mrs caboverde

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., suing in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons having common or general interest with him in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and ADMINISTRATOR OF ECONOMIC COORDINATION, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act,¹ empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given effect.² This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title,³ as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity.

Issue:

Whether the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 null and void for being illegal and unconstitutional, and to issue a permanent injunction requiring respondent NPC to refrain from enforcing or implementing the provisions of the same law.

Ruling:

We share the view of the lower court that the provision in question cannot be impugned either on the ground of its being violative of the constitutional requirement that a bill cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed in its title or by virtue of its alleged failure to satisfy the due process criterion.

1. We consider first the objection that the statute in question is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in [its] title ... "¹⁶ This provision is similar to those found in many American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.¹⁷Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.¹⁸More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment.¹⁹

We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any bill enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.

2. Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the nullification of the challenged provision on the ground of his being deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of law.

It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of which is the due process clause. It is equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest and dissatisfaction",²⁶ when there was the fear expressed in many quarters that a constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of property, would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment that the government therein established is impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The framers saw to that. The welfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution.²⁷ It is implicit in quite a few of its provisions. It suffices to mention two.

There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all the people,²⁸ as well as the pledge of protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the relations between landowners and tenants and between labor and capital.²⁹ This particularized reference to the rights of working men whether in industry and agriculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the rights of consumers, who are the objects of solicitude in the legislation now complained of. The police power as an attribute to promote the common weal would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that the liberty to contract would be restricted, the statute complained of may be characterized as a denial of due process. The right to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme.

3. While not explicitly avowed by petitioner, there is the intimation that to apply the challenged legislation to contracts then in existence would be an infringement of the constitutional prohibition against any law impairing the obligation of contracts.⁵¹ No such fear need be entertained.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-impairment clause by petitioner and the process of adjustment or harmonization be undertaken to ascertain whether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to existing contracts would run counter to such a guarantee, still the same conclusion emerges. There is a failure to make out a case for its invalidity.