morandarte

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Facts:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage

to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

vilando v. electoral tribunal (2011)

EN BANC

[ G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011 ]

RENALD F. VILANDO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1^st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They  alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother,  lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

Issues:

WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.

WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the Philippines

Held:

1.       The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation.   The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution.  Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

2.       The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.   It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.   The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.     The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3.       Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.  The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution)  It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization.  Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship.  The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.

The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

cordora v. comelec (2009)

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009 ]

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Tambunting ran for a public local office which was opposed by Cordora. The latter alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements. In lieu with this, Cordora seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting's father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambunting's citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.

The COMELEC En Banc  was convinced and affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

Issues:

1.       WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on its ruling.

2.       WON Tambunting was qualified to hold  a local public office.

Held:

1.       There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc's ruling that there is no sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.

2.       Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

Suffice it to say, that  the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 (Oath of Allegiance and an execution of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship) do not apply to Tambunting  for the reason that he is natural-born Filipino. The twin requirements apply only when a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's foreign citizenship.

The present petition filed by Cordora was dismissed.