ganzon

ANGELES V OMBUDSMAN (2012)

G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:(1) Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
(2) Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner;(3) Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.

The Ombudsman dismissed the charges against respondent Velasco.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Joint Order, which was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of merit.

Hence the Petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 rules of court, seeks to set aside the Joint Order of the Ombudsman exonerating respondent Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco.

ISSUE:

Whether, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.

RULINGS:

The petition is dismiss. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.

The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Said exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.

The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:

Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.

Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted.

In this Petition, The court does not find any grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Court’s exceptional divergence from the general rule.

OMBUDSMAN V. ANDUTAN

G.R. No. 164679, July 27, 2011

Facts:

Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF). Then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.

Andutan together with some respondents was criminally charged by the fact finding and intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with estafa and through falsification of public Documents,and violations of section 3(a), (e) and republic act no. 3019, otherwise known as the anti-graft and corrupt practice act. As government employees, Andutan were likewise administratively charged of grave misconduct, dishonesty, falsification of official documents and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.

The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter "should not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that the complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of"and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan's forced resignation.

ISSUES:

I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibits the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year after the act was committed?

II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?

III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman's findings supported by substantial evidence?

RULINGS:

The provision of section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed. The period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion.
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.

 Andutans resignation divest the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint against him. Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the case was filed.  What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman's position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.

While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual findings.

OMBUDSMANV. MOJICA

G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005

Facts:

Arturo Mojica is a deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, was have been filed a formal complaint against him by twenty two officials and employees of his office. By committing the following: (1) sexual harassment (2) mulcting money from confidential employees (3) oppression against all employee in not releasing the 7, 200 benefits.

The Ombudsman acting of the formal complaints against mojica, directed his FFIB to conduct a verification and fact finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB found the evidence against mojica strong on the charges of extortion, sexual harassment, and oppression. The Ombudsman constituted COP.

Upon the evaluation of the COP on the evidence of the case, the COP fined sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication. The committee recommended the docketing of the complainst as criminal  and administrative cases.

COP was directed by the Ombudsman to conduct administrative proceedings and to submit a recommendation on the propriety of putting mojica under preventive suspension.

Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition for certiorari before the court of appeals praying that a TRO be issued to prevent the Ombudsman from further investigation of the complaints. And filed an urgent motion for the immediate issuance of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action.

The CA grant the TRO and, The CA rendered a decision in favor of mojica, of being an impeachable official and making all the action of the Ombudsman against mojica null and viod and declared invalid.

Issues:

1.       Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in erroneously ruling that private respondent is an impeachable official?

2.       Whether the court of appeals has no jurisdiction to order the dismissal of a criminal case against a retired deputy Ombudsman, which is still pending preliminary investigation.

Rulings:

Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states that:

Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office, reference was made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading commentators in constitutional law. Thus:

. . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the Ombudsman as impeachable, excluding his deputies.

As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.

That the respondent is not an impeachable official, he can not avail on,” The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office”. Hence, the respondent is no longer in office, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.

Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The SC ordered to reversed and set aside the CA rulings and to reinstate the acts of the Ombudsman against the Petitioner.