180236, January 17, 2012]
FACTS:
As per investigation of the State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma in their
Joint-Affidavit, a scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees Leonardo G. Olaivar,
Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, in the vehicle
registration fees.
In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.[11] Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submit their counter-affidavits.
In response, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies.
After proper hearing the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment, finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected. Accordingly, they were given the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.[11] Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submit their counter-affidavits.
In response, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies.
After proper hearing the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment, finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected. Accordingly, they were given the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the Ombudsman. Hence filed with the CA separate petitions.
The
CA dismissed the consolidated petition and modified that Olaiver be held
administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which carries the same
penalty as dishonesty.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions.
Issues:
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the right
of due process.
2. Whether or not the petitioners
were administratively liable.
Ruling:
Ruling:
1. No. In this case, the
Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend
themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers,
memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been
afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully
complain that they were denied due process of law. It is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the
parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is
given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party
is not denied due process.
2. Yes. Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference. However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind one's task. Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.
The CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. Under Section 58, such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
2. Yes. Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference. However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind one's task. Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.
The CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. Under Section 58, such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given
full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to
receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct
investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of
evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure
of a public officer or employee.
CSC V. PCSO (2010)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010]
FACTS:
Josefina
A. Sarsonas and Lemuel G. Ortega where
both appointed by the Board of Directors of PCSO as Assistant Department
Manager II of of two different
departments of the said office. Sarsonas, in the Internal Audit Department and
Ortega, in the Planning and Production Department, respectively.
However, both appointments were disapproved by the Civil Service
Commission Field Office - Office of the President (CSCFO-OP) in its resolution stating that they failed to meet the
eligibility requirements of the said positions.
The PCSO filed their appeal on both
cases. PCSO reasoned out that Section
7(3), Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides an exclusive
enumeration of the
specific positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES), all of whom are appointed by the President and are required to have Career Service Executive (CSE) eligibility.[25] PCSO argued that since the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require presidential appointment, then it does not require CSE eligibility..
specific positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES), all of whom are appointed by the President and are required to have Career Service Executive (CSE) eligibility.[25] PCSO argued that since the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require presidential appointment, then it does not require CSE eligibility..
But still, denied by the CSC.
Appeal was made on the CA. the appellate court set aside the resolution of the
CSC.
The CSC countered an appeal, but
nonetheless, denied by the respondent court.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the position of
Assistant Department Manager II falls under the CES.
RULING:
No. In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e. Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level or CES.
It is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There is also no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated. Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager, and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not require CSE eligibility.
OMBUDSMAN V. APOLONIO (2012)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165132, March 07, 2012]
FACTS:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive
Officer of the National Book Development Board. In December 2000, NBDB’s
Governing Board approved the conduct of a Team Building Seminar Workshop for
its officers and employees.
Before commencing of the workshop, some of the employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash. Dr. Apolonio consulted Rogelio Montealto, then Finance and Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Concluding the proposal to be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. After the end of the workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their approved allowance.
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the Ombudsman invoking that they committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift cheques. Mr. Marte alleged that the NBDB’s Governing Board never authorized the disbursement of the funds for the purchase of the gift cheques and that the purchases were never stated in Dr. Apolonio’s liquidation report.
Respondent countered, invoking good faith in the purchase of the gift cheques, having in mind the best welfare of the employees who, in the first place, requested the use of part of the budget for distribution to the employees.
On August 21, 2002, the Acting Ombudsman imposed the penalty of removal against Dr. Apolonio. The Acting Ombudsman likewise denied Dr. Apolonio’s motion for reconsideration on September 18, 2002.Hence, his certiorari on CA.
Before commencing of the workshop, some of the employees/participants approached Dr. Apolonio to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be given to them as cash. Dr. Apolonio consulted Rogelio Montealto, then Finance and Administrative Chief of NBDB, about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Concluding the proposal to be legally sound and in the spirit of the yuletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. After the end of the workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their approved allowance.
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto before the Ombudsman invoking that they committed grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase and disbursement of the gift cheques. Mr. Marte alleged that the NBDB’s Governing Board never authorized the disbursement of the funds for the purchase of the gift cheques and that the purchases were never stated in Dr. Apolonio’s liquidation report.
Respondent countered, invoking good faith in the purchase of the gift cheques, having in mind the best welfare of the employees who, in the first place, requested the use of part of the budget for distribution to the employees.
On August 21, 2002, the Acting Ombudsman imposed the penalty of removal against Dr. Apolonio. The Acting Ombudsman likewise denied Dr. Apolonio’s motion for reconsideration on September 18, 2002.Hence, his certiorari on CA.
On
March 23, 2004, the CA granted the petition.
ISSUES:
1)
Does the Ombudsman have the power to directly impose the penalty of removal
from office against public officials?
2) Do Dr. Apolonio’s acts constitute Grave Misconduct?
2) Do Dr. Apolonio’s acts constitute Grave Misconduct?
RULING:
1. Yes. The creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and
his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the
authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officers and
employees.
The
Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise
of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the Ombudsman’s
power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only
grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
2. No. The Court defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Misconduct becomes grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Therefore, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.
2. No. The Court defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. Misconduct becomes grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Therefore, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.
Dr. Apolonio’s actions were not attended by a willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Although the Court
agrees that Dr. Apolonio’s acts contravene the clear provisions of Section 89
of PD 1445, otherwise known as the “Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines,” such was not attended by a clear intent to violate the law or a
flagrant disregard of established rules.
The Court held that Dr. Apolonio is
guilty of simple misconduct. Although her actions do not amount to technical
malversation, she did violate Section 89 of PD 1445 when she approved the cash
advance that was not authorized by the NBDB’s Governing Board. Further, since
the approval of the cash advance was an act done pursuant to her functions as
executive officer, she is not merely guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
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