G.R. No. 160869 May
11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHEARS AND ALLIED WORKERS) member - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG. Petitioner,
VS.
The honorable SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Respondent
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition and prays that a writ of prohibition be
issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An
Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes"
which he avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
R.A. 9225:
SEC. 2. Declaration of
Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue of dual allegiance?
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed
clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep.
Act No. 9225. On the other hand, Congress was given a mandate to draft a law
that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
PETITION is DISMISSED For lack
of merit.
G.R. No. 137000 August
9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, Petitioner
Vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND
YBASCO LOPEZ, Respondents
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a disqualification case against private respondent in
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez (private
respondent) was born on May 16, 1934 in
Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949,
at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines. Petitioner contends
that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant
certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that
she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her
Philippine citizenship,
therefore it operated to disqualify her to run for elective office. He also argued that Comelec’s finding of
renouncing her Australian citizenship and had her Australian passport cancelled
did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a
Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is an Australian citizen
RULING:
No. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless
of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth. Private
respondent was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country and
these were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law. Under both organic acts,
all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899
and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine
citizens. Her father was born on 1879 in Daet, Camarines Sur. Therefore by
virtue of the said laws, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. Also, the principle of jus sanguinis,
which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. Secondly, as ruled in Aznar vs Comelec and Mercado vs Manzano and Comelec, the mere fact that private
respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate
of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship.
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
Petition is DISMISSED. COMELEC resolutions
AFFIRMED.
IMMIGARATION VS. DELA ROSA (1991)
G.R. Nos. 95122 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW,
PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC
MANILA, BRANCH 29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 95123 May 31, 1991
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM AND BENJAMIN KALAW, PETITIONERS,
VS.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 172, VALENZUELA, METRO MANILA, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, AND WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, PETITIONER,
VS.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
On
July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27,
1961, William, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together
with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of
registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based
on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On
July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino
citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The board of
commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen
such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of
special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board
of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry.
On
August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation[*] issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the
same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha v. Vivo and Vivo v. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.
ISSUES:
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha v. Vivo and Vivo v. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen.
ISSUES:
1.Whether
or not the Court of Appeals not RTC which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or
commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special
Inquiry.
2.Whether
or not William is to be declared a Filipino Citizen, and if not, whether the
order of his deportation be barred for such issuance 28 years thereafter.
RULING:
1.
Under
Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue
"writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —
"(3)
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948."
It
does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies.
The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the
Court of Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their
enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals
In
the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of
the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the
Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec. 21 (1), BP
129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with
the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.
2.
Under
Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation
proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years. In the case at bar, it
took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962
before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent
William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. The power to deport an alien is an
act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence
in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic
tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi v. Court of
Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the economy of
the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered
undesirable and be summarily deported when the government, in its concerted
drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any alien
who invest at least US $50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo
that respondent is an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust
and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by petitioners in
the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs
to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Section
1.
The
following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
This
forecloses any further question about the Philippine
citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen.
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