Banas, Mary Rovytte/ People of the Philippines vs Hon. Francis Militante and Rosita Abule GR No. L-57467 October 23, 1982

 DIGEST/ Banas, Mary Rovytte/ People of the Philippines vs Hon. Francis Militante and Rosita Abule    GR No. L-57467     October 23, 1982

Facts:

On September 23, 1980 an information for Violation of BP Blg. 22 was filed against respondent Rosita Abule (Rosita). Before arraignment, Rosita filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy because of a previous criminal case of Estafa that had been filed against her on April 21, 1980 of the same court arising out of the same acts or omission. 

However, the prosecution opposed the quashal of the second Information contending that there is no double jeopardy as both cases are still pending, and that Rosita is charged with two different offenses punishable by different penalties under different statutes.

But on April 21, 1981, the respondent Court dismissed the second case ruling that to prosecute the accused of Violation of BP Blg. 22 would constitute a violation of her constitutional right not to be put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  So the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Order of dismissal as well as the Order affirming it.

Issue: 

Whether or not the order of dismissal of the second case on the ground of double jeopardy proper?

Ruling: 

No. The dismissal of the second case was not proper as the plea of double jeopardy is unavailing. 

Under Section 9, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, the following requisites must obtain in order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused person, to wit: 

1. A valid Complaint or Information or other formal charges sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;

2. a competent Court;

3. the defendant had pleaded to the charge;

4. the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent; and

5. the second offense charged is the same as the first, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or that the second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense or information.

In the case at bar, this lacks the third, fourth, and fifth requisites. Since that the accused herein had not pleaded to the charge of Violation of BP Blg. 22 and that the Estafa case has not been terminated either by a judgment of conviction or acquittal or by dismissal without the express consent of the accused. Moreover, the two offenses charged against her are different offenses as these two imposes specific and different penalties under different statutes. Therefore, the dismissal of the second case was not proper.