del cas

echegaray v. sec. of justice (1998)

        [ G.R. NO. 132601, OCTOBER 12, 1998 ]

FACTS:

On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime.

Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.

On February 7, 1998, this Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.

In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659. Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") and directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed additional Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from acting under the questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.

On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, and further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," and Article V thereof, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which means that they have retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years or more, or in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out executions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and 95 countries as retentionists;[16] and (e) Pope John Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly noted the motion.

ISSUES:

Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for:

(a) Violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,

(b) Violation of our international treaty obligations,

(c) Being an undue delegation of legislative power, and

(d) Being discriminatory.

RULINGS:

1. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

      The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."

      Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

2. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

    Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court." (emphasis supplied)

3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all-cases.

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State. Party to the present Covenant."

3. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

      The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not            through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the  government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.

4. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, RESPONDENTS
[ G.R. NO. 180164, JUNE 17, 2008 ] 

FACTS:

Petitioner Florentino P. Blanco was the mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan from 1987 up to 1992.

During the May 8, 1995 elections, petition ran as a candidate for the same mayoralty position and won during the canvassing by more than 6,000 votes over private respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Private respondent filed a petition for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground of vote-buying which resulted in the suspension of petitioner's proclamation.

On August 15, 1995, public respondent issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner as candidate for the said position due to violation of Sec. 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. This Court affirmed the disqualification under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, which was promulgated on July 21, 1997.

During the 1998 elections, petitioner again ran as a mayoralty candidate. Domiciano G. Ruiz, a voter of Meycauayan, Bulacan, sought to disqualify him on the basis of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258.

On April 30, 1998, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued a resolution in SPA No. 98-043 dismissing the petition for disqualification on the ground that petitioner was not disqualified under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code as his previous disqualification in the May 8, 1995 elections attached only during that particular election.

Moreover, the COMELEC stated that "no criminal action was instituted against [petitioner], much less a judgment of conviction for vote-buying under Sec. 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code has been rendered against [petitioner] in order that Section 264 of the same [Code] providing for the accessory penalty of disqualification from holding public office may attach to [petitioner]."

During the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner again ran for a mayoralty position, but private respondent sought petitioner's disqualification based on the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258.

On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued a resolution in SPA No. 01-050, this time disqualifying petitioner from running for a mayoralty position in the May 14, 2001 elections under Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code for having been removed from office through an administrative case. It denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period.

During the May 10, 2004 elections, petitioner again ran as a mayoralty candidate, but private respondent sought to disqualify him based on the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258. Petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy, so the petition for disqualification was dismissed for being moot.

Apprehensive that he would encounter another petition for disqualification in succeeding elections, petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the issuance of a judgment declaring him eligible to run for public office in contemplation of Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code and Secs. 68, 261(a) and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In a Decision dated November 6, 2005, the RTC declared petitioner eligible to run for an elective office.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner ran anew for a mayoralty position. Again, private respondent sought the disqualification of petitioner based on the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258 and the COMELEC Resolution dated May 11, 2001 in SPA No. 01-050.

On August 28, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued a resolution in SPA Case No. 07-410 disqualifying petitioner from running in the May 14, 2007 elections on the ground that Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, affirmed its disqualification of petitioner in the May 8, 1995 elections, and that the COMELEC Resolution in SPA No. 01-050 also disqualified petitioner under Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC stated that since petitioner failed to show that he had been bestowed a presidential pardon, amnesty or other form of executive clemency, there is no reason to disturb its findings in SPA No. 01-050.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the COMELEC, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner is disqualified to run for an elective office by reason of the Court's ruling in Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, as well as the Resolution of the COMELEC in SPA No. 01-050.

2. Whether or not the COMELEC, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner is disqualified to run for an elective office since he has not been bestowed a presidential pardon, amnesty or any form of executive clemency.

RULINGS:

1.Petitioner's contention is meritorious.

The Court notes that the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, found this petition meritorious.

Petitioner's disqualification in 1995 in Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258, was based on Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, although the COMELEC, Second Division, pronounced that petitioner violated 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The records did not show that a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for the election offense of vote-buying under Sec. 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. There was also no evidence that the accessory penalty of disqualification to hold public office under Sec. 264 of the same Code was imposed on petitioner by the proper court as a consequence of conviction for an election offense.
Since there is no proof that petitioner was convicted of an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code and sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office.

Therefore, the COMELEC, Second Division committed grave abuse of discretion.

2.The COMELEC, Second Division, committed grave abuse of discretion in pronouncing that absent any showing that petitioner had been bestowed a presidential pardon, amnesty or any other form of executive clemency, petitioner's disqualification from being a candidate for an elective position remains.

The COMELEC Second Division, committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner from running for an elective position under Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code in its Resolutions in SPA No. 01-050 dated May 11, 2001 and in SPA No. 07-410 dated August 28, 2007. The grave abuse of discretion attending the Resolution in this case is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction and thus renders it a nullity, thereby allowing this Court to grant this petition directly against the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division.

Wherefore, petitioner Florentino P. Blanco is held eligible to run for an elective office.

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. Y GERCILLA @ "KA NONOY," RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO @ "KA RICKY/KA LIZA/KA JUN," AND TEN JOHN DOES, ACCUSED, FRANCISCO SALLE, JR., Y GERCILLA AND RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

[ G.R. NO. 103567, DECEMBER 04, 1995 ]

FACTS:

For resolution is the enforceability of the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellant Ricky Mengote during the pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.

In the decision dated 18 November 1991 of Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q­-90-11835, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, an indemnity in the sum of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim.

The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, this Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court then required his counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaid motion.

In her Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on 9 December 1993. He was discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a conditional pardon and released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon.

Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.

In the resolution of 23 March 1994, this Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and considered this case closed and terminated insofar as he is concerned.

On 3 June 1993, Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva of the Bureau of Corrections submitted certified photocopies of the conditional pardon granted separately to Salle and Mengote and of their certificates of release. The said copies of the conditional pardon state, among other things, that it is upon acceptance of the pardon that the appellants will be released from confinement. But there is nothing to show when the appellants accepted the pardon.

In its Comment of 17 August 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed.

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grantpardon after conviction by final judgment.

ISSUE:

Is the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellant Ricky Mengote during the pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court enforceable?

RULINGS:

This Court resolved to require:

1.The Office of the Solicitor General and the counsel for the accused-appellants to submit, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, their respective memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon; and

2.The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal

The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the limitations on the pardoning power of the President. Thus:

It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.

The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that pardon could be granted only after final conviction. Section 14 of Article IX thereof reads as follows:

The Prime Minister may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after final conviction, and, with the concurrence of the National Assembly, grant amnesty. (Italics supplied)

The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, however, removed the limitation of final conviction, thereby bringing us back to the aforementioned provision of the Jones Law. Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as thus amended, reads:

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.

But the said limitation was restored by the present Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. (Italics supplied)

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is "final conviction," as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.

Accordingly, while this Court, in its resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Pedro Sepada, dismissed the appeal for having become moot and academic in view of the parole granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared the necessity of a final judgment before parole or pardon could be extended.

The COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal for having become moot and academic. To avoid any possible conflict with the judicial determination of pending appeals, the Court further DIRECTED the Board of Pardons and Parole to adopt a system which enables it to ascertain whether a sentence has become final and executory and has, in fact, been executed before acting on any application for parole or pardon. The Court Administrator shall coordinate with the Department of Justice on how this may be best achieved.

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.

So Ordered.