gikan ni karen, ang paboritong apo ni lolo sa jollibee

G.R No. L-4164, December 12, 1952

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF INFANTE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

ANTONIO INFANTE, PETITIONER AND APPELLE,

Vs

THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS ACCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT

TUASON, J.:

FACTS:

            Antonio Infante (petitioner), herein, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day. After serving 15 years, 7 months, and 11 days of his sentence, he was granted a conditional pardon and released from imprisonment. The period of the sentence remaining to be served was 1 year and 11 days. The condition of the pardon was that “he shall not again violate any of the penal law of the Philippines”. After 10 years on the date he was released from imprisonment, Antonio Infante was convicted of a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law for driving a jeep without a license and was sentenced to pay P10 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not Infante can be re-arrested and serve the unexpired term or period of his sentence for breach of the conditions of the aforesaid pardon

HELD:

            A conditional pardon delivered and accepted has been said to constitute a contract between the sovereign power or the executive and the criminal that the former will release the latter upon compliance with the conditions.

            According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from the provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of prescription. There has no such evasion in this case.

The condition of the pardon which the prisoner was charged with having breached was no longer operative when he committed a violation of Motor Vehicle Law.

Pardon is an act of grace, and there is general agreement that limitations upon its operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202); so that, where a conditional pardon is susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee. (39 Am. Jur., 564) Thus, in Huff vs. Dyer, 40 Ohio C.C. 595, 5. L R A, N S, Note 1064), it was held that the duration of the conditions subsequent, annexed to a pardon, would be limited to the period of the prisoner's sentence unless an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. In that case, the prisoner was discharged on habeas corpus because the term of the pardon in question did not, in the opinion of the court, imply that it was contemplated to have the condition operated beyond the term of his sentence. The herein petitioner's pardon, it will be noted, does not state the time within which the conditions thereof were to be performed or observed. In adopting, which we hereby do, the rule of strict construction, we take into account, besides the benevolent nature of the pardon, the fact that the general run out prisoners are unlettered or at least unfamiliar with the intricacies and legal implications of conditions subsequent imposed in a pardon.

 G. R No. 116512, March 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

Vs

WILLIAM O. CASIDO AND FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the grant of bail, release or pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) then contented that since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or after then institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes even after conviction. Thereafter, accused-appellant were granted conditional pardon. But under the resolution of July 30, 1996, the conditional pardon granted in this case is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution (February 22, 1996) the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) favorably acted on the applications of Franklin A. Alcorin and Williom O. Casido.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the release of accused-appellant is valid

HELD:

            The release then of accused-appellant William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin can only be justified by the amnesty, but not by the pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

            Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in concurrence Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June 1994.

            IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of accused-appellant William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and this case dismissed with costs de oficio.

 G.R No. 78239, February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, PETITIONER

Vs

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., RESPONDENT

FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:

            March 25, 1983, petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correctional.

            Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court which affirmed the case. She then filed a motion for reconsideration which during the pendency of the motion, she was extended pardon by the President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.

            By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog treasurer requesting the she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant and stressed-out that the full pardon bestowed on her wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted. This entitling her to reinstatement from the date of her preventive suspension and a backpay for the entire period of her suspension and that she should not be required to pay the proportional share of the amount of 4,892.50.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of new appointment

HELD:

            The Ministry of Finance referred the request of Monsanto to the Office of the President which gives a statement through it Deputy Executive Secretary that it is only during an acquittal, not absolute pardon, as the only ground for the reinstatement of previous position and entitlement of salary payments of the public officer (People v. Lansing, Crim Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985)

            Monsanto, being convict for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents with a penalty of prision correctional carries, as one of its accessory penalty, of suspension from public office.

            Through pardoned, petitioner cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earning and benefits.

            The pardon granted to the petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but that cannot go beyond it. That to regain the former post, she must re-apply and undergo usual procedure required for a new appointment and in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.