ayuban

RAMON L. LABO, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO ORTEGA

FACTS:

Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega, on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office. Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec, on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Comelec decided in favorof Ortega.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualifiedto run for Mayor; 2) Whether Ortega having the next highest number of votesis entitled to be proclaimed Mayor upon Labo’s disqualification.

HELD:

Petition DISMISSED. 1) No. Labo was disqualified as a candidate forbeing an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippinecitizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public office. Labo merely applied for repatriation and such application unless officially approved does not amount to repatriation. One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.2) No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitlepetitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes toproclamation as the Mayor. While Ortega may have garnered the secondhighest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and nomeasure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority orplurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Separate Opinions

 PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting

            It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australiancitizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied theknot with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not become anAustralian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not deprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up hiscitizenship in order to acquire a stateless status. In deciding cases involving citizenship, the presumptions should be in favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We should not lightly strip a person of his natural born status but should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with theexercise of a right that was vested in him from birth. In view of the foregoing, the PETITION is GRANTED. 

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO

FACTS:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for theposition of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Montejo, theincumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate forthe same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement forresidency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. Mrs. Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changingthe entry "seven" months to "since childhood", however, the ProvincialElection Supervisor of Leyte informed her that the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. COMELEC sustained Montejo.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections

HELD:

 Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile in election laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile.

Separate Opinion

PONENTE:

PUNO, J.,

concurring:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to schooland thereafter worked there.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married thelate President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicilebecame subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given byArticle 110 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 110.The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the courtmay exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroadunless in the service of the Republic. 3

 Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriageto former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Taclobandomicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not causeher to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gavethe husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of theright, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, inwhich case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged.Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death onSeptember 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batacdomicile. In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we shouldcontinue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,especially married women.FRANCISCO, J., concurring:Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation isfixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode,or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a presentintention of making it his permanent home. It is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicileof origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, orof the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. The records clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutionalone-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to thePhilippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the PCGG whichsequestered her residential house and other properties forbade hernecessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila.In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, shewent back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and residedwith her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City untilAugust of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in hersequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the samemonth of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previousregistration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995.From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied forthe cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thefact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitionertransferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan,Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in theconstituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can nolonger be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she wasbefore. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, butexercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. Inreturning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstratedby overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion toher domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicilein the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run asRepresentative of the First District of Leyte.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections

HELD:

 Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile inelection laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately andknowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead tohis or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistakein her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factualrelationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legalresidence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile.

Separate Opinion

PONENTE:

PUNO, J.,

 concurring: First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban,Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to schooland thereafter worked there.Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married thelate President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicilebecame subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given byArticle 110 of the Civil Code provides:Art. 110.The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the courtmay exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroadunless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied) Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriageto former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Taclobandomicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not causeher to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gavethe husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of theright, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, inwhich case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged.Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death onSeptember 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batacdomicile. In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we shouldcontinue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,especially married women.FRANCISCO, J., concurring:Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation isfixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode,or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a presentintention of making it his permanent home. It is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicileof origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, orof the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. The records clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutionalone-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to thePhilippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the PCGG whichsequestered her residential house and other properties forbade hernecessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila.In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, shewent back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and residedwith her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City untilAugust of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in hersequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the samemonth of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previousregistration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995.From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoningperiod of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied forthe cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thefact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitionertransferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan,Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in theconstituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorilycomplied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.ROMERO, J., separate opinion:I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can nolonger be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she wasbefore. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, butexercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. Inreturning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstratedby overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion toher domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicilein the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run asRepresentative of the First District of Leyte.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

Narvasa, C.J., concurs. PADILLA, J.,

dissenting: To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether ornot the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words,the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Andthis, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar withthe environment and problems of a district he intends to represent inCongress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimumperiod to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.REGALADO, J., dissenting:Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is,domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. Thefirst is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, thesecond is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propiomotu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that thedomicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicileby operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, byoperation of law, not only international or American but of our ownenactment, she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, IlocosNorte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law asa result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952(sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicileat the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there wereno indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin.Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of theprovisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, herlegal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasissupplied).Mrs. Marcos having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannotlegally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is apart continued since her birth up to the present.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: 

It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of lawsometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later,President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is thatdomicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his ownintention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as thatof the wife arising from marriage. Under the governing law then, Article 110of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicileof her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows: The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon thedeath of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome thelegal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported bylaw and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband'sdeath the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the lastdomicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. Or, on the deathof the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived,but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband atthe time of his death. Note that what is revived is not her domicile of originbut her power to acquire her own domicile.

almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have knownabout such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, asthere was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction —to speak of yet at such time. The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be foundin the circumstances of Rodriguez.

 JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE

 FACTS:

Lee sought the disqualification of Frivaldo to run for governor of Sorsogon for being an alien. When Frivaldo got the highest number of votes,Lee asked the COMELEC to proclaim him instead of Frivaldo since he got thenext highest number of votes. Accordingly, Lee was proclaimedFrivaldo alleged that he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of thePhilippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filedwith the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had beengranted". As such, when COMELEC order was released and received byFrivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no morelegal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In thealternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

ISSUE/S:

1) Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did itseasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed andto hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,from when? 2) Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to orhold the governorship of Sorsogon?

HELD:

1) Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when thecandidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which mustconsist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an electivepublic office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none otherthan to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to anothernation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon hisproclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the veryday the term of office of governor (and other elective officials)began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to holdsuch office and to discharge the functions and responsibilitiesthereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was alreadyqualified to govern his native Sorsogon

. The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of hisapplication on August 17, 1994.It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have noretroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settledexceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE orREMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and alsoprovides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Itprovides a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural bornFilipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious andcumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 theycould now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplifiedprocedure of repatriation.Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldodeserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defectsthere were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by hisrepatriation.Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would preventprejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect,and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos whomay be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his Americancitizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. Thisshould not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, itis to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice toprevail.Any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also bedeemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated --i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previousregistration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannotgovern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person maysubsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local GovernmentCode is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time heis proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has beenelected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to thepresent, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly atany time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properlygranted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial orcurative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his politicalstatus and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as hismeans of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be givenretroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during thependency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipinocitizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should havebeen proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. Theforegoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of thecitizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to runfor and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previousrulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear anddecide petitions for annulment of proclamations

DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:

On Feb. 22, 1991 in SC declared EO 284 unconstitutional insofar as itallows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants, to hold other offices,in addition to their primary offices and to receive compensation.COA issued Memorandum 97-038 directing all unit heads/ auditors/ teamleaders of the national government agencies and GOCCs which have effectedpayment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration tocabinetsecretaries, their deputies and assistants, and their representatives inviolation of the rule on multiple positions to: a)Immediately causedisallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to andreceived by the concerned officials; b)Effect the refund of the same fromFebruary 22, 1991 until the present.Accordingly, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of “

members who were the ex-officio members of the NHA BOD and//or their respective alternates whoactually received the payments.”NHA Board of Directors from 1991-1996, appealed the noticeofdisallowance,grounds:1.)The prohibition against multiple positions does not apply to appointiveofficials2.)NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Asst. Secretaries

COA denied their appeal, because petitioners were holding the position asrepresentatives of cabinet members who are constitutionally prohibited fromholding any other office during their tenure.

ISSUE/S:HELD:

COA AFFIRMED. “

The authority shall be governed by a BOD, which shall becomposed of:1.)The Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication,2.)the Director-General of NEDA,3.)the Secretary of Finance,4.)the Secretary of Labor,5.)The Secretary of Industry,6.)The Executive Secretary,7.)The General Manager of the Authority.From among these members, the President will appoint a chairman. The members of the Board may have their respective alternates who shall bethe officials next in rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the actsof their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided, that in theabsence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding officer.

DEBULGADO V. CSC

FACTS:

Victoria, a career service officer of 32 years was promoted by herhusband, the Mayor Debulgado as General Service Officer on Oct. 1, 1982.CSC revoked the appointment on the ground of nepotism.

ISSUE/S:

Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibitionagainst nepotism?

HELD:

Yes. CSC had authority & duty to revoke the approved appointment.All appointments include “promotional” not just “original”. EO 292 Revised Administrative Code of 1987Book V.Section 1. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall insure and promote theConstitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be madeonly according to merit and fitness; xxx.

Section 59. Nepotism.

(2) The ff are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism:a.)persons employed in a confidential capacity;b.)teachers;c.)physicians; andd.)members of the AFP:Provided, however, that in each particular instance full report of suchappointment shall be made to the Commission. The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable in the caseof a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any positionin an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office orbureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husbandand wife may be allowed.(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previousappointments which are in contravention t=hereof shall be corrected bytransfer and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall beallowed in favor of the relative/s who were appointed in violation of theseprovisions. Omnibus Implementing Rules

Rule XVIIISection 6. (essentially the same)Section 9.  an appointment may be void from the beginning dueto  or because it was issued in violation of law. The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. Theexceptions appears to be a closed one

 SC also cited Laurel V. CSC, wherein the confidentially posted brother was“designated” into the position of Provincial Administrator, which the Courtstruck down on ground of nepotism, what cannot be done directly, cannot bedone indirectly.A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY 

FACTS:

Dacoycoy, Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Artsand Trade, Northern Samar was charged with nepotism for the appointmentsof his 2 sons: Rito – as driver and Ped – as utility worker.CSC held him guilty. CA reversed, it was Mr. Daclag who recommended andappointed Rito and Ped.

ISSUE/S:

Whether there was nepotism.

HELD:

 There was nepotism. To constitute violation of the law, there are 4situations covered, if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the 3^rd degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the ff.:1.)Appointing authority;2.)Recommending authority;3.)Chief of the bureau of office;4.)Person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiencyof its personnel. The prohibition against nepotism is a comprehensive one.

                                           

LUEGO V. CSC:

FACTS:

 "temporary," subject to the finalaction taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another

Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II in the Office of the CityMayor in Cebu City. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as employee. The Civil Service Commission later found Tuozo bettter qualified than Luegoand directed that Tuozo replace Luego as Administrative Officer II. The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the newmayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanentappointment, is now before the court to question that order and the privaterespondent's title.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanentappointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than theappointee

HELD:

No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine thekind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its

authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment inthe light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law

.When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements aresatisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment inaccordance with the Civil Service Laws. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and wastherefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the rightto do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission toreverse him and call it temporary.Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed bythe officer, the only condition being that the appointee should possess thequalifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that thereare others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus, unlike theCommission on Appointments, the Civil Service Commission is limited only tothe non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the personappointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law. This political detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause inthe Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service arerevoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of whatever party may be in power.

SINON V. CSC

FACTS:

Prior to the reorganization:

•Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF)Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) in Region II, Cagayan – Juana Banan

•Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II – Eliseo Sinon Department of Agriculture (DA) reorganized the MAF with the issuance of EO116 on Jan. 30, 1987. The evaluation of employees list prepared by the Placement Committeeexcluded Banan.She filed an appeal with DA Reorganizations Appeals Board (DARAB) for re-evaluation, the next list (Resolution 97) excluded Sinon.CSC affirmed the DARAB’s findings.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Committee’s findings are subject to DARAB re-evaluation.

HELD:

Yes. The Placement Committee 3’s findings is subject to the re-evaluation of the DARAB. The RAB was specially created by the Circular of the Office of the Presidentand conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of officials andemployees affected by the reorganization. The decision of RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and iscontrolling in matters of appointment. In fact, the DARAB findings here hadthe approval of the Secretary of Agriculture’s approval affixed (d) Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in thecareer service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, beenseparated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level forwhich he is qualified.When she returned to work for DOLE, it was not a continuation of herprevious service, but the start of a new work slate.Her right to due process was not violated, she was a casual employee awareof her date of termination.