bagarinao's corner

GUDANI V. SENGA (2006)

 [ G.R. NO. 170165, August 15, 2006 ]

TINGA, J.:

FACTS

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon. Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. It enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

 ISSUE

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional? 

HELD  

No. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that "the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x" Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief. Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.

The exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ESTRADA V. ARROYO (2001)

 [ G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001 ]

PUNO, J.:

FACTS

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE/S

I. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President and; whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

II. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

HELD

I.

Yes. Using totality test, the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.  Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.  The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.  His presidency is now in the past tense.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

II.

In re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

DAVID V. ARROYO (2006)

[ G.R. NO. 171396, May 03, 2006 ]

FACTS

As the nation celebrated EDSA’s 20^th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. G. O. No. 5 is also issued by the President implementing PP 1017. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant.

ISSUE/S

Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

HELD

The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence is declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional.