G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco& Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco& Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
FACTS:
Petitioners
filed a petition for the annulment of the PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order.
The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and
therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of
Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution
PD 1869 is the
charter that created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)was
created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a
franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted
in the well-known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation
was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to
fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects
It is
reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs, sponsored other
socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with
various governmental agencies, and other private associations and
organizations.
ISSUE:
Ø Whether or not PD 1896 is
valid/constitutional
Ø Whether or not the local Government of Manila have the power
to impose taxes on PAGCOR
RULING:
Every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, for PD 1869
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition
must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering
the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization
as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and
educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
The court rules that
The City government of Manila has no power to impose taxes
on PAGCOR.Reason:
The principle of Local autonomy does not make local governments
sovereign within the state; the principle of local autonomy within the constitution simply
means decentralization. It cannot be an“Imperium in imperio” it can only act
intra sovereign, or as an arm of the National Government.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to
operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
government. Being an instrumentality of the government, PAGCOR should
be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
The power of local government
to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" whichCongress may provide by law. Since PD 1869
remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed
or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception tothe exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees.
It cannot therefore beviolative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
G.R. NO.
118910, JULY 17, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO
R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T.
APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL
G. FERNANDO, RAOUL. V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN.
FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, AND THE PHILIPPINE
GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
As a result of the decision in G.R. no. 113375,
invalidating the contract of Lease between the PCSO and PGMC on the ground that
it had been made in violation of the Charter of the PCSO, the parties entered
into new agreement that would be consistent with the latter’s Charter and signed an
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
Petitioner’s
seeking to declare ELA null and void since it is basically or substantially the
same as or similar to the old lease contract as represented and admitted by
respondents PGMC and PCSO.
ISSUE:
Ø Whether
or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.
RULING:
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, §2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
That standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that
only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
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