THE CITY OF ILOILO, Represented
by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS, City Mayor, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE EMILIO LEGASPI, Presiding Judge, RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 22, and HEIRS OF MANUELA YUSAY, Represented by SYLVIA YUSAY DEL ROSARIO and ENRIQUE YUSAY, JR.,respondents.
vs.
HON. JUDGE EMILIO LEGASPI, Presiding Judge, RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 22, and HEIRS OF MANUELA YUSAY, Represented by SYLVIA YUSAY DEL ROSARIO and ENRIQUE YUSAY, JR.,respondents.
G.R. No. 154614
November 25, 2004
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the City of Iloilo on March 7, 2001 enacted regulation ordinance granting
umbrella authority to then Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor to
institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the
name of Manuela Yusay, located at barangay Sto. Niño Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City.
On March 14, 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del
Rosario, administration of the estate, making formal offer to purchase the property for the purpose of
converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless resident
of the city. With apparent refusal to sell the property, the city represented
by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas filed an expropriation case based on the Power of State on
Eminent Domain. Upon the strict compliance to the governing rules on
expropriation, the city of Iloilo argued that it is entitled to an immediate
issuance of a writ of possession.
ISSUES:
1. When does a court order become final and executory?
2. What is the legal basis of the Local Government Unit to
exercise power of eminent
domain?
3. What are the requisites in issuance of Writ of Possession?
RULING:
A. Time-honored and of
constant observance is the principle that no order dictated in open court had no juridical existence before
it is set in writing, signed, promulgated and served on the parties. Since the order orally pronounced in
court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to file a motion
for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the time the same
was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the written order within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
B. Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise
its power of eminent domain. It
being a local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:
Sec. 19 Eminent
Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
C. For a writ of possession
to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the
required provisional deposit. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 provides that the local
government unit may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing
of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax
declaration. As
long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has
been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Petition is hereby
GRANTED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
On August
14, 1987, Andre Marti and common-law wife, Shirley Reyes sends four (4)
packages to Andre’s friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Following standard operating procedure, proprietress Anita Reyes asked the
former if she could examine and inspect the package. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring that the packages contained books, cigars and gloves and were
gifts. Thus, in view of appellants’ representation, she no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages.
However,
Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita opened
the boxes for final inspection before sending the same to the Bureau of Customs.
A peculiar odor emitted therefrom; curios, he took several grams of the
contents (dried leaves) thereof. Moreover, Job Reyes reported the
shipment to the NBI requesting laboratory examination and surrendered the
custody of the shipment. The NBI-Forensic Chemistry
Section declared that the dried leaves were marijuana.
Thereafter,
information was filed against appellant for violation
of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The special criminal court rendered him guilty.
ISSUES:
1. WON the
evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of appellants’
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
2.
WON that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
A. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
It
must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, the accused/appellant
cannot validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizure has been violated. More so, an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, in
the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
B. The fourth amendment and the case
law applying it do not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment
only proscribes governmental action. The admissibility of the evidence
procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation,
non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
The
contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search
and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.
The conviction is AFFIRMED.
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