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FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

These incidents arose from our Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to restore and maintain the PGBI to its situation prior to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8679, pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari that PGBI filed to challenge this Comelec Resolution. Our Status Quo Order, in short, directly ordered the Comelec to include PGBI in the list of candidates under the party-list system in the May 10, 2010 elections pending the final determination of PGBI’s qualification to be voted upon as a party-list organization.

We issued the Status Quo Order on February 2, 2010. It was served on the Comelec on the same date,⁵ i.e., within the period that the Comelec itself gave for the correction of any error or omission in its published official list of party-list participants in the May 10, 2010 elections. The Comelec itself declared:

On January 30, 2010 at 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon, pursuant to Comelec Minute Resolution No. 10-0042 dated January 19, 2010, the Information Technology Department of Comelec published a list of candidates with the instruction that "(s)hould there be any misspelling, omission or other errors, the concerned candidate must call the Law Department’s attention within five (5) days from this publication for the purpose of correction. Thereafter, Comelec shall be relieved from liability"⁶ and the final list shall then be prepared for printing.⁷

The Comelec responded the next day (February 3, 2010) to our Status Quo Order by asking for its reconsideration and/or recall, based on the following grounds/arguments:

1) There will be insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications in complying with the status quo order.

2) To add the petitioner’s party/acronym in the database of the List of Candidates for sectoral party/organization or coalition participating in the party-list system of representation will have a critical impact on the already tight and overstretched election timelines of the Commission. Copy of the Revised Automation Implementation Calendar is hereto attached as Annex "1".

3) Printing of the ballots is an intricate and complicated process. It is not a simple process of encoding data in a computer and printing the ballots using a printer attached to the computer.

4) Prior to the printing of the ballots, several technical and mechanical preparatory activities have to be done which include among other things:

a. Generation and back-up of database containing the candidates[’] information;

b. Configuration of Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines and Consolidation and Canvassing System (CCS);

c. Creation and design of one thousand six hundred seventy-four (1,674) ballot templates;

d. Production of the ballot templates;

e. Verification of each and every ballot template to ensure that it contains the accurate names of candidates for the national positions and acronyms of sectoral party/organization or coalition participating in the party-list system of representation and their corresponding assignments to the correct districts, provinces, municipalities/cities, and clustered precincts. Since the ballots are precinct-specific to ensure the security of the voting and counting, this means verification of seventy six thousand three hundred forty (76,340) variations of the one thousand six hundred seventy-four (1,674) ballot templates; and

f. Placing several security markings in the ballots.

5) In fact, the installation of the Election Management System, which is used to generate the PCOS machines configuration and ballot templates production have already been in place as of January 25, 2010.

6) To comply with the status quo order will not only affect the printing of the ballots but also have serious implications on other activities of the Commission, such as:

a. The setting of configuration of the PCOS and CCS machines;

b. Testing of PCOS machines in their actual configuration with the ballots;

c. Deployment of PCOS and CCS machines and transmission equipments;

d. Checking/testing, demos, and sealing of the PCOS and CCS machines; and

e. Shipment of the ballots to all parts of the country.

7) Due to several re-scheduling of the timelines of the Commission, Smartmatic-TIM cautioned that it is extremely risky to change the database containing the candidates’ information at this point in time. Any change in the database and other preparatory activities would mean:

a. Twelve thousand (12,000) PCOS might not be configured and dispatched to the field on time; and

b. Four million eight hundred thousand (4,800,000) ballots might not be printed before the deadline and shipped out on time.

Even if the Commission will resort to contingency measures to configure and ship out the twelve thousand (12,000) PCOS machines on time, the printing of the ballots cannot be completed before May 10, 2010. This means that four million eight hundred thousand (4,800,000) voters might not be able to vote due to lack of ballots, thus disenfranchising them.

x x x x x x x x x

10) Hence, the Commission fervently requests the understanding and forbearance of the Honorable Court which is the bastion of our justice system, protector of the democratic processes and our last resort in ensuring a clean, peaceful, orderly and credible May 10, 2010 elections, to take a second look on the status quo order issued on February 2, 2010.⁸

After due consideration of the attendant facts and the law, we find the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt of this Court.

The Comelec Chair and Members are guilty of indirect contempt of Court

We explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC²¹ the Court’s contempt power as follows:

The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.

Under our Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt, which may be summary, is committed "in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so."

Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. We quote Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, enumerating the acts punishable as indirect contempt, as follows:

"SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings."

Based on the recited antecedent facts, it cannot be disputed that the Comelec did not comply with our Status Quo Order; it simply pleaded insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications as reasons for its avoidance of our Order. It essentially posited that compliance with our Status Quo Order was rendered impossible by the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections.

However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the Comelec’s own self-imposed deadline of February 4, 2010 for the correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of participating party-list groups and organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections.

The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had determined that changes in the official ballot could still be made at any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases then pending involving the registration of party-list organizations, the deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would have to be resolved before the deadline; otherwise, the Comelec could not be held liable for their non-inclusion.

We fully read and respected the Comelec’s signal, fully aware that we have to balance the interests the Comelec has to protect, with PGBI’s intent to be voted as a party-list organization. Thus, on February 2, 2010, we issued our Status Quo Order after a preliminary but judicious evaluation of the merits of PGBI’s motion for reconsideration, only to receive the Comelec’s response on February 3, 2010 manifesting that it could no longer change the ballots because of the nature of an automated election.

In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot make a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced declaration. The Comelec knew very well that there were still cases pending for judicial determination that could have been decided before the deadline was set.

Although the recent case of Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections,²² involved the registration of political parties, we found that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in allowing the out of time registration of the NP-NPC coalition despite the mandatory deadline the Comelec itself had set. In this case, we underscored the significance of the Comelec’s compliance with its self-imposed deadlines, particularly in the implementation of the first-ever automated elections of May 10, 2010.

To be excused, the Comelec needed more than its generalized descriptions of the process of ballot printing and the alleged problems it faced. We needed reasons on how and why the deadline was set, as well as detailed and specific reasons why PGBI could no longer be listed while other errors and omissions could still be remedied.

Unfortunately for the Comelec, we did not see that kind of justification in its Compliance before us. Like the Comelec, we expect obedience to and respect for our Orders and Resolutions, and we cannot be sidetracked based solely on supposed operational constraints caused by the automated polls. Its treatment of our Status Quo Order simply meant that even before the Comelec deadline, a definitive ruling that a party-list organization should be included in the list to be voted upon would have been for naught as the Comelec would have anyway pleaded automation constraints. Even if its excuse had been meritorious, the Comelec effectively would have been guilty of misrepresentation on an election matter and in dealing with this Court.

Although we have recognized the validity of the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections in Roque, Jr. v. Comelec,²³ we stress that automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process. An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them; the party-list system, in the words of Ang Bagong Bayani–OFW Labor Party v. Comelec,²⁴ affords them this choice, as it gives the marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in governance. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Comelec took this freedom of choice away and effectively disenfranchised the members of the sector that PGBI sought to represent when it did not include PGBI in the list of qualified parties vying for a seat under the party-list system of representation. This is a consideration no less weighty than the automation of the election and cannot be simply disregarded on mere generalized allegations of automation difficulties.

The Appropriate Penalty

Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides the penalty for indirect contempt. Section 7 of Rule 71 reads:

SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x

In the past, we have found the Chairman and members of the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt inAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.²⁵ In that case, we held that the Chairman and members of the COMELEC guilty of contempt and required them to pay a fine in the amount of P20, 000.00 for "degrading the dignity of th[e] Court;²⁶ for brazen disobedience to its lawful directives, in particular its Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001; and for delaying the ultimate resolution of the many incidents of the case, to the prejudice of the litigants and of the country." We also warned the Comelec that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.²⁷

Evidently, the Rule cited above does not provide that reprimand may be imposed on one found guilty of indirect contempt. However, we have in recent cases imposed a penalty less than what is provided under the Rules if the circumstances merit such.²⁸

In Alcantara v. Ponce,²⁹ the Court, instead of citing the respondent Atty. Escareal-Sandejas for contempt, chose to reprimand her (and warned her that her commission of the same act would be more drastically dealt with) noting her apparent inexperience in practice of the profession, especially in appellate proceedings before the Court. Similarly, in Racines v. Judge Morallos,³⁰ the Court, after finding Jaime Racines guilty of indirect contempt, merely reprimanded him because "he is not learned in the intricacies of the law."

In the present case, special circumstances exist which call for our leniency and compel us to impose the penalty of severe reprimand instead of of imprisonment and/or fine under Section 7, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as we have ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party. We emphasize that although automation is a special circumstance that should be considered in the present incidental matter, however, its effect on the Comelec’s non-compliance is merely to mitigate, not to totally exculpate, the Comelec from liability for its failure to comply with our Status Quo Order. In other words, even if we grant that automation might have posed some difficulty in including a new party in the party-list listing, the Comelec still failed to prove to our satisfaction that the PGBI’s inclusion was technically impossible and could not have been done even if the Comelec had wanted to. Thus, at the most, we can give the Comelec the benefit of the doubt to the extent of recognizing its excuse as a mitigating factor.

Therefore, instead of imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine provided under Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, we deem it proper to impose upon the Comelec, particularly on its Chair and Members the penalty of severe reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely.

At this juncture, we take judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo’s resignation effective January 15, 2011³¹ and Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal’s retirement on February 2, 2011.³² We hasten to clarify that their departure from government service, however, do not render moot and academic their liability for indirect contempt, since "contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government." Thus, in Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority,³³ we held:

Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or employee, more so if it involves a former member of the bench.

PGBI’s Participation in the May 10, 2010 Party-List Elections

We partly agree with the Comelec that we cannot recognize PGBI to be a party-list organization fully qualified to run under the party-list system in the coming 2013 party-list elections. The question of full and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination as this is not before us for resolution. Participation in a previous election and the level of votes in favor of a participating organization are not the only qualification issues that can arise in a party-list election, and we cannot assume that PGBI shall meet all other legal standards to qualify as a party-list organization in the 2013 elections.³⁴

But separate from the question of PGBI’s overall qualification is the narrower question of its participation in the May 10, 2010 elections – an issue that is subsumed by the issues in the main certiorari case. As shown above, PGBI intended to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections but it was not able to do so because the Comelec did not – contrary to our express directive – include it in the list of party-list organizations to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections. As it was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in the May 10, 2010 party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited party-list groups or organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite our directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have participated in the May 10, 2010 elections, and cannot be disqualified for non-participation or for failure to garner the votes required under Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941. To conclude otherwise is to effectively recognize the ineffectiveness of our Status Quo Order, of our April 29, 2010 Decision, and of this Court.

As a final note, the subject of the Court’s action is the COMELEC’s disobedience to our Status Quo Order of February 2, 2010 in the case in caption. The composition of the COMELEC has since then changed. We therefore clarify that this Resolution affects and reflects on the COMELEC and its membership as then constituted as they were the ones directly responsible for the disobedience.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Comelec Chair³⁵ and Members³⁶ are hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT of the Supreme Court for their disobedience to our lawful directive, specifically the Status Quo Order dated February 2, 2010. They are accordingly SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for this disobedience. They are further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. shall be deemed not to have transgressed the participation and level of votes requirements under Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 with respect to the May 10, 2010 elections.

BANAT V. COMELEC (2009)

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.⁶

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."⁷ There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections"resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?¹⁶

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."¹⁹

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision.Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, January 28, 2000

Facts : On June 18, 199 , the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez. Secretary of Justice then ordered a technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition request.
Pending evaluation, private respondent (Mark Jimenez) through counsel wrote a letter addressed to herein petitioner requesting copies of official extradition request from the US Government. He requested ample time to comment and for the matter to be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Secretary of Justice denied the said request specifically invoking our country’s responsibility to the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties that “every treaty in force is binding upon parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Extradition is a toll of criminal law enforcement and to be effective must be processed expeditiously.
Particularly in this case is the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crimes against the law of a State and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment.
Pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country’s legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Lantion acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order to herein petitioner in performing his legal duties as Secretary of Justice.

Held : The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply, thus extradite has the basic right of notice and hearing. The RP-US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation Clause in case of conflict is not superior over a national law. International law is given equal standing but not superior to national legislative enactment. The principle lex posterior degorat oriori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In States where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment and supporting evidence
There was only a void on some provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty as regards to the basic due process right of a prospective extradite at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding.
RTC’s decision is rendered moot and academic and herein petition is DISMISSED.