mira FINALS digest

1)

Jacot v. Comelec

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Jacot assails Comelec Resolution affirming his disqualification from running for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225. Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws. When the local and national elections were held petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law for persons seeking public office.

Ruling:

No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. It specifically provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional requirements and existing laws. At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have one citizenship, that is, Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.

A candidate who failed to  comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was  AFFIRMED and petitioner was DISQUALIFIED.

2)

Frivaldo v. Comelec 

G.R. No. 120295  June 28, 1996

Facts:

Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.

Issues:

1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?

2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?

3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?

4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

Ruling:

1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his

office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold  office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually.  In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of  filing of his application.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective provincial  officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

3)

Go v. Ramos

G.R No. 167569, G.R No. 167570 & G.R No. 171946

Facts:

Respondent  Ramos initiated a petition against petitioner Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien and not a Filipino citizen. Ramos alleged that Go represents himself as a Filipino citizen when in fact Go’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Go denies the allegation and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein. They challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. Go filed al petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the Decision. However, RTC dissolved the writ and dismissed the decision. Following the dismissal of the petition the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the his apprehension. Go commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but was dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. A petition for certiorari before the CA was filed imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the Resolution and the charge sheet. The CA dismissed the petition.  A motion for reconsideration have been denied by the Bureau of Immigration thus a petition.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the cause of action of the Bureau against petitioner had prescribed;

2) Whether or not the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein;

3) Whether or not the evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove their claim of Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;

4) Whether or not due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and

 5) Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

Rulings:

1) Deportation may be effected any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from the time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. A prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The counting could not logically start when his passport was issued because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen, otherwise his application would have been denied.

2) To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien.

3) No. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own. Unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: a) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; b) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and c) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Court.

The doctrine of jus soli only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. In this case, there was no sufficiency to show merit the extension of the 3-year period. The exercise of his right of suffrage were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. His registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship which is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.

4) No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.

5) No. A writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. The petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Petitions Denied.