REPUBLIC v. SALUDARES 327 SCRA 449, November 10, 2010
FACTS:
The
PCGG issued a writ of sequestration against the Lianga Bay Logging Company,
which was later lifted by the Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied.
Private
respondent, on the other hand, filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money against the company with prayer for preliminary attachment where PCGG was
not impleaded as defendant nor was the sequestration made known to the RTC.
The
Court granted the preliminary attachment, and because of failure of company to
answer complaint, it also declared the company in default and ruled in favor of
private respondent.
Petitioner
argues that RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the sequestered assets
are under custodia legis of the PCGG.
ISSUE:
Whether if the RTC has the
jurisdiction over the sequestration case and if whether the attachment is void?
HELD:
The SC
ruled that the order of default of the RTC is affirmed but should be held in
abeyance until the sequestration case is determined. However, the order of
attachment was declared null and void. The Court said that the disputed
properties of the company were already under custodia legis by virtue of a
valid writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG when the judge issued the writ
of attachment. Since the writ of sequestration was already subsisting, it could
not be interfered with by the RTC because the PCGG is a coordinate and equal
body.
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO
and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No.
142971, May 7, 2002]
FACTS:
On 17
September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged
therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the
construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan
International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.
The
lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner
alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing
market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.
HELD:
No. In
the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for
the determination
of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides
that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly
stated therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of the complaint,
the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
CASTILLO v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 109271 (March 14, 2000)
FACTS:
On August 25, 1986, a complaint was filed against
petitioners with the Tanodbayan.
On Oct. 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan recommended filing a
case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioners filed motion for reinvestigation.
The Ombudsman filed an information against
petitioners on November 5, 1990 without first resolving the motion for
reinvestigation.
Petitioners argued that the case should be dismissed
for unjustified delay in the filing of the information.
ISSUE:
Whether if there is a violation against the
constitutional right of the petitioner on speedy trial?
HELD:
There
was no violation of right to speedy trial. The delay was not capricious
nor oppressive but was brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws
in the initial stages of the case.
SECRETARY
of JUSTICE v. MARC JIMENEZ, 322 SCRA (January 18, 2000)
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice
Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate
ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United
States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing
a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the afore stated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official
extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the government’s ironclad
duties under a treaty.
HELD:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien,
and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they
collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is
so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be
a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
CITY
OF MANILA v. LAGUIO [G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005]
FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate
Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
March 30, 1993 – City Mayor
Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services, and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 – MTOC filed a Petition
with the lower court, praying the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and
inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid
exercise of police power and it constitute a denial of equal protection under
the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the
petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the City of
Manila validly exercised police power.
2. Whether or not there was a
denial of equal protection under the law.
HELD:
The Ordinance infringes the due
process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are
not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote the social and welfare of the community; it will not in
itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication
nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage
parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques,
cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not
per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
The Ordinance invades
fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions.
And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTALMINING COOP., et
al.[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002]
FACTS:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was grantedExploration
Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area. On June
27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to beimplemented by
the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)
under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of
EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement
(MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive
Director, docketed as RED Mines Case.
On
February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its
EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated
MPSA over the land covered by the permit. In
due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City
(MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of
petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed.
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the
Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC
cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting
mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED
Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of diret state
utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush
Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of
Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining
Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization"
espoused therein would effectively impair its
vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily
imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before
mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "direct state
utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its
vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.
HELD:
No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state
utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed hereunder
was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners
or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the
alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note
that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB
decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised
in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a
vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be
deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the
issuance of MO 97-03. It
must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's
rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the
State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national
interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its
all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare. Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is
authorized to undertake in
the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional
policy of full control and supervision of the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by
either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he
ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in
accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the
State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if
it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated
by the gold rush.
MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and SUSANA M. CABALLES [G.R.
No. 187635, January 11, 2009]
THE FACTS:
Respondent
Susana M. Caballes and petitioner Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. were candidates
for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in
the October 29, 2007 barangay elections. Having garnered
four hundred and fifty-six (456) votes as against the four hundred and
forty-eight (448) votes Caballes obtained, Nollen was declared as the punongbarangay-elect.
Dissatisfied
with the result, Caballes instituted an election protest with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) in Sariaya, Quezon. On June 3, 2008, the MTC
rendered a decision declaring protestant Caballes as punong barangay-elect,
having garnered four hundred fifty-six (456) votes, or five (5) votes more than
the four hundred fifty-one (451) votes of Nollen.
Unable,
as to be expected, to admit defeat, Nollen filed on June 5, 2008 his notice of
appeal and paid the MTC the appeal fee of PhP 1,000.
Following
the elevation of the MTC’s records to the COMELEC, the First Division of the
COMELEC, by Order of September 22, 2008 in EAC BRGY 360-2008, dismissed
Nollen’s appeal for his failure to pay the appeal fee of PhP 3,000 prescribed
by Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the reglementary
period of five (5) days.
From
the above order, Nollen moved for reconsideration, praying for the liberal
interpretation of the rules, but stating in the same breath that his PhP 1,000
appeal fee payment was sufficient to perfect his appeal. To still require
him to pay the additional amount of PhP 3,000 as appeal fee and a bailiff fee
of PhP 200 on top of what he already paid the MTC, would amount, so he claimed,
to a denial of his right to due process. On October 6, 2008, Nollen,
despite his earlier avowal to pay his deficiency only if the COMELEC En
Banc would reconsider the dismissal order of the First Division, paid
the poll body’s Cash Division the amount of PhP 3,200.
By
Resolution dated April 2, 2009, the COMELEC En Banc denied
Nollen’s motion for reconsideration on the rationalization that, while he
timely filed his notice of appeal and simultaneously paid the PhP 1,000 appeal
fee with the MTC on June 5, 2008, the appeal would be deemed duly registered
and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to the
COMELEC. By its ruling, the COMELEC En Banc evidently
had in mind Zamoras v. COMELEC, among other cases. And citing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC held that the error in the payment of filing fees in
election cases is no longer excusable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC––in
first dismissing Nollen’s appeal from the MTC and then denying his motion for
reconsideration––acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided the
case in favor to the petitioner and therefore granted the petition for
centiorari. The court had taken judicial notice on the Resolution No. 8654 on its following guidelines:
1.
The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the PhP
1,000-appeal fee to the court that
rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of
the additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 to the
COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
2. If the appellant filed his appeal before the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the
additional appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
notice from the
Commission, in accordance with Resolution No. 8486. If the latter should refuse to comply,
then, and only then shall the appeal be dismissed.
The Order of the COMELEC First
Division dated September 22, 2008 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated April 2, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the
COMELEC for its review of the assailed June 3, 2008 MTC decision.
MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al.
vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002]
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil
was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids
for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards
Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of
Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-INP and
Tahei Co.
The COA subsequently discovered that there was a
discrepancy in the amounts indicatedon the disbursement voucher and the
purchase order. Consequently, the DILG
Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the respondents.
After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except
Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan andRamirez. Formal
charges were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and
Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information.
Flores and
Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was
granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution,
however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turn about as regards Roxas,
Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as
accused violated their right to due process.
HELD:
YES. It appears that the charge against
respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no
motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to
be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by
those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge
against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for
impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due
process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process
when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against
them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires
that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He
has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage
of the proceedings.
PCGG
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001]
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On August 28, 1990,
PCGG sent Corporate Secretary Victor A. Africa of Oceanic Wireless
Network, Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him to send
notices to all stockholders of record
of OWNI for special stockholders' meeting. On September 17,
1990,during the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI, PCGG voted all the Class
"A" shares in the election of directors and elected to the
board of directors Commissioners Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing
the Class "A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class
"B" and "C" shares. None of the registered Class
"A" shareholders of OWNI was present in that, specialstockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered the Class "A" shareholding about 60% of theoutstanding
capital stock, and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares.
On October 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa wrote
the SEC questioning the electionof PCGG nominees as directors of the OWNI board on the ground that they were not
stockholders of OWNI.
On January 27, 1991, the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI took place.Stockholders owning 63,573 Class "A"
shares were represented. An election of directors for Class
"A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J. Africa and A. Africa were elected
as directors for Class"A" shares for 1991 until their successors are elected and qualified. Class "B" and "C"shareholders
did not attend the meeting. No new directors for them were elected.
On July 29, 1991, PCGG, acting for itself and in behalf of OWNI, filed with theSandiganbayan
a complaint for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa,
Nieto, Jr. and Ocampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the defendants from
interfering with PCGG's management of OWNI and/or representing themselves
as director.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PCGG's takeover of OWNI is legal.
HELD:
NO. In
PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr ., the Court ruled that who should vote the
sequestered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character
of those shares and consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The
issue was still pending in the main case in the Sandiganbayan. This is only an incident of the main case and is
limited to the stockholders' meeting held on September 17,
1990. This is without prejudice to the final disposition of the
merits of the main suit. The ownership of the shares is still under
litigation. It is not known whether the shares are part of
the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and
his "cronies."
We
find the writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid because the suit
in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr.
and J. Africa as shareholders in OWNI is not a suit against OWNI. This Court has held that
"failure to implead these corporations as defendants and merely annexing a list of such
corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process
for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate
personality without a hearing.
Furthermore,
PCGG issued the writs of sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the
period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26, of the 1987
Constitution provides.
Sec. 26.The
authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3dated
March 25, 1986 in relation to
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the
ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as
certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration
or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the
list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with
the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall
be filed within six months from its
ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.
The
sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial
action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
The sequestration orders issued against respondents shall be
deemed automatically lifted due to the failure of PCGG to commence the proper
judicial action or to implead the respondents therein within the period
prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution.
The lifting of the writs of sequestration will
not necessarily be fatal to the main case
since the lifting of the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property are not ill-gotten. The effect of the lifting of the sequestration
against OWNI will merely
be the termination of the role of
the government as conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no longer
exercise administrative or housekeeping powers and its nominees may no longer
vote the sequestered shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of the
subject firm.
MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. Nos. 140199-200, February 6, 2002]
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Felicito S. Macalino was the Assistant
Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration and
Insurance Section of the Philippines National Construction Corporation (PNCC),
a government-controlled corporation. On September 16, 1992, the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed
with the Sandiganbayan two informations against the petitioner and his spouse
Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of official
documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents.
During the initial presentation of evidence for the
defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion dismiss on the ground that
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer
because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation with the original character. The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
HELD:
No. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original character as
it was incorporated under the general law on corporation, it follows inevitably
that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019, as
amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only
instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is
when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice, or
accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The cases cited by respondent People of the
Philippines are inapplicable because they were decided under the provision of
the 1973 Constitution which included as public officers, officials, and
employees of corporations owned and controlled by the government through
organized and existing under the general corporation law. The 1987 Constitution
excluded such corporations.
The crime charged against petitioner was committed in
1989 and 1990. The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled
that “the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the
law in force at the institution of the action.
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