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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. PASTOR B. TINAYA

G.R. No. 154898, February 16, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS

On November 16, 1993, Pastor B. Tinaya, respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.

On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994.

On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.

Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.

On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondent’s temporary appointment, Acting Mayor Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was permanent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent’s original appointment as municipal assessor on November 16, 1993 is permanent, granting him security of tenure; and in declaring that his subsequent appointment on December 1, 1994 does not violate the rule on nepotism.

RULING

The powers and functions of petitioner are defined in Section 9 (h) of the Civil Service Law, thus:

“SECTION. 9. Powers and Functions of the – The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter;

Here, respondent’s original permanent appointment as municipal assessor was approved as temporary by petitioner CSC pending his submission of the required service record of his three (3)-year work experience in real property assessment or in any related field prior to his appointment, as required by the CSC Revised Qualification Standards. As found by petitioner, it was only on December 1, 1994, after his temporary appointment expired on that day, that he was able to submit the required paper. Thus, upon its submission, respondent’s new appointment was made permanent.

Records show that before respondent married Caridad Justimbaste, daughter of then Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste, on December 16, 1993, the latter appointed him municipal assessor. The appointment was permanent. As stated earlier, petitioner approved it as temporary. On December 1, 1994, Acting Mayor Luban extended to respondent (already the son-in-law of Mayor Justimbaste) a permanent appointment after his original temporary appointment expired. This new appointment was initially disapproved by petitioner. But respondent’s mother-in-law, Mayor Justimbaste, appealed to the CSC Regional Office No. VIII. Being then the incumbent mayor, she was the chief of respondent and deemed to have recommended him to Vice-Mayor Luban to be appointed as municipal assessor. Verily, such appointment is in violation of Section 59, Chapter 8 of the Civil Service Law, which provides:

“SEC. 59. Nepotism. – (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word ‘relative’ and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63051 are REVERSED. The Resolution No. 002470 dated October 26, 2000 and Resolution No. 010126 dated January 12, 2001 of petitioner CSC are AFFIRMED.

 

RENATO M. LAPINID VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO JUNSAY

G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991

CRUZ, J.

FACTS

On October 1, 1988, Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. Lapinid’s appointment was protested by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious.  It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).

Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.

On the premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.

ISSUE:

Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING:

In Luego v. Civil Service Commission the  Court declared:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, the Court said:

The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.

 

BRILLANTES vs. YORAC

192 SCRA 358, 1990

Facts

The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. 

Issue

Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. 

Held

NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

Cayetano vs Monsod

201 SCRA 210, 1991

FACTS

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.

ISSUE

Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

HELD

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Feliciano vs. Commission on Audit

GR 147402, 14 January 2004

Fact

A Special Audit Team from Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD). Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano sent a reply dated 12 October 1999 informing COA’s Regional Director that the water district could not pay the auditing fees. Feliciano cited as basis for his action Sections 6 and 20 of PD 198, as well as Section 18 of RA 6758. The Regional Director referred Feliciano’s reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999. On 19 October 1999, Feliciano wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA. On 16 March 2000, Feliciano received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services, and to stop charging auditing fees, to LMWD. The COA also denied Feliciano’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees previously paid by LMWD. Feliciano filed a motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30 January 2001. On 13 March 2001, Felicaino filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue

Whether a Local Water District (“LWD”) is a government-owned or controlled corporation.

Held

The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled. Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange  Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that “[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no articles of  incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange  Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since under the Constitution only  government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm. Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD 198.

 

LAUREL V vs. CSC

GR No. 71562, October 28, 1991

FACTS
Petitioner, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. Upon the vacancy of the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas, petitioner designated his brother as Acting Provincial Administrator. Then, he issued Benjamin Laurel o promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer which is position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as “primarily confidential” pursuant to P.D. No. 868.
ISSUE
Does nepotism apply to designation?
RULING
Yes. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service. Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Sections 49 of P.D. No. 807does not suggest the designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary; hence a designation of a person to fill up because it is vacant, is necessary included in the appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose.

Boncalon vs. Ombudsman

G.R. 171812, Dec. 28, 2008

Facts

On November 25, 1997, Loida C. Arabelo, the State Auditor II of Bago City, Negros Occidental, conducted an audit on the cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV at Bago City Treasurers Office. The audit revealed a cash shortage of P1,023,829.56. The state auditor also discovered, upon verification from the depository bank, that the entry in Boncalons cashbook pertaining to the deposit of P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 was false. Deposits totaling said amount were made only on November 25, 1997 and December 22, 1997, in the amounts of P200,000.00 and P819,535.21, respectively. In view of the audit findings, Boncalon was administratively charged with dishonesty before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas).

Issue

Is the Ombudsman limited only to the power to recommend, but not to impose, the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee?

Ruling

Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring public official, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic Act No. 6770. While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to recommend, removal, suspension, demotion of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21of RA 6770. The word or in Section 15(3) before the phrase enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 grants the Ombudsman this alternative power. Section 21 of RA 6770 states that, the power of disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government, except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and the Judiciary vests in the ombudsman. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the ombudsman.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. 180122, March 13, 2009

Facts

Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer and chair of the National Housing Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public funds amounting to P230,000 to pay a Makati-based construction company for a ghost project(financing a project that is not part of a plan) in Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring with fellow officers;namely, Josephine Angsico, Virgilio Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the allegation, and after a thorough investigation, the court dismissed the charges of the alleged conspirants for failure to prove participation, but it retained Lazarte’s charge.
Issue: As department manager of the NHA (Salary Grade 26), does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over petitioner Lazarte?

Ruling

The Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the scope of its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. NHA being part of that.
Further, the position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan---- that which includes the position held by Lazarte.

LUEGO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-69137

FACTS

Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 June 1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Service Commission’s order and the private respondent’s title.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution is set aside.

MARIVIC ZARATE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

JULIAN LALLAVE, JR.

G.R. No. 129096.  November 19, 1999

FACTS
Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes. Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of “JL”. The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid. Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real” should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively. The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc. The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
Issue
 Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
Held
 Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division. The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.