EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989 ]
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections
a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's election
and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January
20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22,
1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely
forced upon himself as a means of survival
against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines
after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his
title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper
party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections
decided instead by its Order of January
20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988.
He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered
with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits
scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same
time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their
assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American
citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and
be elected governor. They also argued
that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The ultimate purpose was
to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered
as one for quo warranto, it could not
have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation
because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his
naturalization. And assuming that the
League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who
was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless
institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General
supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a
citizen of the Philippines
and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public
office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because
the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the
Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's
argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable
because what the League and Estuye were seeking was
not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness."
In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [1955 I.C.J. 4;
49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German
national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only.
He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections
because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized
then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation.
Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional
elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his
prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the
importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to
resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only
after a
long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the
public interest and the vital principles of public office to be
here applied.
It is true that the
Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's
citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the
Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo
is a foreigner. We assume this stance
was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the
Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7, of the
Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we
must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January
18, 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition
are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this
inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution
"allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of
candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of
such status. The evidence shows,
however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER, Clerk
by: (Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BARENG
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In
fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on
him as a
measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason
not to believe that the petitioner was one the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree
that as a
consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship.
His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected
outright.
There were
many other Filipinos in the
United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of
them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary - nor do
they claim to have been coerced - to abandon their cherished status as
Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared
"on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty
of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive
list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner held fast to
their Philippine citizenship
despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the
petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality
which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle
is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the
Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status an of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of
Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein
one month before the outbreak of World War II.
Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on
Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his
properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with
Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant
to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two
states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether
or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under
our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone us
sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its
nationals."
It is also worth noting
that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas
in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting
his naturalization in the United
States.
If he really wanted to
disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo
does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in
the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted
country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not
have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that
he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo’s contention that he could not
have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided
for therein had not yet been
constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious.
Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it
were. It would allow all Filipinos who
have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without
formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that
Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law envisions - surely, Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been
convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his
office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's
entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and
by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied,
that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged
shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born
citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more
reason why it should be treasure like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the
gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored.
This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like
a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if
repentant children. The returning renegade
must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN
G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office
and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province
once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March
9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurred with a brief concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., no part, Petitioner is my client.
Cortes, J., in the result.
CONCURRING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I concur in the
pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I
agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public good
should supersede any procedural infirmities which may affect a petition filed
with the Commission on Elections. I fail
to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is
indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of any
province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed
by law for the filing of a protest -- whether
quo warranto or election contest
-- is mandatory and jurisdictional.[1]
As a rule, the quo warranto petition
seeking to annul the petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election results.[2]
The purpose of the law in not allowing
the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and
definite time within which petitions against the results of an election should
be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such
disputes.[3] The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the
Philippines to file quo warranto
proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a
forfeiture of his office.[4] However, where the Solicitor General or the
President feel that there are no good reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings,[5] the Court should allow a person like
respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a
clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.[6]
Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility,[7] I believe that the ten-day period should be
applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court
found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for
the petitioner's claim of having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am
constrained to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
[1] Ferrer v. Gutierrez and Lucot, 43 Phil. 795 [1922]; and Nisperos v.
Araneta Diaz and Flores, 47 Phil. 806 [1925].
[2] Section 253, Omnibus Election Code, B.P. Blg. 881.
[3] Municipal Council of Masantol v. Guevarra, 44
Phil. 580 [1923].
[4] Rule 66, Section 1, Rules
of Court.
[5] Rule 66, Section 2.
[6] Section 253, Omnibus
Election Code; See Casin v. Caluag, 80 Phil. 758 [1948].
[7] Among them are corrupting voters or election
officials with money or other material considerations (Section 68, B.P. 881);
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one's candidacy (id);
overspending for election expenses (id); soliciting, receiving, or
making prohibited contributions (Sections 89, 95, 96, 97, and 104 of B.P. 881);
the use of a void certificate of candidacy (Section 78, id); engaging in
partisan political activity outside of the campaign period (Section 80, id);
destroying or defacing lawful election propaganda (Section 83, id);
using prohibited forms of certificate election propaganda (Section 85, id);
unlawful use of mass media (Section 86, id); coercion by a public officer of subordinates to campaign for or against a candidate
(Section 261-d, id); using threats and intimidation to force a person to
campaign or to prevent him from campaigning for or against a candidate (Section
261-e, id); electioneering within the prohibited space around or
inside a polling place (Section 261-k, id); use of public
funds for certain election purposes (Section 261-u, id); and use of a void certificate of candidacy
(Section 78). Under Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, certain persons like ecclesiastics and soldiers in
the active service are disqualified from running for elective municipal office.
This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System
No comments:
Post a Comment