JEJOMAR C. BINAY
PETITIONER
VS.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 120681-83, October 01, 1999
FACTS:
On September 7,
1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayanthree
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and two for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. The informations, which were subsequently amended on September
15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in
1987 during petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of
Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan . The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a “Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite.” The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganyaban to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioner’s reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan . The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a “Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite.” The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganyaban to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioner’s reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
On June 13,
1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
refer his cases to the “proper court” for further proceedings, alleging that
when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the
Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The
Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner’s motion.
There is no
question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade “27” under the
compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of
the commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim
capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5,
original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation
that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than
Grade “27”, because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he
was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade “27” does not hold
water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in
existence.
The Grade
classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of
the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of
the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989
classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade “27”, it is a conclusion beyond cavil that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
On July 7, 1995,
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that
the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court
also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente
lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to
refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary
restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The
Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an “Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs),” praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an “Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs),” praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
On June 1, 1996,
the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash
the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the
accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to
double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accused’s
motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended
proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition.
Back at the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2,
1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On
October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution
ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT the
Sandiganabayan has jurisdiction over the case of the passage of RA 7975
HELD:
The Court rules that
it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the
subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861, the pertinent provisions of which state:
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861, the pertinent provisions of which state:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The
Sandiganabyan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code;
where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying
the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors,
vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors
are "local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
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