DIGEST/ ALBERTINE DIN/ Cruz v Enrile, 1988, G.R. No. 75983

 Cruz v Enrile, 1988, G.R. No. 75983

 

Facts: 

            Even until 1986, there were still around 157 civilians who were imprisoned by courts martial during the nine-year Martial Law. Habeas corpus proceedings were filed to question their detention.

 

Issue: 

1.     W/N courts martial have jurisdiction over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not executive or military process.

2.     If the civilians are released, can those who committed crimes still be prosecuted under civilian courts?

 

 

Held: 

1.     A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

2.     The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been committed, and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses.No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offensewould result from the retrial of the petitioners’ cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardyfrom attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DIGEST/ ALBERTINE DIN/Buan v. Matugas, 2007, G.R. No. 161179

 Buan v. Matugas, 2007, G.R. No. 161179

 

 

Facts: 

Buan, an employee of the provincial government, alleged that Matugas, who was the governor at that time, attempted to rape her in 1995, during an allegedly work-related trip to Manila.

 

At that time, Buan’s mother advised her daughter to postpone the filing of the case since the respondent was still influential as a provincial governor. Finally in 2001, Buan filed a complaint, but the prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

 

            The Secretary of Justice reversed the dismissal holding that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. As such, Matugas filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, claiming grave abuse of discretion. CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. 

 

Issue: W/N the CA erred in concluding that the Sec of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when it found the existence of probable cause.

 

Held: The Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion when it found the existence of probable cause. The CA, therefore, had erred in reversing the findings of the Secretary of Justice at this embryonic stage of the proceedings.

            

            It is the task of the public prosecutor to determine whether there is probable cause. As such, the CA is precluded, under the principle of separation of powers, from usurping the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive branch, the Department of Justice.

 

            Wisdom or error of judgment on the part of the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusions of fact and law which is proper in an appeal cannot legitimately be the subject of review in a petition for certiorari before the CA because the decision of the Secretary of Justice is not appealable to the CA.

 

Moreover, the CA missed a crucial step: the trial proper. It had no business reviewing and weighing the evidence submitted, exercised appellate jurisdiction and stepped down to the role of becoming a trier of facts which is definitely uncalled for under the circumstances. Had the respondent been convicted by the trial court and an appeal therefrom taken to the CA, then the CA’s consideration of such matters as his defense of alibi would be proper, but not in a certiorari proceedings before it.

 

 

Doctrine:

-       Two grounds when the CA is empowered under its certiorari jurisdiction to annul and declare void the questioned resolutions of the Secretary of Justice

o   lack of jurisdiction, and 

o   grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

-       there is grave abuse of discretion:

o   when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction

o   where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion andpersonal hostility

o   must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law

-       The CA CANNOT reverse and set aside a decision of the Secretary of Justice and substitute its own judgment

DIGEST/ ALBERTINE DIN/People v Judge Asis & Abordo, 2010, G.R. No. 173089

 People v Judge Asis & Abordo, 2010, G.R. No. 173089

 

Facts:

 

            Abordo was on his way home when private complainants Majait, Calvez, and Montes met him. Abordo shot Majait and Calvez and Montes was unhurt. 

            The RTC acquitted Abordo on the grounds of lack of intent to kill and no treachery and evident premeditation. As such, the RTC only held Abordo accountable for serious physical injuries and less physical injuries. 

            The OSG filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) before the CA but was dismissed by the latter for wrong remedy. 

 

Issue:

1.     W/N the CA mistaken in dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

2.     W/N the petition for certiorari placed the accused in double jeopardy.

3.     W/N there was grave abuse of discretion by the respondent Court.

 

Held: 

 

1.     The CA was mistaken in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

 

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level on the grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

 

Our jurisdiction adheres to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. 

 

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari upon clear showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 

 

2.     Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

 

3.     There was no abuse of discretion nor excess or lack of jurisdiction.

 

No error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence. She considered all the evidence adduced by the parties and the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. 

 

Two kinds of error: error of judgment (one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction) and error of jurisdiction (one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction). 

 

The error of jurisdiction is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.