Jan Benoni Macarulay- Digested Cases for Finals

             MERCADO VS.MANZANO 

                                     [G.R. No. 135083.  May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD:

No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

          

           DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC

                                           G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.

Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA

9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

HELD:

We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:

1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country.

The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.

Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.

APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE      

                BAR VICENTE D. CHING, APPLICANT                                                                         

                             B.M. No. 914, October 01, 1999

                                            EN BANC

FACTS:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's  citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE:

Whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time.

 whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

HELD:

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.

Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.

Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority". Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

WHEREFORE, the application of Vicente D. Ching for the admission to the Philippine Bar is DENIED.
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