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1)

Arao v. Comelec

G.R. No. 103877 June 23, 1992

Facts :  

Benjamin Arao and Warlito Pulmones were candidates for mayor of Pagadian City in the 1988 local elections. After canvass, Arao was shown to have garnered 12,447 votes while Pulmones got only 12,030 or a margin of 417 votes in favor of Arao. Pulmones filed his protest alleging fraud and anomalies in the voting centers which were glaring and notably perpetrated in specified districts. A resolution was issued denying Pulmones’ amended protest and finally, after revision of ballots and hearing ruled that arao is the winner with a margin of 378 votes in lieu of the 417 votes formerly proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers. Upon Pulmones’ motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC, en banc, declared Pulmones as the duly elected mayor with a margin of 516 votes against arao and ordered Arao to vacate the office.

                            

Issue:          

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it examined ballots not included in the original protest but only in the amended protest which was submitted beyond the required period?

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the extraordinary power of the Supreme Court to pass upon an order or decision of the COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with care and caution while giving it the regard and respect due to a constitutional body. The abuse of discretion must be grave. Unlike an ordinary suit, an election protest is of utmost public concern. The rights of the contending parties must yield to the far greater interest of the citizens for the sanctity of the electoral process. This being the case, the choice of the people to represent them may not be bargained away by sheer negligence of a party to raise the question of identical handwriting in the ballots. There is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

2)

Dipatuan v. Comelec

G.R. No. 86117 May 7, 1990

Facts:        

Petitioner Dipatuan and private respondent Aleem Hosain Amanoddin were candidates for Mayor of Bacolod Grande in the February 1988 special local elections in Lanao del Sur. The other private respondents were candidates for Vice-Mayor and Councilors in the same municipality. On February 21, 1988, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bacolod Grande, chaired by Samuel Minalang, finished canvassing the votes but did not proclaim the winning candidates. It did so on February 29, 1988, when private respondent Amanoddin was proclaimed winner and elected mayor. Earlier, on February 25, 1988, petitioner Dipatuan was proclaimed Mayor by a separate Board of Canvassers headed by one Mamacaog Manggray, after the said Board had excluded the election returns from Precincts Nos. 15,17 and 21 from its canvass. Later on a Special Board of Canvassers was convened in Manila by the Comelec to re-canvass the election returns from Bacolod Grande. On June 21, 1988, during the re-canvass, petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election returns from precinct nos. 15 and 17, contending that the returns from the two precincts were “spurious and manufactured”.

Issue:   

Did the questioned returns present a pre-proclamation controversy to be resolved before proclaiming the candidate?

Held:            

The High Court held that the issues raised constitute issues properly afforded in pre-proclamation controversies. The assailed returns were obviously manufactured – but such allegation must be evident from the face of the election return themselves. In the case at bar, petitioner does not claim that the election returns from said precincts had not been made or issued by the BEI or that they had been manufactured by some unknown third party. Petitioner does not claim that the returns themselves were not authentic. What the petition in effect contends is that the election returns, although genuine or authentic in character, are reflective of fraudulent acts done before or carried out by the BEI, the returns should be deemed as obviously manufactured.It is unfair to conclude that alphabetical voting in Lanao del Sur is indicative of fraud. There is evidence on record from the testimony of witnesses that alphabetical voting is an honest procedure adopted by some Boards of Election Inspectors in Lanao. In some precincts in Lanao del Sur, alphabetical voting is imposed to promote an orderly election. Usually in the morning the bulk of the voters gather in the precincts. What the Board of Election Inspectors should do is to call one by one the names of the voters in alphabetical order to avoid overcrowding in the precincts. Petition was therefore DISMISSED.

3)

Labo v. Comelec

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

Facts:          

Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec, seeking to annul Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the latter’s citizenship disqualification. Comelec granted the petition, ordered the cancellation of Labo’s certificate of candidacy and motu proprio, ordered the suspension of the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for city mayor for the City of Baguio.

On appeal, Labo prayed that he be declared a Filipino citizen alleging that the election automatically restored his Philippine citizenship and that the pending application of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before the Office of the Solicitor General vests him of said citizenship. Ortega, however, insists on the finality of the Comelec decision because of the failure of the Court to issue a temporary restraining order and such be declared as the mayor for having garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue:          

Does the disqualification of Labo entitle him Ortega who received the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate?

Held:

Reiterating the Court’s ruling in Abella v. Comelec, it ruled that while Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve and his subsequent disqualification does not make Ortega the mayor-elect.

4)

                                                      Ombudsman v. Mojica

G.R. No. 146486

Facts:

The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:

1)     Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;

2)  Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and

3) Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed. Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules.

Issue:

 Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987  Constitution?

Ruling:

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of the Republic of the Philippines.

5)

Pangilinan v. Comelec

G.R No. 105278 November 18, 1993

Facts: 

Petitioner Francis Pangilinan and private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. were both candidates for congressman in the 4^th legislative district of Quezon City in the May 1992 elections. Petitions for disqualification were filed against Belmonte by two registered voters of Quezon City together with several other petitions for disqualification for violation of section 68 of the Election Code. Despite a petition to suspend the canvass and/or proclamation, the COMELEC failed to act upon the motion. During the canvass of the returns, petitioner objected to over 120 election returns being canvassed by the city board of canvassers on the ground that they were tampered, altered or spurious. The city board of canvassers, however, overruled petitioner’s objections on the ground that under Section 15 of RA 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413 – pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Petitioners filed the present petition to question the constitutionality of RA 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC resolution 2413 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Does COMELEC have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives?

Held:

It will be noted that the COMELEC is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials. It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, under Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members.

6)

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Leal
G.R. No. 113459, November 18, 2002

Facts:                                                                                                                        

 Pursuant to Sec. 116 of the Tax Code which imposes percentage tax on dealers in securities and lending investors, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91 dated March 11, 1991, imposing five percent (5%) lending investor’s tax on pawnshops based on their gross income and requiring all investigating units of the Bureau to investigate and assess the lending investor’s tax due from them. The issuance of RMO No. 15-91 was an offshoot of petitioner’s evaluation that the nature of pawnshop business is akin to that of lending investors. Subsequently, petitioner issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 43-91 dated May 27, 1992, subjecting the pawn ticket to the documentary stamp tax as prescribed in Title VII of the Tax Code. Adversely affected by those revenue orders, herein respondent Josefina Leal, owner and operator of Josefina Pawnshop in San Mateo, Rizal, asked for a reconsideration of both RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 but the same was denied with finality by petitioner in October 30, 1991. Consequently, on March 18, 1992, respondent filed with the RTC a petition for prohibition seeking to prohibit petitioner from implementing the revenue orders. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction to review the questioned revenue orders and to enjoin their implementation. Petitioner contends that the subject revenue orders were issued pursuant to his power “to make rulings or opinions in connection with the Implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws.” Thus, the case falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, citing Sec. 7(1) of RA 1125.
The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss holding that the revenue orders are not assessments to implement a Tax Code provision, but are “in effect new taxes (against pawnshops) which are not provided for under the Code,” and which only Congress is empowered to impose. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order issued by the RTC.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Commissioner implementing the Tax Code.

Held:

The jurisdiction to review rulings of the Commissioner pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals and NOT to the RTC. The questioned RMO and RMC are actually rulings or opinions of the Commissioner implementing the Tax Code on the taxability of the Pawnshops.
Under RA 1125, An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, such rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are appealable to that court: Sec. 7 Jurisdiction – The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided— Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. tax remedies; section 220; who should institute appeal in tax cases.

7)

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

G.R No. 148560 November 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted under an Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness. It dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:

 1) Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2) Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.

3) Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

Held:

In the question whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional. The court held that it is not, As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which the petitioner is alleged to have committed. The court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution first if it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid and secondly when, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. In the second issue under Sec. 4 of Rule of Evidence it states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The court answered that Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is to be considered as malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

8)

Ombudsman v. Samaniego
G.R. No. 175573  | September 11, 2008

Facts:

Respondent Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City, Albay. On separate dates, the Commission on Audit (COA) filed two administrative complaints against Samaniego, for dishonesty and grave misconduct. In these administrative complaints, the COA alleged that respondent incurred shortages in his accountabilities for two separate periods. Respondent received letters of demand requiring him to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave misconduct because he failed to explain his side and settle his accountabilities. Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA, respondent assailed the joint decision of the Office of the Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable in one of the admin cases filed. His prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted.

Since it was not impleaded as a respondent, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction. The motions were denied. The Office of the Ombudsman now claims that the CA erred in denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was the subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary injunction should be recalled.

Issue:

Whether writ of injunction was necessary to stay the execution of the order of the Ombudsman?

Held:

No. Under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. A literal reading of this rule shows that the mere filing of an appeal does not prevent the decision of the Ombudsman from becoming executory. However, we clarified this rule in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja: Only orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory. The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. He filed an appeal of the Ombudsman's joint decision on time. In his appeal, he included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in order to stay the execution of the decision against him. Following Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, we hold that the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity.

9)

Legaspi v. CSC

G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Facts:

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for  sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue: 

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.

Held: 

The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. 

10)

NAC v. COA

G.R.No.156982 September 8, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.  It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994.However, on October15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued.

 Issue :

Is COA Memo No. 97-038 not published valid? 

Ruling:

Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2.  Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.  We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera : All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.  Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.  Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.  Neither is publication required of the so-

called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.)COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.