EN
BANC
[
G.R. No. 147904, October 04, 2002 ]
NESTOR
B. MAGNO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CARLOS C. MONTES,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
On March 21,2010 A private
respondent filed for the disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as
mayoralty candidate during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that
petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of
direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. On July
25,1995 the petitioner was sentenced and applied for probation and was
discharged on March 5,1998. On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of private respondent and
declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the position of
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 10, 2001, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC in
its resolution dated May 12, 2001. Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not
a crime involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of RA 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which he claims is the
law applicable to the case at bar, not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as
claimed by the COMELEC.
Petitioner insists that he had
already served his sentence as of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from
probation. Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period imposed by
Section 40 of the Local Government Code expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner
was qualified to run in the 2001 elections.
On July 18, 2001, the
Solicitor-General filed his manifestation and agreed with petitioner that
COMELEC should have applied Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE:
whether or not petitioner was
disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections.(1) whether the crime of
direct bribery involves moral turpitude and
(2) whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government Code
that should applying this situation.
HELD:
Moral turpitude can be inferred
from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise
or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an
official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part
of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society
in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and
position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude.
Though his crime of direct
bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless could not be
disqualified from running in the 2001 elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40 of the Local Government Code
(RA 7160). Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and he was
therefore under no such disqualification anymore when he ran for mayor of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Unfortunately, however, neither
this Court nor this case is the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of
Sonia Lorenzo’s proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the
rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already been proclaimed as the
winning candidate, the legal remedy of petitioner would have been a timely
election protest.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of
the Commission on Elections dated May 7, 2001 and May 12, 2001 are hereby
reversed and set aside. The petitioner’s prayer in his supplemental petition
for his proclamation as the winner in the May 14, 2001 mayoralty elections in San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, not being within our jurisdiction, is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST
DIVISION
[
G.R. No. 60151, June 24, 1983 ]
SALVADOR L. BUDLONG, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ACTING THIRD ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL, CITY OF TAGBILARAN, PETITIONER,
VS. HONORABLE AQUILES T. APALISOK, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING CITY JUDGE, CITY
COURT, BRANCH II, CITY OF TAGBILARAN, AND CAMILO PUYO Y GALAGAR, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
The petitioner filed information before
the respondent court charging private respondent Camilo Puyon y Galagar with
the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. During the
scheduled arraignment, on February 4, 1982, the accused pleaded guilty to the
crime charged. Immediately after the plea the respondent judge rendered judgment
in open court and sentenced the accused to suffer thirty (30) days of
imprisonment and to pay the costs. No civil liability was imposed. At this same
hearing, the accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law, as amended. Acting on the
manifestation, the respondent court gave the counsel of the accused five (5)
days within which to file the petition for probation. On February 5, 1982, the
petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Hearing for the reception
of evidence to prove the civil liability of the accused. On February 11, 1982,
the respondent court issued an order denying the aforesaid motion. On February
18, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 11,
1982 order. On February 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. The Acting Third Assistant City
Fiscal decided to file this petition. On April 14, 1982, the issued a
resolution. The
Solicitor General filed his comment as directed. The private respondent,
however, decided not to file any comment. In a manifestation dated October 8,
1982, the counsel for accused Camilo Puyo y Galagar stated that the private
respondent was submitting the matter to the sound discretion of this Court
without any comments. In the light of this manifestation, we have given due
course to the petition.
The petition is meritorious.
Considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the February 11, 1982 order of the
respondent court denying the motion for hearing on the civil liability of the
accused was improper.
ISSUE:
Whether
the Respondent Court has Committed has committed grave abuse on rendering
judgment convicting the respondent without adjudication of Civil Liability?
RULING:
In the instant
case, the civil action was more than impliedly instituted because the
information specifically alleged that there were physical injuries inflicted on
the victim which would require medical attendance for a period of forty (40)
days and would incapacitate the victim from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time to the damage and prejudice of the latter and that the
same would be "in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case
The provision of
the Probation Law clearly provides only for the suspension of the sentence
imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has
absolutely no bearing on civil liability. There is no legal basis for the
respondent court's conclusion that a hearing to prove the civil liability of
the accused under the circumstances of the case, "... would in effect
nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very
purpose of the Probation Law." The civil action for the civil liability is
separate and distinct from the criminal action. (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8; People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA
120).
Probation has been
with us for six (6) years but the statutory concept and objectives, the
selection criteria, and its many other aspects, and the prescription for its
success appear to elude some judges charged with its implementation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The respondent court's
orders dated February 11, 1982 and February 19, 1982 respectively are hereby
SET ASIDE. The respondent court is ordered to set hearings on the civil
liability of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST
DIVISION
[
G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993 ]
VICENTE
GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was a
Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily
dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the
decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications for the loss of several telegraph poles which were located at
the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner
did not appeal from the decision.
A criminal case for
qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial
court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. On 26th
of August 1981, by authority of the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, a executive
clemency was granted to the petitioner.
Petitioner again
filed a claim to recover his back salaries for the period when he was
reinstated. In Decision embodied in its 3rd Endorsement, respondent COA denied
the claim stating that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back
wages and that he had not rendered service during the period of his claim.
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed the COA decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the
President. On 21 April 1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., by authority of the President, denied the appeal.
Issue:
Whether
or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency?
HELD:
In the
case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the
trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for
which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that
petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him
innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern
and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the
primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the
favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.
After having been
declared innocent of the crime of qualified theft, which also served as basis
for the administrative charge, petitioner should not be considered to have left
his office for all legal purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office held, including back
wages. 11
Consequently, this
Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April
1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated.
The payment shall be without deduction or qualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent
Commission on Audit dated 23 July 1985 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered ordering public respondents, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
the Minister (now Secretary) of Land Transportation and Communications, the
Regional Director of Telecom Regional Office No. IV, or whoever may be sitting
in office in their stead, to pay the full amount of petitioner's back salaries
from 1 April 1975 to 12 March 1984 based on his latest salary scale.
SO ORDERED.
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