G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L.
AFRICA (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, AND POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), RESPONDENTS.
BRION.
FACTS:
A case was
filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to
the allegation that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous
incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by
Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which
sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing him to account for the
alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising
voting rights. The present respondents were not
made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa
(Africa) was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party thereto.
In the
proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony
of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was
taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before
Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. The
purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his
affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or
establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class
A stock.
As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner
filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of the
witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane
which was denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination. The
petitioners did not in any way question the 1998
resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.
Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered
exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for
re-opening of the case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and
requested the court to take judicial notice of the facts established by the
Bane deposition. This was however denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000
resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed by the petitioners on
November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the
petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the
15-day reglementary period.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the SB committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained
finality and in refusing to re-open the case.
2. Whether the Bane deposition is
admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of judicial notice.
RULING:
1. The court ruled that the SB’s
ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
due to the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. The SB’s
ruling, although an erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment,
or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.
The 1998
resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still
premature since the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed
in a situation where neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party except
if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party
of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1st
motion, the presentation of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after
the denial of the 1st motion should have been for the petitioner to
move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the
admission of the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion,
petitioners should have already questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively
foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane
deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day
reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse,
and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
However, the
court ruled that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the
purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition. The Rules
of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to
present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided that the
evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from
the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where
the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered
evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the respondents
had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the
Bane deposition, which was concededly omitted “through oversight.”
2. Despite the cases being
closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply with
the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a
different proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the
deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or
hearing otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay.
Cross-examination will test the truthfulness of the statements of the witness;
it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. Depositions
from the former trial may be introduced as evidence provided that the parties
to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later
proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner failed to establish the
identity of interest or privity between the opponents of the two cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, the deposition is admissible only against him as an ETPI
stockholder who filed Civil Case No. 0130.
Further, the
rule of judicial notice is not
applicable in this case as it would create confusion between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a
party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.
The petition
was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
________
G.R. NO. 165835, JUNE 22, 2005
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA,
PETITIONER,
VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS
TINGA.
The Office of
the Ombudsman filed Petition with
Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against petitioner, his wife, and
three sons, seeking forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under Sec. 2
of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman,
after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal
cases, has determined that a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia
and the other respondents therein who hold such properties for, with, or on
behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier and
public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income,
if any.
ISSUE/S:
(a) Whether the SB has
jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA No. 1379;
(b) Whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such
petitions for forfeiture (instead of the Solicitor General); and
(c) Whether petitioner is guilty
of forum-shopping. (In view of the pending Motion to Dismiss filed by the
Petitioner with the SB.)
RULING:
Pursuant Sec. 2
of RA No. 1379, it was originally the OSG who was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the city or
province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office. However
with the enactment of PD No. 1486, creating the Sandiganbayan, the exclusive
and original jurisdiction over such violations was transferred to the latter. Subsequent
amendments to PD No. 1486 only served to strengthen the jurisdiction of the SB
on violation of RA No. 1379. The latest, RA No. 8249 specifically mentions
members of the Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank as among
those subject to the SB’s jurisdiction. Also, even though a forfeiture
proceeding is civil in nature, the court ruled that the SB still has
jurisdiction over the case since forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a penalty.
As to the
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate, initiate and prosecute petitions for
forfeiture, it was granted with the enactment of RA No. 6770. Section 15 par.
11 of the said law provides the power of the Ombudsman to include the authority,
among others, to “investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery
of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved therein.” Therefore, it is the Ombudsman
who should file the petition for forfeiture under RA No. 1379 but is restricted
only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after 25 February 1986. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted within its authority.
As to the
charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping, the court ruled in the
affirmative. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely
by, some other court. The fact that a Motion to Dismiss was already filed
before the SB with the same arguments, the petitioner should have waited for
its resolution. Worst, petitioner did not inform the court of the existence of
such motion and issued a certification against forum shopping.
The petition
was DISMISSED.
________
G.R. Nos. 120681-83. October 1, 1999
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner, vs. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,respondents.
G.R. No. 128136. October 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B.
CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and
VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioners, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F.
MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
KAPUNAN.
FACTS:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
The Office of
the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations
against petitioner, Mayor Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code (Illegal Use of Public Funds), and two for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (giving undue favor to private parties). The informations
alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro
Manila. Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
cases filed against him.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner
Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of
Mayor Magsaysay’s co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. Two
complaints were raised against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) and
(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for
the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School which informations
were filed before the RTC of Batangas City. While another complaint on the same
matter was eventually filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash
the Criminal Case filed before the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that the same
complaints has already been filed with the RTC. The proceedings of both cases
were suspended by the Sandiganbayan and the RTC pending resolution of the Binay
case as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE/S:
I.
Whether
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
II. In
GR No. 128136, whether the filing of information with the RTC effectively ousted the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the
case and estopped the respondents from filing an information before the latter;
and whether the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes
double jeopardy.
RULING:
I.
The court ruled that it is the
Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. R.A. No. 7975 (took effect on
May 16, 1995) as amended by RA. 8249 (took effect on February 8, 1997)
specified that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code when the principal
accused includes officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
with enumeration as to officials specifically included. Even if the municipal
mayor is not specifically included in the list and despite the fact that the
actual salary received is not equivalent to grade 27, the court ruled that the
classification of salary grades should not be based on the actual amount of
salary received but on the nature of the functions performed by the official
concerned - the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification
requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the official’s Grade that determines
his or her salary, not the other way around.
In the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades prepared by the DBM
lists the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27. Petitioners, therefore, fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 444(d) of the Local
Government Code also settles the matter as it provides that municipal mayor
shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758.
II.
The court ruled
that the Sandiganbayan was not ousted of its jurisdiction even if the
information was first filed in the RTC since the latter did not have
jurisdiction in the first place as provided in R.A. 7975. Estoppel could not
also be invoked because jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the
consent or agreement of the parties. The court has previously ruled that a
filing of a complaint with one court does not prevent the plaintiff from filing
the same with the competent court. This does not amount to forum shopping since
the only authority of the first court was to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. By estoppel, it means that the party estopped consistently
invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the
proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse
decision. Also, the filing of another complaint with the Sandiganbayan does not
also amount to double jeopardy because there can be no double jeopardy where
the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy
should have been for the petitioner to move the quashal of information for lack of jurisdiction.
The
consolidated petitions were DISMISSED.
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