Joseph Erick Q. Cimafranca

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents.

G.R. No. 176278

June 25, 2010

EN BANC

FACTS:

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

ISSUE:

Petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and mootness.

Ruling:

An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

G.R. No. 149036

April 2, 2002

EN BANC

FACTS:

On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners in an ad interim appointment.

In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.

Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.

Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

               

                Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

                We find petitioner’s argument without merit. 

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

               

JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

G.R. No. 107369

August 11, 1999

EN BANC

FACTS:

                On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government.  The said Act states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions.  Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation 

2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional 

RULING:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.  As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.”On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police.  Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional.  The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands.  It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided sections.

Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

In view of the foregoing disquisition and conclusion, the respondent former Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III of the Department of Budget and Management, did not act with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing and effecting disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the respondent police officers whose appointments are valid.