CASE NO. 1. Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China on January 6,
1932, arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to visit her cousin,
Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first
marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also
by the first marriage, born in Hongkong on September 11, 1957.
Chan Sau Wah and her minor
son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary
visitor's visa for two (2) months and after they posted a cash bond of
P4,000.00.
On January 24, 1962, Chan
Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this
union on September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr.
To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last
extension expired on September 10, 1962.
In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner
of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the
country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to
do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of
their bond.
Instead of leaving the
country, on September 10, 1962, Chan Sau Wah (with her husband Esteban Morano)
and Fu Yan Fun petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for mandamus to
compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioners' Alien
Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from issuing
a warrant for their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the
Commissioner from confiscating their cash bond and from issuing warrants of
arrest pending resolution of this case. 1 The trial court, on November 3, 1962,
issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After
trial and the stipulations of facts filed by the parties, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment, viz:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Granting this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect
to petitioner CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of
Registration and other immigration papers, upon the payment of proper dues; and
declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, prohibiting
the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or
deporting said petitioner;
(b) Dismissing this petition with respect to petitioner FU YAN FUN,
and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein, restraining
the respondent, his representatives or subordinates from arresting and/or
deporting said petitioner;
(c) Authorizing
respondent Commissioner to forfeit the bond filed by herein petitioners CHAN
SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN in the amount of P4,000.00; and
(d) Denying, for lack of merit, the prayer to declare Sec. 37 (a) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 unconstitutional;
Without pronouncement, as to
costs.
QUESTION: Is the
ruling of the trial court valid? Explain.
CASE NO. 2.From mainland China where he
was born of Chinese parents, Mr. Chan Sing Kha migrated to the Philippines in
1894.As of April 11, 1899, he was already a permanent resident of the
Philippine Islands and continued to reside in this country until his death.
During his lifetime and when he was already in the Philippines, he married
Charing, a Filipina (his salegirl) with whom he begot one son, named Ho Pia
Kha, who was born on October 18, 1897. Ho Pia got married (to his classmate)
Mirtil, a Filipina, and one of their children is Todas Kha, who was born on
September 27, 1936. Todas finished Commerce and engaged in business.
In
the May 1989 election, Todas Kha ranfor and was elected Congressman. His rival
candidate, Gavino Ang, filed a qou warranto or disqualification case against
him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. It was pointed out that
Todas Kha did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of 21.
Decide whether Todas Kha suffers
from disqualification or not.
CASE NO. 3.For the death of Joey,
Erning was charged with homicide (docketed as Crim. Case No. 4567) before the
RTC of Dipolog City.He was arraigned. Due to numerous postponements of the
scheduled hearings at the instance of the prosecution particularly on the
ground of unavailability of prosecution witnesses who cannot be found or
located, the criminal case has been pending trial for a period of 8 years. Upon
motion of the accused Erning, who invoked his right to a speedy trial, the
court dismissed the case.
Eventually,
the said prosecution witnesses appeared and agreed to testify. Another criminal
case for homicide (now docketed as Crim. Case No. 8910) involving the same
incident was filed against Erning, who moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution objected submitting the reason
that it was not able to present said witnesses earlier because the latter went
to hiding for fear of their lives.
Resolve
the motion of Erning.
CASE NO. 4. . The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court
acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for
review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial
on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant
Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court
of Lucena City, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) When
the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed
with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion
for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but
the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner
to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In
an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. In a comment that was filed by
the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due
course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in
the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. A motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April
10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the
motion and set the arraignment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is
a motion to dismiss this Case filed by the prosecuting fiscal premised on
insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice,
evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the
Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved
having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the liability
of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's
thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on
evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of
Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as
without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be,
as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
The accused then filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order
in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On
January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against
the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the
Court. In a decision of October 25, 1979
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979. A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a
resolution of February 19, 1980.
Hence this petition for review
of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said
decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from
enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in
said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal
force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.
In a resolution of May 19, 1980,
the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition
required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motion to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the
Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being
meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment
and a separate comment to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed.
In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court
resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of
February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the
petition.
QUESTION: Is the action of the
judge in not dismissing the Information, despite the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the Prosecutor valid? Reason out your answer.
CASE NO. 5. On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas
City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System,
equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold
Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed,
without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building” owned by the
private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the
allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said
electric [ice and cold storage] plant."
During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a
written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter.
On 24 November 1975, an
Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an Information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1,
Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its
terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or
both, at the discretion of the court."
This information reads as follows:
The undersigned,
Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3
(b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No.
1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by
the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from
November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any
lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings
and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric fluid at the
Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of
such unauthorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the
accused, the City Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the
total amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS
(P41,062.16) Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to
February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas
in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia
pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a
motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged
had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In
an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged
was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery
thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal
more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20
April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation
to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. This information read
as follows:
The undersigned
Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft,
defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on,
during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February,
1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light
System, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light
System, owned and operated by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia
filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously
acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing
thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By
Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion
to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in
the following paragraphs:
“The only
question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly
pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash. In the first paragraph of the
earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10
Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City
Government of Batangas, etc.. The first case, as it appears, was not simply one
of illegal electrical connections. It
also covered an amount of P41, 062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly
with intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge
had meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal
connections, which were done at one instance on a particular date between
November 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that
from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from
any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of
electric wirings and devices, etc." , it was meant to include the P
41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The
information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When,
therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court,
he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what
allegedly happened between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 that had
allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P
41,062.16.
QUESTIONS: 1.WAS THE ACCUSED
SUBJECTED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND
INFORMATION?
2.STATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
REGARDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
CASE NO. 6.
At the time the accused committed the
offense punishable by death, Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, required a
unanimous vote of all the Justices of the Supreme Court for the imposition of
death penalty. Subsequently, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted requiring an
affirmative vote of only eight justices to impose the death penalty.
Is the New Judiciary
Act applicable to the accused? Will it not be a case of an ex post facto
law? Explain your answer.
CASE NO. 7. What do you understand by the writ of
habeas corpus? It is a principle that it is not the writ itself, which is
suspended, but the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What is the
significance of this concept? Finally what are the grounds for the suspension
of the privilege?
CASE NO. 8. On the right against self-incrimination:
a.
The prosecution
alleged that John swallowed the diamond, which was missing. To prove that John
was the thief, the prosecution moved that John be x-rayed to show that the
diamond is still in his stomach. John objected invoking his right against
self-incrimination. Is the objection valid?
b.
In a prosecution
for adultery, the prosecution moved that the accused be subjected to a
pregnancy test, on the allegation that she is pregnant. As judge would you
grant the motion?
c.
On a charge for
falsification, the accused denied that he signed the check, and that it was a
forgery. The prosecutor moved that the accused be made to sign his name three
times so that specimen signatures be obtained from him. The accused objected.
Is the objection proper?
CASE NO. 9. What
is “custodial investigation”? What are the rights of a person under “custodial
investigation”?
CASE NO. 10. The purpose of the impairment clause under the
constitution is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreement
against unwarranted interference by the state. As a rule, they should be
respected by the legislature and tampered with by subsequent laws that will
change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The
will of the obligor and the obligee must be observed; the obligation of their
contract must not be impaired.
It should be stressed at the outset, however, that the protection of
the impairment clause is not absolute.
In what instances can the state validly impair a valid contract?
Explain.
CASE NO. 11. The crime of murder was
committed on November 25, 1987 by the accused, Jose Go. The penalty for murder
pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. On
December 31, 1993, R.A. 7659 took effect, which increased the penalty of murder
to reclusion perpetua.
On September 21, 2001 the accused after due trial, was convicted with
murder and sentenced by Judge Gone to reclusion perpetua.
The counsel of the accused objected on the penalty meted.
Is the objection valid? On what ground?
CASE NO. 12. Lopez, administrative officer of the DECS, was
investigated by the COA, concerning anomalous purchases. The COA made some
findings and recommended for the filing of the criminal case for graft and
corruption before the Ombudsman on Dec. 22, 1993.
On July 17, 1998, the investigating Ombudsman conducted the preliminary
investigation and agreed with the findings of the COA. He issued a Resolution
on December 9, 1998 recommending the filing of criminal information against
Lopez.
On Feb. 27, 1999, Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito Gervacio
forwarded the Resolution to Ombudsman Chief Aniano Desierto, who then filed the
Information against Lopez before the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999.
Lopez filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the ground that there
was undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the
complaint filed against him which violated his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases.
Is the Information dismissible? Explain your answer.
CASE NO. 13. On March 17,
1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs
indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February
19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through
Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for
the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is wanted for the
following indictable crimes:
1.Wright/Orr
Matter one count of Obtaining Property
by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2.Wright/Cracker
Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining
Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act
of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to
Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury
contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes
were allegedly committed in the following manner:
Pursuant
to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded
between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990,
extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels
of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent
court directed the petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file
his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the
NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.
The respondent
court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior
Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on
April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI
detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the
petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the
petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith David,
with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a
fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him;
that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to Australia
on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11, 1990, left the
Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the
Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing
by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from
that time on, has not left the
Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he could not
produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has neither produced any
certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June
1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government of
Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government
meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the
offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable
offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held
that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted
irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed,
provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at
the time the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed.
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional
Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
I.THAT THE HONORABLE
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE
EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT
SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II.THAT THE ACT OF THE
HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA
AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE
VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
RULE ON THE ASSIGNED ERRORS.
CASE NO. 14. The complaint for
illegal possession of untaxed blue seal cigarettes against petitioner was filed
on November 3, 1964. He was duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge
on December 21, 1964, manifesting likewise his readiness for trial. It was,
however, postponed to January 18, 1965. Five minutes after 9:00 o'clock on that
day, the case was called for trial, but neither the prosecutor nor the
witnesses had as yet arrived. It took respondent Judge only twenty minutes
before issuing an order of provisional dismissal, which reads thus: "This
case was called for trial at exactly 9:05 A.M. without the presence of the
government witnesses and the government prosecutor. In order not to prejudice
the interest of the government, they were given a time extension; but according
to the counsel it is now 9:25 a.m. and still we do not have here the
presence of the government prosecutor and the government witnesses. In view of
the apparent lack of interest on the part of the government to proceed, let
this case be dismissed provisionally. The bail bond filed by the accused for
his provisional release is hereby cancelled." On that very same day, January 18, 1965, the
other respondent, Captain Felix C. Ochotorena, as Assistant Provincial
Commander, did file anew the very same case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7732. 5 There was motion to quash by petitioner on January 27, 1965 on the
ground that he had been placed in double jeopardy by virtue of the provisional
dismissal on January 18, 1965. 6 Then came the order of March 6, 1965 wherein respondent
Judge granted the motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact of the previous
dismissal being of a provisional character.
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution on March
15, 1965. Then came the challenged
resolution, worded thus: "This case was dismissed by this court because
of the prosecution's apparent neglect to appear when this case was called
several times. ... As the present motion to reconsider is a good demonstration
of prosecution's interest to proceed, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby granted and the case restored to its previous status as a pending case."( reference: G.R. No.
L-25595 February 15, 1974 AGUSTIN TALADUA
vs. FELIX C. OCHOTORENA, ET AL).
QUESTION: Rule on the validity of
the judge’s order. IS double jeopardy present? Reason.
CASE NO. 15. The petition before us arose from a
November 10, 1989 incident when the jeep ridden by private respondent and
Barangay Captain Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden
by herein petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the
former with dust.
Irked by this incident, Mabuyo
followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered the back gate of Rattan Originals
in Tanke, Talisay Cebu. Inquiring from a nearby security guard as to who owns
the Nissan Patrol, he was informed that it belonged to and was driven by
petitioner Dr. Ramon Paulin.
Later, while Mabuyo was
investigating some problems of his constituents in Kilawan at Tanke, Cebu, Dr.
Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed their guns at Mabuyo while
Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses, acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one
of the barangay tanods to call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the
exit of the spouses and their lone companion.
Sensing that they were outnumbered, the spouses put their
guns down and upon the arrival of the police officers, they were brought to the
police station. On the same date, Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a
complaint for "grave threats," against the spouses Paulin and Bacho,
herein petitioners, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5204. On
November 20, 1989, the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave
threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 5213.
The cases were jointly tried and,
on June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu (Branch IX),
acting on a motion of the spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed Criminal
Case No. 5204. On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a, "Motion for
Reconsideration," of the said dismissal order which the court granted in a
resolution dated July 3, 1990.
At the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 5213 on July 5, 1990, petitioners vigorously sought the setting aside of
the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the same was denied
in another resolution.
Not satisfied with the resolution
of respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores, petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a
petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for
preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining order"
with the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, which was
thereafter docketed as Special Civil Action No. CEB-9207 and later re-raffled
to Branch 5 stationed in Cebu City presided over by respondent Judge Celso M.
Gimenez, who dismissed the petition in a decision dated December 19, 1991. The
decretal portion of the decision states:
All the
foregoing considered, for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby
dismissed. Public respondent is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
Crim. Case Nos. 5204 and 5213 and to decide both cases on their merits within
the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued dated May 9, 1991, is hereby lifted
and set aside.
Still not contented, petitioners
have now resorted to the instant petition, arguing that (a) the decision of the
municipal trial court dated June 13, 1990 dismissing the case against them was
a judgment of acquittal, and may no longer be set aside without violating
petitioners' right against double jeopardy; and (b) the regional trial court,
in dismissing the petition in CEB-9207 abused its discretion as it ignored
petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
The main issue to be resolved is
whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5204
against petitioners precludes a subsequent reconsideration or reversal of such
dismissal as the same would violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy.
QUESTION: Ruleon the main issue:
whether double jeopardy exists.
CASE NO. 16.State whether the right of the accused was
violated under the following circumstances:
1.A person charged with rape, but
was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The judge of qualified seduction
instead convicted him.
2.A witness was subpoenaed on
request of the accused but instead of taking steps to compel her attendance;
the judge held the defense responsible for bringing her to the trial, stating
that her testimony would be dispensed with if she failed to appear.
3.In a criminal case for murder,
the fiscal was not ready because his witness was absent. The accused insisted
on his right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition provisionally
dismissed the case without the accused’s express consent.
4.The accused was first prosecuted
for slight physical injuries, but after he had pleaded not guilty, the charge
was changed to serious physical injuries, when it appeared that the wounds
inflicted on the victim after healing, had left permanent scars on his face.
5.Jose obtained sacks of rice from
Maria and issued a check worth 20,000. The check bounced. He was convicted of
BP 22 (Bouncing checks law). He applied for probation and was placed thereon.
Later he was again charged of Estafa, based on the same act.
CASE NO. 17.State whether the right of the accused
against self-incrimination is violated, in the following instances:
1.An unknown assailant murdered the
victim. Three days later, Victor was arrested by the police officer, and
detained in jail. In there, he confessed that he was the murderer. He further
confessed that Romy and Sonny were his companions. They were made to re-enact
how the crime was committed. Is the re-enactment admissible as evidence in
court?
2.Victor was interviewed over the
DXKD, and in said interview, he revealed the truth that it was really him who
murdered the victim. Is the tape recorded/video interview admissible against
Victor?
3.Victor talked to the mayor, and
made the same revelation. Is said evidence admissible against him?
CASE NO. 18. On the right to bail:
1.Who
have the constitutional right to bail?
2.Does a
soldier under court martial custody enjoy the right to bail?
3.Robert
is charged with murder. His case is still under preliminary investigation by
Judge Lupos of the MTC of Polanco. In the course of the preliminary
investigation, the judge arrives at a probable cause of homicide only.(Note:
Murder is non-bailable, but homicide is). The judge then issued a warrant of
arrest but fixed bail at 200,000 pesos. Is the judge correct?
4.Granting
that the judge finds probable cause for murder, is there no way by which Robert
can avail of the right to bail? Explain.
5.Mark
committed estafa in the United States.He fled to the Philippines. USA filed an
extradition request against him. The RTC, pursuant to the extradition
proceedings issued a warrant of arrest against Mark. Does Mark have the right
to be released on bail? Explain.
CASE No. 19.On the right to be presumed innocent:
1.For
purposes of disqualification in an election, Section 4 of BP 52 says:” the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes beforre a civil court or
military court after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact (disqualification). Is this valid?
2.Section
40 of the Local Government Code disqualifies from running for office a “
fugitive from justice in criminal or non-olitical cases here or abroad”. If
applied to one who has not yet been convicted of any offense but was merely
fleeing from trial, would there be a violation of the presumption of innocence?
3.Does
preventive suspension pendente lite violate the right to be presumed innocent?
4.Art.
217 of the Revised Penal Code says that failure of an accountable officer to
produce money in his charge upon demand shall be prima facie evidence of
malversation. Does such law violate the presumption of innocense of the
accused?
5.Art.
315 of the RPC prescribes a period of 3 days from notice wihtin which the
issuear of the check mus pay the creditor, otherwise, a prima facie inference
of deceit constituting false pretence of fraudulent act shall arise. Does this
offend against the contitutional presumption of innocense?
CASE NO . 20.Rosalinda is the daughter of Telesforo. She
was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia (which adopts the jus soli
principle). Her mother is an Australian citizen named Teresa.Telesforo was born
in Daet, Camarines Norte on January 5, 1879, (where he registered as a Spanish
citizen) but died in Australia at the age of 80. Rosalinda is a holder of an
Australian passport and had with her an Australian Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) in 1988.
She went
back to the Philippines, lived in their ancestral house in Daet, married and
had children to a Filipino husband.
She ran
for a congressional seat and won in the district of Daet.
Her rival
files a disqualification case citing:
1.That
Rosalinda is not a Filipino citizen hence disqualified for public office.
2.That
under section 40 of the Local Government Code, “The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position x x x (d) those with
dual citizenship.”
Rule on
the two issues above cited.
