Francisco
S. Tatad vs. Commission on Appointments [G.R. No. 183171] August 14, 2008
ISSUE:
On May
4, 2005, respondent Commission on Appointments (Commission) issued a
Certification of Consent and confirmed the appointment of former Vice
President Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to the People’s Republic of China with concurrent
jurisdiction over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Mongolia.
Petitioner
Tatad challenged the consent before the RTC in Quezon
City via a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity. He contended that
the appointment of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona as Ambassador had
violated the law and public policy because Teofisto was already beyond the age
of 70.
On August
30, 2006, the RTC issued its Order dismissing the complaint. The
RTC declared the case moot because of the resignation of Vice President
Teofisto Guingona in the position.
The
petitioner had elevated the case on the Court of Appeal and he argued, in his
appeal, that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7157, otherwise known as the Philippine
Foreign Service Act of 1991, prohibits appointments of those beyond
seventy (70) years old to ambassadorial posts; that Ambassador Guingona’s
resignation did not render the case moot because there must be a continuing
determination of those responsible for the illegal act.
On March
17, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the resignation of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona in the
position had rendered the case moot?
RULING:
The
Supreme Court agrees with both the trial and appellate courts. The resignation
of former Vice President Guingona as Ambassador rendered the issues raised in
this petition moot. It has become a non-issue such that a resolution
either way would be of no practical effect. In essence, there is no
more illegal appointment to speak of because the appointee ceased to occupy the
subject position.
An
issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justifiable
controversy. In such a case, there is no actual substantial relief
which a petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. We have consistently held that courts will not
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief will be
granted.
Jesus
Armando A.R. Tarrosa vs. Gabriel C. Singson, et al. [G.R. No. 111243] May 25,
1994
FACTS:
On
July 2, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed the respondent Gabriel C.
Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral.
The
petitioner Tarrosa filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment
of the respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The
petitioner seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from the performance of his
functions as such official until his appointment is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments and respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and
Management, from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson.
Respondents
had made their comment and claimed that the Congress had exceeded its
legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contended that an appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
citing Article VII, Section 16 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Did
Congress exceed its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral?
HELD:
The
petition is dismissed. The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the
latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko
Sentral, a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General
or by a “person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
unlawfully held or exercised by another”.
It
is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To
uphold the action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts,
thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation
of the governmental machinery.
Its capstone having been removed, the
whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence, there is no need to resolve the
question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the Court refrains
from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in
deference to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination
of the case.
Teofisto
T. Guingona, et al. vs. Neptali A. Gonzales, et al. [G.R. No. 106971] March 1,
1993
FACTS OF THE CASE:
After
the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.
To
suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the
parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x
12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for
LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo,
as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen
Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of
eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of
LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise
is against proportional representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not rounding off is
allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
HELD:
It
is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the
political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2
to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
one political party either the LAKAS NUCD
or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly
elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to
resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations
with the other party.
No comments:
Post a Comment